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Chapter 1
Introduction
Political decisions are inﬂuenced by special interests. Politicians pay tribute
to organized interests which spend remarkable resources in order to shape
policies in their favor. Considerable research has been undertaken in the
last three decades to understand how interest groups shape policies, and re-
markable insights have been gained. This book deals with lobbying from a
theoretical point of view. Its main objectives are threefold: First, I give a
broad overview of theoretical approaches towards lobbying in chapters 2 to 5
with the aim to survey the main insights of this interesting ﬁeld of research.
Second, I contribute to recent research by presenting two own lobbying mod-
els. Chapter 6 deals with environmental regulation and the instrument choice
of lobbies, and chapter 7 focuses on the inﬂuence of multinational enterprizes
on national regulation. Third, it is shown how theoretical insights might be
used to approach regulation in practice. Chapter 8 deals with the ﬁnal draft
for the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, which is criticized on theoret-
ical grounds.
Before I state my main research questions in detail, let me give some examples
of lobbying issues. It is important to mention in that context that many kinds
of lobbying activities are politically institutionalized and abide by the legal
system. Examples are public campaign spending (up to a certain extent) in
Germany and the United States, or the integration of experts in the political
process through hearings or advisory boards. However, a considerable extent
of lobbying receives no public attention, and the borderline between legal
inﬂuence and illegal corruption is not always as clear cut as it ought to be.
Examples for lobbying activities are abound, even though its eﬀect on the
policy decision can often only be vaguely assessed:
1
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• The German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology is cur-
rently run by Werner Mu¨ller. He was a member on the board of direc-
tors of the energy company Veba from 1992 to 1997 before he joined
the German Government as a crossbench member. Veba merged with
Viag to Eon in 2000, which then decided to acquire a close competi-
tor named Ruhrgas. This acquisition has been vetoed by the German
competition authority (the German Federal Cartel Oﬃce) for competi-
tive reasons. However, there seems to be a strong governmental interest
that this acquisition takes place.
The Minister of Economics currently considers to overrule this veto and
allow the acquisition through a special permit. This is a legal policy
instrument which is only available to the Minister of Economics. It
is intended to allow mergers and acquisitions if they are in the public
interest even though they may have negative competitive eﬀects (and
must be forbidden by the competition authority for this reason). As
this instrument is very rarely used, the public suspected that the fore-
seen special treatment has reasons beyond politics. The suspicion is
that the Minister, a manager who came to politics as a crossbencher,
will possibly revert to business after his incumbency. Does the spe-
cial permit support this step? The government denies this claim. It
got caught up in indecision when it realized that the case stirred up
more public attention than anticipated. The ﬁnal decision is still open,
but there are strong signals that the Minister will make use of this
instrument and overrule the independent competition authority.1
• Technical expertise is often diﬃcult to obtain and politicians must rely
on information by experts who may possibly be biased. Consider for
instance the administration of George W. Bush, whose aﬃliation with
the energy cooperation Enron is now subject to investigation through
congressional panels. The public in the United States has been taken
aback when it learned about these former alliances, which may never
have been known had the company not gone bankrupt. For instance,
the Bush administration appointed Enron managers as experts to the
Federal Energy Board, a political institution which has a strong inﬂu-
ence on energy policy in the United States. These experts had been
proposed by former Enron Chairman Kenneth Lay to the Bush admin-
istration. Other members of this board are reported to own substantial
shares in this company. The question then arises if alliances like these
1http://www.bmwi.de/textonly/Homepage/English%20pages/The%20ministry/mueller.jsp,
Financial Times Deutschland, February 12th 2002
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are simply subject to a lack of unbiased experts, or if this is indeed a
way of camouﬂaged gives and takes beyond politics.2
• As a nice example of how informational lobbying may take place serves
a decision of an advisory commission to the German Bundestag.3 It
prepares the decision about the future development of the computer
infrastructure in the German Bundestag. (In fact, the commission
makes the decision because the body of the Bundestag formally taking
the decision is expected to abide to this advice.4) Under consideration
have been two general concepts, namely a pure propriety infrastructure
based on Microsoft’s Windows platform, and an Open Source infras-
tructure based on Linux. Under consideration is a solution for 150
servers and 5000 clients, which is of considerable value and gives busi-
ness incentives to care about this decision. But there is an additional
reason why this decision is conceived as being important: It is ex-
pected that it emanates a strong signal about the use of Open Source
software by governmental administrations in general, which challenges
Microsoft’s current position.
Hence, Microsoft engaged a professional lobbying institute (lead by a
former Microsoft manager), which started intensive informational lob-
bying: The task was to inform the committee members (in comfort-
able hotel over a three-day weekend) about the merits of proprietary
software solutions and the risks of the Open Source concept. This
prompted counteractive lobbying by the Linux community. Lobbying
eﬀorts on both side increased and ﬁnally culminated in Microsoft’s in-
crimination that committee members (favoring Linux) denounced users
of Microsoft software as being ’undemocratic’ and ’undutiful’. Finally,
it was not only due to Microsoft’s invitation of the committee mem-
bers to a gala dinner at the eve of the decision that oil poured on
troubled water. Interestingly, the resulting committee decision appears
to be quite balanced and can be interpreted as a compromise merging
the merits of both worlds.5 This may be viewed as an indication that
informational lobbying may improve political decisions if all relevant
interests organize.6
2Chicago Sun-Times, Feb. 1, 2002; www.dailybulletin.com; www.c-span.org/enron/.
3Kommission des Bundestags fu¨r Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologie (IuK).
4The decision is made by the A¨ltestenrat of the German Bundestag.
5Opinions may vary to this respect.
6Information on this issue can be found in various issues of the German magazine c’t,
and on http://www.heise.de/fastbin/nt.arcview?d=2002.
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• Companies may possess data which is not available to the public. This
can be used to strategically inform politicians about a certain policy
eﬀect, as will be laid out in chapter 4. For instance, companies may
ﬁnance independent research activities which have the task of evaluat-
ing ﬁrm data. These studies may be published if the gained insights
suit companies’ interests, and may vanish into thin air otherwise. A
case in point is the discussion which came up with the trials against the
tobacco industry in the United States. Several ﬁrms have been accused
of having withheld studies about (negative) health eﬀects of smoking.
As The Economist puts it:7
”...a review published in the Journal of the American Medical Asso-
ciation (JAMA) examined articles about the health risks posed by
passive smoking. The reviews authors found that they could reliably
predict what an article would conclude about the eﬀects of passive
smoking by looking at one simple factor: whether the articles au-
thors had any ﬁnancial aﬃliations with the tobacco industry. (No
prizes for guessing which way results veered when they did.)”
These examples indicate that lobbying occurs in various types, for diﬀerent
reasons and with open outcomes. For instance, the ﬁrst two issues are related
to lobbying through fringe beneﬁts or contribution payments. The other is-
sues focus on lobbying as transmission of information (which may also be
paired with extra beneﬁts). Moreover, they indicate that political outcomes
may be ambiguous. It appears that ﬁerce lobbying by two opposing interests
in the Bundestag case increased the informational base upon which the de-
cision has been cast. In contrast, the other cases indicate that lobbying may
well have negative eﬀects on aggregate welfare.
This book is organized as follows. Chapters 2 to 5 survey theoretical ap-
proaches towards lobbying. I begin in chapter 2 with reduced form and
rather abstract models of political inﬂuence which provide some general in-
sights and have found many policy applications. However, these models treat
the political process mainly as a black box. Newer approaches ﬁll this gap
and provide a more thorough microfoundation for lobbying. They represent
the ’state of the art’ nowadays, and are therefore reviewed in great detail.
Chapter 3 deals with the inﬂuence motive of lobbying and analyzes the ef-
fect of contribution payments on political decisions. The models presented
assume that the politician has complete information concerning the eﬀect of
his policy choice, but he is willing to choose a worse policy from a welfare
7The Economist, May 17th 2001.
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point of view in exchange for money. In contrast, the models of chapter 4
assume that information is asymmetrically distributed: Interest groups are
better informed than the politician about the eﬀect of policy on aggregate
welfare. Interest groups use this advantage to strategically transmit infor-
mation to the politician. This is the information motive for lobbying. A
shortcoming of these branches of literatures is that the links between them
are largely unexplored, albeit in reality lobbying often consists of combined
forms of inﬂuence seeking. Research has only recently begun to consolidate
these two branches. I will pay tribute to these approaches analyzing the
instrument choice of lobbies in chapter 5.
The model presented in chapter 6 provides an attempt to contribute to this
interesting ﬁeld of research. It considers that interests groups ultimately fol-
low the same aim, namely low environmental regulation. However, they may
choose between two diﬀerent ways of inﬂuencing the political process. The
ﬁrst type of lobbying has a strong competitive ﬂavor, because it determines
the distribution of the political rents created through lobbying. It is denoted
as private lobbying, because investments into this kind of activity lead to
private beneﬁts to the lobbying interest group, which are at the expense of
the other. The second type of lobbying caters to the joint interest of in-
terests groups. General lobbying eﬀorts lead to lower overall environmental
regulation, which positively aﬀects all groups. The model investigates condi-
tions under which interest groups prefer private or general lobbying. Hence
it provides a simple ﬁrst step towards the analysis of instrument choice by
lobbies.
Through my approach is more general, it applies lobbying models to envi-
ronmental regulation which is still rarely done. It tries to analyze whether
the existence of individual loopholes to environmental regulation is harmful
with respect to environmental quality. The idea is that although loopholes
are detrimental per se, it may well be the case that they increase lobbying
competition which in turn beneﬁts the environment. As it turns out, this is
the case if the existence of loopholes diverts inﬂuence activities from harmful
general lobbying towards mere redistributive private lobbying.
The second formal analysis of this book is an application of the common
agency framework to the regulation of multinational enterprizes. The moti-
vation for this approach is the perception that the process of globalization
leads to a loss of sovereignty of the nation state. I focus on one speciﬁc
aspect of globalization, namely the increasing importance of multinational
enterprizes. The question is whether the existence of multinational enter-
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prizes in domestic markets leads to lower national regulation. Chapter 7
focuses on diﬀerences in the ﬁxed costs of relocation between national and
multinational companies and analyzes the lobbying incentives of both types
of ﬁrms. It turns out that regulation is ambiguous: The possibility of lob-
bying tends towards stricter regulation of multinational ﬁrms compared to
national ones, because multinationals have smaller stakes in domestic mar-
kets. Negative welfare eﬀects through relocation in contrast tend towards
lower regulation of multinationals.
Empirical research on lobbying is quite scarce, especially when it comes to
European politics.8 Lobbying is often conceived as being immoral and given
the ﬂavor of ’money buying politics’. Maybe it is partly for this reason that
ﬁrms do not provide data about lobbying expenses, and politicians are reluc-
tant to state the extent to which they care about interest groups. Therefore
I leave empirical investigations of lobbying activities aside, but want to deal
with an important topic of regulation in practice, the Multilateral Agreement
on Investment (MAI). Its intention was to provide a general regulation of in-
vestment ﬂows on a multilateral level, comparable to the framework of the
GATT and WTO with respect to international trade.9 The OECD countries
tried to implement this agreement in the mid nineties, which eventually failed
in 1998 partly due to intense lobbying eﬀorts of opposing interest groups. De-
spite its failure, there is considerable chance that a multilateral framework
of this sort will be implemented in the future. The idea of chapter 8 is to
analyze the contents of the ﬁnal draft from an industrial organization point
of view, because multinational companies are mainly present in oligopolistic
markets. To the best of my knowledge, this view on the MAI has not yet
been pursued. The aim is to propose improvements for a possible future
implementation. Chapter 9 summarizes the main insights and concludes.
8Recent empirical approaches towards lobbying are Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and
Baldwin and Magee (2000). Sloof (1997b) gives a comprehensive survey.
9GATT is the abbreviation for ’General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade’, which is the




Reduced form models of
political inﬂuence
I restrict my attention to inﬂuence seeking activities of one or many lobbies
which try to inﬂuence the political decision of an incumbent politician.1 My
approach contrasts with existing surveys on lobbying in several respects.2
First, many surveys cover only certain types of lobbying models, for instance
common agency or signalling models. Surveys which comprise several ap-
proaches typically do not cover all of them comprehensively, or leave certain
types of models aside. To my best knowledge, there is no survey to date
which covers all relevant approaches to lobbying in a comprehensive way, as
the following chapters attempt to do.
Second, many surveys focus on political economy models in the context of
trade theory. This comes naturally, as much of the pioneering research in
lobbying models has been conducted in this ﬁeld of research. However, the
objective of this survey is to give a broad and general intuition of how lob-
bying aﬀects policy. The scope is therefore not restricted to models of trade
theory, but shall cover all relevant topics of policy formation, such as for
instance the provision of public goods, regulation of industries or environ-
mental policy. However, as much of the research has been done in the context
of trade models, reference to trade is given if it is considered crucial for an
understanding of the underlying eﬀects.
1I do not cover election models (Besley and Coate 2001) as well as models focusing on
institutional setups (Bennedsen and Feldman 2000).
2Compare Helpman (1995), Rodrik (1995), Austen-Smith (1996), Sloof (1997b), Pers-
son (1998), Persson and Tabellini (2000), Potters and vanWinden (1996), Ursprung (2000).
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Moreover, newer approaches like the signalling literature, the choice of in-
struments, group formation models or models on lobbying as auctions have
been surveyed seldomly - or not at all. The following chapters try to ﬁll this
gap. They put much weight on micro founded approaches to lobbying and
relate them to the insights of their reduced form counterparts.3
The questions I wish to address in the following chapters are:
What are the welfare eﬀects of lobbying?
For instance, does lobbying increase or decrease welfare? Under what circum-
stances is lobbying welfare enhancing? And what is the type of improvement
achieved through lobbying?
Who beneﬁts from lobbying?
The question arises whether interest groups always beneﬁt if they engage
in lobbying. Or may it be the case that interest groups lobby without any
eﬀect? How does lobbying competition aﬀect the distribution of beneﬁts?
Does the politician beneﬁt from lobbying?
What are relevant policy ﬁelds for lobbying?
This question is closely related to the distribution of beneﬁts. One would
expect that interest groups try to inﬂuence those policy ﬁelds where lobbying
may be successful. What are the characteristics of relevant policy ﬁelds?
Reduced form lobbying models abstract from certain aspects of individual
behavior. Instead, plausible assumptions are used which describe the pre-
sumed behavior of relevant individuals. For instance, the inﬂuence function
approach (chapter 2.1) focuses on strategic interaction between two lobbies,
but leaves the politician and the underlying decision process as a black box.
The politician has no individual objectives, nor does he act as a player in
the game. The political outcome is solely determined through the relative
amounts of lobbying expenditures. As a second example, reduced form elec-
tion models (chapter 2.2) assume that parties can somehow convert money
into votes, which gives them an incentive to collect contributions from special
interests. However, how money turns into votes if voters are rational is left
as a black box.
3This paper deals with theoretical models of lobbying. Empirical research will not
be covered. For a recent survey on empirical investigations, consider for instance Sloof
(1997b).
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The newer approaches covered in chapters 3 to 5 overcome these shortcomings
and provide fully speciﬁed microeconomic frameworks, which makes them
more convincing with regard to their theoretical foundation. But reduced
form models are nonetheless worth being discussed: First and most impor-
tantly, these models lead to insights which are also contained in models with
a sound microeconomic foundation. Hence they combine the beneﬁt of valu-
able general insights with lower costs in terms of theoretical complexity. This
makes them a good starting point for a diverse range of applications. Second,
reduced form models often combine main insights from a diverse set of the
newer approaches. This helps to abstract from particularities which result
from speciﬁc microeconomic setups.
Several surveys exist which cover reduced form approaches extensively.4 Ac-
cordingly, this chapter will only mark the main insights. It serves as an
introduction for the newer microeconomic approaches of chapters 3 and 5.
2.1 Models with an incumbent government
Two types of models analyze how lobbies inﬂuence political decisions of an
incumbent politician: The model by Peltzman (1976) constitutes a regula-
tory approach. It assumes that a politician determines a policy in order to
maximize an exogenously given weighted sum of special interests utility and
aggregate welfare. These weights are exogenous. They can be thought of
as being the outcome of an underlying lobbying process, that is not ana-
lyzed explicitly.5 This approach has found many applications in the con-
text of international trade policy. The policy formation approach by Becker
(1983) analyzes the lobbying process explicitly, but abstracts from the de-
termination of the policy variable by the politician. Instead it introduces an
”inﬂuence function”, which states how realized policies depend on contribu-
tion payments by lobbies. This approach has been applied in the context of
international trade policy and environmental regulation.
4Compare for instance Helpman (1995), Rodrik (1995) or Potters and van Winden
(1996).
5Chapter 3 describes models, in which the lobbying process determines the political
weights endogenously.
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2.1.1 The regulatory approach
The regulatory approach was ﬁrst proposed by Stigler (1971) and formal-
ized by Peltzman (1976). It describes policy formation when special interest
groups inﬂuence the decision maker, although this process is not explicitly
analyzed. Instead, the model assumes that an unmodelled lobbying stage
determines a political objective function, which reﬂects the fact that the
politician is partially captured by special interests. This objective function
serves as a starting point for the analysis.
Peltzman describes a general analysis and an application to price regulation.
The general analysis determines the size of the interest groups and the re-
sulting political contributions. However, the particular application to price
regulation found greater acceptance in the literature and will be described
in the following.
In the model, the politician maximizes a payoﬀ which depends on the policy
choice p and on the utility level of the interest group, V .6 The utility of the
interest group depends on the policy choice and an exogenous parameter θ.
The direct eﬀect of the policy on the politician’s payoﬀ can be interpreted as
his interest in aggregate welfare. Thus, he chooses p to maximize
max
p
W [p, αV (p, θ)] .
Note that α is an ampliﬁcation parameter which aﬀects the politician’s care
for the interest group’s payoﬀ.7 By assumption, W is concave and depends
negatively on the policy level, i.e. Wp < 0 and Wpp < 0 around the equi-
librium policy. The eﬀect of interest group utility on the politician’s payoﬀ
is positive and concave and W has the following properties with respect to
the second argument: W2 > 0, W22 < 0. The utility level of the interest
group increases in p and is concave, Vp > 0, Vpp < 0. For instance, V may
represent proﬁts of an organized industry which lobbies for higher producer
prices. The exogenous parameter θ might then be interpreted as a cost or
6The model can be easily extended to multiple interest groups (Peltzman 1976,
Long van and Vousden 1991). For expositional purposes I restrict the analysis to one
group.
7If the payoﬀ function of the politician is separable in aggregate welfare and interest
group utility, the maximization problem can be rewritten as maxpW (p) + αV (p, θ), and
W represents aggregate welfare. This speciﬁcation corresponds to the separable setup of
the common agency approach in chapter 3. I do not assume separability for the moment
and stick to the original setup for reasons which will become clear later, but point at the
underlying similarity between the regulatory and the common agency approach.
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demand parameter, which aﬀects proﬁts for a given price level. The eﬀect of
p on W represents the welfare eﬀect of a price increase in this case which is
negative, because consumers prefer low prices.8
The model characterizes the equilibrium and derives comparative statics re-
sults. First, note that it incorporates the case of a benevolent politician for
the limiting case of α = 0. In this case, special interests are unimportant to
the politician, and he chooses the welfare maximizing policy (for instance the
competitive price level in the case of price regulation). As α→∞, aggregate
welfare becomes unimportant and the politician chooses the policy which
maximizes the utility of the interest group (i.e. the monopolistic price). For
intermediate weights, the politician sets a policy which reﬂects a compromise
between various interests.
More important groups ﬁnd it easier to inﬂuence the political decision. Con-
sider an increase in the exogenous weight α, capturing the idea that the
special interest group becomes more important to the politician. Obviously,
the equilibrium policy favors the interest group more, and p increases in α.
But a shortcoming of the model also becomes apparent: It cannot explain
which factors determine the importance of an interest group, and hence α.
The common agency models of chapter 3 ﬁll this gap.
Finally, consider an increase in the exogenous parameter, and suppose that θ
aﬀects the interest group negatively (for instance θ might be interpreted as a
proﬁt reducing cost parameter). There is a direct and an indirect eﬀect on the
endogenous variable p. The direct eﬀect is the economic adjustment of the
endogenous variable by the interest group, which is independent of political
considerations. For instance, if production costs increase, proﬁt maximizing
behavior leads to a price increase. The indirect eﬀect reﬂects the change in
relative utility levels and the induced political adjustment. As the utility
level of the special interest group falls, a marginal policy change in favor of
the interest group leads to a higher marginal gain for that group, which in
turn leads to an increase in p. So in this case, the economic adjustment and
the political eﬀect work in the same direction, and p increases.
8This example also demonstrates the shortcoming of this approach, which results from
the partial analysis character: Aggregate welfare obviously depends on proﬁts as well. The
payoﬀ to the interest group is also negatively aﬀected by an increase of the price level,
because producers also consume their income. These aspects will be laid out in chapter
3. But the general insights of this model do not crucially depend on these aspects. The
mentioned eﬀects can be interpreted as the dominating ones, resulting from an increase in
the price level.
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The same intuition applies if the exogenous variable aﬀects the utility level of
the interest group in a positive way, for instance if θ is a parameter reﬂecting
increasing demand. Again, the direct eﬀect works towards an increase of the
policy variable. But now the political eﬀect pushes towards a decrease in p.
The utility level of the interest group increases, which lowers the marginal
gain of a policy increase on producers’ utility level. In this case, the indirect
policy eﬀect dampens the direct economic adjustment, and p increases less
than without political considerations.9
A more general insight can be obtained from this analysis independent of the
speciﬁcations of the utility and welfare functions. If the exogenous parameter
changes, political adjustments spread the resulting gain or burden over all
relevant groups. The reason is that the politician cares about all interests
and tends to distribute the eﬀects of exogenous changes across all groups.10
Several authors have applied the regulatory approach to trade policy or
environmental regulation.11 As an example, consider the determination of
trade policy in a small country (Hillman 1982). The politician maximizes a
weighted sum of consumer surplus and industry proﬁts of an import compet-
ing industry. An exogenous decline in the world market price then leads to an
increase in the domestic tariﬀ: Consumers gain from an exogenous decline in
the price of the importable, and producers lose. Since the politician balances
these eﬀects, he compensates the loser at the cost of the winners. This leads
to a tariﬀ increase, which partly oﬀsets the decline in the world market price.
The tariﬀ increases more if the politician puts a higher weight on the interest
of the producer lobby. However, he does not grant full compensation for the
decline of the world market price.
9If the politician’s payoﬀ function is separable in aggregate welfare and utility payoﬀ
as indicated in footnote 7, the political eﬀect vanishes. The direct eﬀect prevails and p
must increase in this case.
10This also leads to the insight that extreme groups face relatively much regulation,
whereas moderates faces less. Consider for instance a monopolist or a competitive ﬁrm.
Both set the price either high or low. Since the regulated price lies somewhere in between,
both groups gain relatively much regulation. In contrast, oligopolistic ﬁrms choose inter-
mediate prices. Regulation has then only small eﬀects on the resulting price level, because
regulation always tends towards intermediate prices.
11For instance, Hillman (1989), Long van and Vousden (1991), or Maggi and Ro-
driguez Clare (2000) consider trade policy. Hahn (1990) analyzes environmental regu-
lation.
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2.1.2 The policy formation function approach
The following model picks the choice of contribution payments by two oppos-
ing lobbies as the central theme (Becker 1983, Becker 1985).12 The analysis
provides no rationale for the decision problem of the politician. Rather,
it assumes that the relative contribution levels of both groups completely
determine the policy outcome. The political sphere is represented by a pol-
icy formation function, which maps contribution payments into policies. Its
properties are common knowledge among all groups. Groups choose their
contribution levels non-cooperatively.
The political decision has only redistributive eﬀects. One lobby gains from
redistribution via subsidies and the other lobby looses, because subsidy pay-
ments are ﬁnanced through taxes.13 The collection of tax revenues and the
payment of subsidies are associated with deadweight-losses. This implies
that a dollar of tax revenue induces a cost on the tax payers which exceeds
one, and the beneﬁt of a dollar of tax income to the receiving group is less
than one. The budget is always balanced by assumption. Hence the analysis
can be restricted to the determination of a uniform per capita tax. The tax
then determines the level of per capita subsidies available to the recipients.
Each group is characterized by an exogenous number of group members. The
model diﬀerentiates between the total payments collected from the members
of a particular interest group, and the resulting amount of contributions
paid to the politician. The total amount of contributions aﬀects the policy
choice. It depends positively on the total payment of the group members, and
negatively on the group’s size. This reﬂects the free-riding aspect of group
membership, because the same amount of payments leads to less contribu-
tions if the group is large. The total payment of the group is the product
of per capita payment times the number of members. The lobby determines
the amount of per capita payments per member and maximizes total utility
of all group members.14 The implemented policy depends on the relative
12Findlay and Wellisz (1982) propose a political economy model of trade-protection,
which follows the same lines. A protectionist and a free-trade lobby choose the amount
of labor devoted to lobbying simultaneously, which determines the tariﬀ level. This ap-
proach is known as the ”tariﬀ formation function approach”. It reﬂects the same ideas as
the approach discussed in this chapter, namely that policy is determined by the relative
amount of contribution payments.
13The assumption that the political decision is a zero sum game is not important for
the main insights. The crucial assumption is that both groups have opposing interests in
a common policy dimension.
14The two approaches of Becker (1983) and Becker (1985) vary slightly with respect to
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amounts of each groups’ contribution payments to the politician.
The setup can be summarized as follows: Ci are contributions, ni the size,
and ai the per capita payment of a member of group i (the same notation
applies for lobby j). p(Ci, Cj) is the realized policy, which depends positively
on the contribution payments of lobby i, and negatively on those of lobby j.
U(p, ai) is the utility level of lobby i, and −U(p, aj) is the utility of lobby
j. Contributions are a function of total payments by all group members,
mi ≡ aini, and the group size ni. Each lobby chooses the amount of per
capita payment to maximize group utility. So for group i:15
maxai U(p[Ci(mi, ni), Cj(mj, nj)], ai) with mi ≡ aini
pi > 0, pii < 0, pj < 0, pjj > 0
Cm > 0, Cmm < 0, Cn < 0
Up > 0 and Upp < 0, Uai < 0,
and for group j analogously.
First note that in a symmetric equilibrium, both groups pay the same amounts
of contributions and the resulting policy is neutral: Lobbying does not lead
to privileges for any group (i.e. p = 0). In this case, both groups engage in
pure counteractive lobbying, because lobbying serves only to oﬀset the lob-
bying expenditures of the opponent. There is scope for cooperation between
lobbies, as both groups can jointly reduce their payoﬀs without aﬀecting the
policy outcome.16
Second, a group increases contribution payments if its lobbying eﬀorts be-
come more eﬃcient (i.e. contributions have a higher eﬀect on p). The policy
turns to its favor, the payoﬀ increases, and the opponents’ payoﬀ falls. Both
lobbies increase contributions: The marginal beneﬁt of contributions by the
more eﬃcient lobby increases. Hence it increases contributions, and its payoﬀ
rises, whereas the payoﬀ to the opponent falls. This in turn also induces more
lobbying by the opponent, because payoﬀ functions are concave in p. The
increase in contributions by the opponent dampens the unfavorable policy
eﬀect, but does not reverse it. Note that in a symmetric equilibrium, a joint
and symmetric eﬃciency increase has no eﬀect on the equilibrium policy. It
this and some other minor aspects.
15Note the slight abuse of notation: For instance, Cm denotes the ﬁrst derivative of
Ci with respect to total payments of group i, mi. pi is the ﬁrst derivative of the policy
variable, p, with respect to contributions of group i, Ci. The same deﬁnitions apply for
group j if not stated otherwise.
16Aidt (1997) analyzes cooperation between lobby groups in a related setup (compare
also chapter 3.3).
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only induces higher amounts of contributions. This leads to the surprising
result that similar lobbies gain from being ineﬃcient.17 Hence in a sym-
metric equilibrium, groups’ utility is maximized if lobbying has no marginal
eﬀect on policy, for instance if the institutional setup forbids lobbying. A
lobby beneﬁts only from a uniform eﬃciency increase, because only relative
contribution levels matter.
If the exogenous group size of a lobby increases, two opposing eﬀects are at
work. First, more members imply higher total payments, which increases
their political inﬂuence. But as the number of members increase, the free-
riding eﬀect becomes more important, which tends to reduce contributions.
As the latter eﬀect becomes more severe in large groups, small groups are
relatively more successful. They beneﬁt from an increase in group size, in
contrast to large groups which lose.
Next, consider an increase in the deadweight loss associated with redistri-
bution. For instance, tax collection has higher deadweight costs if demand
elasticities increase, or the redistribution of tax revenue may become ineﬃ-
cient if bureaucracy increases. Lobbies bear the deadweight costs, because
tax payers pay higher taxes for a dollar of tax income, and recipients get less
money from each government dollar. For instance, if tax collection results in
higher deadweight losses, the utility level of the tax payers decreases. As a
result, lobbying becomes more important for this group, and contributions
increase. This tends to decrease eﬀective redistribution, which induces oﬀset-
ting lobbying eﬀorts by the opposing group. In sum, the policy shifts toward
the preferences of the group with the increased deadweight costs, and redis-
tributive eﬀorts decrease. Note that both groups lose, because tax payers face
higher deadweight losses and increase costly lobbying. Tax recipients lobby
more and get fewer subsidies. Hence less eﬃcient policies are less likely to
gain political support, and eﬃcient policy instruments dominate ineﬃcient
ones from the lobbies’ point of view.18 Consider for instance a symmetric
equilibrium: More eﬃcient policy instruments increases the welfare of both
groups, as both groups face less incentives to engage in costly counteractive
lobbying. Thus the restriction of available policy instruments to eﬃcient ones
increases aggregate welfare.
Several applications of this model exist, once again predominantly in the con-
text of international trade policy.19 For instance Pecorino (1997) analyzes
17Compare chapter 6 for a variation on this theme (Polk 2002c).
18This result contrasts to the results of Grossman and Helpman (1994a), who explain
why less eﬃcient policies may be more successful in a political contest.
19Compare Findlay and Wellisz (1982), Wellisz and Wilson (1986) or Pecorino (1997).
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the short run and long run lobbying eﬀorts of a declining import-competing
industry. The paper abstracts from lobbying competition, but incorporates
free-riding of ﬁrms in the import-competing industry. The author determines
conditions such that lobbying expenditures increase in the short run if the
industry faces an exogenous decline (i.e. decreasing world market prices).
Moreover, the author asks if lobbying is self-defeating over time. Intuitively,
increased protection leads to higher proﬁts and the sector expands. Two
eﬀects result: Lobbying has a higher marginal beneﬁt if the sector is large
because more ﬁrms beneﬁt from a tariﬀ-induced price increase. On the other
hand, free-riding among ﬁrms becomes more important which tends to de-
crease lobbying eﬀorts. If the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates, increased protection
leads to expansion, reenforcing lobbying incentives. But if free-riding is im-
portant, lobbying becomes self-defeating: In this case, successful lobbying
leads to larger industries, and the free-riding eﬀect decreases total lobbying
eﬀorts.20
2.2 Election models
Some models analyze lobbying in the context of elections, where two can-
didates compete for political oﬃce. Each lobby pays contributions to one
or both candidates.21 By assumption, contribution payments to a party in-
crease the chance of election. The process by which money turns into votes
is left as a black box, i.e. the models are reduced in the sense that the voting
decision of rational individuals are not picked as a central theme.
The literature distinguishes between two motives for contribution payments:
Lobbies may pay contributions in order to increase the winning chance of a
party which promises a preferred policy outcome (for instance high protec-
tion, low regulation, or low tax payments). This motive is called an electoral
motive, because contributions are aimed at increasing the election probability
of a preferred candidate with a given policy position. In contrast, contribu-
tions with an incentive motive are paid to extract a favorable policy from
a candidate once he is voted into oﬃce, given that the probability of being
elected is ﬁxed. As lobbies and parties behave strategically and, dependent
For an application in the context of environmental regulation compare Damania (1999)
and chapter 6 (Polk 2002c).
20For related arguments consider also Kruger (1993).
21Hillman and Ursprung (1988), Baron (1989), Wilson (1990), Magee, Brock and Young
(1989), Damania (1999).
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on the speciﬁc setup, anticipate each other’s behavior, most models implicitly
incorporate both motives for contribution payments.
The following chapter describes the approaches by Baron (1989) and Hillman
and Ursprung (1988). Both models formalize political competition between
two parties engaged in an election. The chance of success is solely determined
by the relative amount of contributions each party obtains, not by the policy
choice itself. Contributions are paid by lobbies, whose utility levels depend on
the realized policy variable after the election. Favorable policies are exclusive
to lobbies which contribute, and all others are excluded from these beneﬁts.
Lobbies pay contributions before the election takes place. They maximize
expected utility. Apart from this general setup, both models diﬀer concerning
their speciﬁc assumptions:
Baron (1989) assumes that parties beneﬁt from being in oﬃce. The value
of holding an oﬃce is exogenous for each party. As votes depend solely on
money (and not on the policy), parties need to attract contributions in order
to win the election. They oﬀer favorable policies to lobbies which contribute
money. Special interest policies are costly for the politician, but increase the
utility level (and contributions) of the lobbies. A continuum of lobbies exists,
which diﬀer with respect to their policy stakes. In the ﬁrst stage, each party
announces a uniform policy oﬀer. It consists of a policy parameter, which
determines the beneﬁt to a participating lobby. This beneﬁt increases in the
individual policy stake of each lobby. It also states a uniform contribution
request, which must be paid in order to beneﬁt from the policy oﬀer if the
candidate is elected. Each lobby observes the oﬀer in the second stage of
the game, and decides whether to accept or not. Lobbies form expectations
about the winning probability of each candidate, anticipating how money
inﬂuences votes. These decisions to buy access to the parties determine
the equilibrium probabilities of electoral success. The political equilibrium
is characterized by rational expectations of all lobbies, which requires that
anticipated probabilities match the realized election outcome.
Contributions are paid before the election, but special interest policies of a
party are only realized if the party wins the election. Policies are exclusive, in
that lobbies which do not contribute are excluded from the policy gain if the
party wins. Hence contributions serve as an access device to the politician
in this setup.22 The equilibrium consists of the policy vectors oﬀered by
22Compare chapter 4.2 for signalling models of access buying. Note two points about
this model: First, it assumes that parties are not able to cheat, and the proposed policy
is always realized ex post. This can be justiﬁed if one thinks of the political process as
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the candidates, the contribution payments of the lobbies, and the resulting
equilibrium probabilities.
Consider ﬁrst a symmetric equilibrium, which is characterized by an equal
election probability for both candidates. It has the following comparative
statics properties: More lobbies buy access to a party, if it oﬀers higher
levels of specials policies to the groups. These oﬀers are high if the value
of being in oﬃce to a candidate is high, and they decrease in the cost of
providing these extra beneﬁts. The expected utility of a lobby increases in
the parties’ net beneﬁt of being in oﬃce, as the parties are more eager to
oﬀer favorable policies in exchange for money. The expected payoﬀ to a party
increases if the beneﬁt of being in oﬃce is high: Even though it caters more
to special interests (which is costly), it will never give up its full beneﬁt of
being in oﬃce.
Obviously, parties beneﬁt from a ban on lobbying in a symmetric setup.
The chance of being elected does not change with lobbying. Both parties
attract the same amount of contributions, but are forced to oﬀer costly special
interest policies in order to keep the equal chance of election. Lobbies gain in
this situation. The welfare eﬀect of a prohibition on lobbying depends on the
welfare eﬀect of the special interest policies. To assess its impact, suppose
that special beneﬁts are deviations from a ﬁrst best policy (for instance
free trade or the ’right’ amount of environmental regulation). Then, welfare
decreases through lobbying. Moreover, contributions are paid which tend to
be unproductive (i.e. advertisement campaigns, etc.).
Further insights can be gained if one introduces asymmetries between the
parties. Baron analyzes four types of asymmetries, namely incumbency ad-
vantages, diﬀerences in the value of being in oﬃce, exogenous campaign
funds, and alignment of candidates to distinct sets of interest groups. As
an example, consider party A which faces an incumbency advantage. This
means that its election probability exceeds one half if contributions are iden-
tical. In equilibrium, party A has a higher winning probability and caters
less to special interests. The reason is as follows: If the party tends to win
the election, access to this party becomes more important. It must cater less
to special interests to induce the same amount of contributions as without
the advantage. Thus smaller special beneﬁts induce a trade-oﬀ: Catering
less to special interests saves costs of providing them, but tends to lower
a repeated stage game. Second, note that the access buying motive implies that a lobby
may pay contributions to both parties in order to get special treatment for any election
outcome. Payments to both parties cannot be explained through the electoral motive.
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the probability of electoral success. In equilibrium, party A partly sacriﬁces
the incumbency advantage in exchange for lower political costs. The author
shows that total contributions to this party increase if the incumbency ad-
vantage is small, because more interest groups lobby the likely winner despite
decreasing beneﬁts of access. In contrast, contributions decline if the incum-
bency advantage becomes suﬃciently high. Moreover, total contributions to
both parties decrease with the extent of the incumbency advantage. Voters
anticipate that party B has a smaller probability of electoral success, and
contributions decrease if the disadvantage grows. This latter eﬀect domi-
nates the increase in contributions to party A. As a result, lobbies gain from
a close election race, because they are more important for the parties.
The model of Hillman and Ursprung (1988) develops a closely related setup,
which diﬀers from the above in two ways.23 First, parties align with one lobby
by assumption. Lobbies have opposing interests, which introduces compe-
tition between lobbies. This aspect is not present in the former approach,
because lobbies get private beneﬁts from special interest policies, which do
not aﬀect other lobbies.24 Second, the choice sets of the lobbies diﬀer, which
induces important diﬀerences. In the ﬁrst stage, the parties announce policy
platforms. In the second stage, lobbies decide about the amount of contri-
butions paid to properly aligned parties. The choice set of the lobbies is not
restricted to the decision to buy access for a given price, as was the case in
the above analysis. Rather, lobbies determine the optimal contribution pay-
ment, which determines the election outcome. This aspect is important with
respect to the underlying motive for campaign contributions: The Baron
model focuses on the inﬂuence motive for campaign contributions, as money
helps to induce a favorable policy treatment. The Hillman and Ursprung
model focuses on campaign contributions for electoral motives, because pol-
icy oﬀers are ﬁxed when lobbies decide on the contribution oﬀers. They are
paid to increase the winning probability of the aligned party.25
The model provides an application to trade theory. The political equilib-
23For comments on this paper compare Hofer and Woodruﬀ (1994), and Hillman and
Ursprung (1994).
24One extension in Baron (1989) also covers this case.
25This distinction is not as clear cut as the above discussion suggests, because both
models eventually incorporate both motives: In the Baron model, even though lobbies take
the winning probability as given when they decide whether to participate, this anticipation
is rational and correct in equilibrium. Thus lobbies implicitly determine the equilibrium
winning probability of each party. Moreover, parties in the Hillman and Ursprung setup
anticipate how lobbies choose contributions. Therefore anticipated contribution payments
inﬂuence the policy choice as well.
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rium determines the amount of protection which results if a foreign lobby
pays contributions to a free-trade party, and a domestic import compet-
ing industry supports a protectionist party. It also determines the winning
candidate. Particularities depend on the characteristics of the underlying im-
perfect market structure. Wilson (1990) extends this model to incorporate
deadweight-losses from protection, which supports the insight that ineﬃcient
policy instruments tend to reduce the incentives to engage in lobbying.
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Contribution payments to an
incumbent government
The approaches discussed in the following assume that interest groups pay
contributions to an incumbent government in order to induce favorable pol-
icy outcomes. The chapter focusses on the incentive motive of lobbying, i.e.
contributions provide incentives for the politician to deviate from a ﬁrst best
policy choice. In contrast to the reduced form models of chapter 2, these
models fully specify the objective function of both the politician and the in-
terest groups. This allows for an analysis of strategic interaction amid interest
groups, and vis a vis the politician. Moreover, lobbies’ objective functions
result from a fully speciﬁed microeconomic general equilibrium model, and
are not made ad hoc. This allows further insights concerning the resulting
equilibrium policies.
The models of this chapter make use of theoretical results from common
agency theory, which has been pioneered by Bernheim andWhinston (1986a).1
The theory comprises situations in which a set of principals inﬂuences the
decision of a common agent. It is a general setup and not speciﬁc to lobbying.
Hence lobbying applications of the common agency framework are crucial for
an understanding of how special interest inﬂuence works. Applications have
been introduced by Grossman and Helpman (1994a), and several authors
thereafter. The focus lies in applications to international trade theory. This
chapter follows this line. Lately, other applications have been introduced,
i.e. Aidt (1998) in the context of environmental regulation, and Neven and
1Compare also Bernheim and Whinston (1986b).
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Ro¨ller (2000) in the context of regulation theory.
To embrace this, this chapter starts with an introduction to common agency
theory. Recent theoretical extensions, which are not yet reﬂected in lobbying
applications, will be discussed brieﬂy in a digression. In chapter 3.2, I will
discuss an application to international trade theory, which nowadays serves
as a workhorse model. Even if the main insights are stated in the context of
international trade theory, the underlying intuition is generally valid for this
class of lobbying applications. Extensions to this model will subsequently be
discussed in chapter 3.3.
3.1 Common agency theory
The common agency framework is characterized by an agent and a set of
principals (Bernheim and Whinston 1986a). The agent chooses an action p
among a feasible set of actions, which aﬀects his own utility,W (p), and that of
the principals i = 1...n, with individual utility levels Ui(p). The utility levels
of the principals depend on the agent’s chosen action. Hence principals face
an incentive to inﬂuence the agent’s choice. In the ﬁrst stage of the game,
each principal makes a contingent contribution oﬀer to the agent. These
oﬀers are individual payment functions Ci(p), which state money rewards to
the agent for each possible action he might choose. The individual payment
functions thus map actions into money payments. The agent observes the
contribution oﬀers and decides which action to choose in the second stage of
the game. Then principals make their payments which, in conjunction with
the chosen action, determine the individual utility levels of all players.
Lobbying applications ﬁt well into this framework: The politician (the agent)
decides about a policy p, which aﬀects the payoﬀs to the principals (the
interest groups), who in turn try to inﬂuence his choice. In the ﬁrst stage
of the game, each lobby decides on a non-negative contribution function
Ci(p), which is a menu oﬀer to the politician, stating how much money
will be paid for each alternative policy realization. In the second stage,
the politician observes these oﬀers, determines the policy, and collects the
respective money oﬀers. The politician may well have preferences about the
policy. For instance, a benevolent politician will prefer the policy which
maximizes aggregate welfare. Any deviation then reduces aggregate welfare,
and thereby his utility level. Contribution oﬀers by special interest groups
serve to compensate the agent for any deviation from the welfare maximizing
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policy.2 On the other hand, if the politician is completely opportunistic, he
cares only about contributions, but not about the policy itself.
A political equilibrium consists of a policy choice p∗ and a set of individual
contribution schedules {C∗i (p)}i. The equilibrium [{C∗i (p)}i , p∗] determines
the utility levels of the lobbies, Ui(p
∗)−C∗i (p∗), and the utility of the agent,
W (p∗) + C∗(p∗)), with C∗(p∗) ≡∑iC∗i (p∗), such that
• The politician maximizes his payoﬀ through the choice of p∗, given the
set of equilibrium contribution functions C∗i (p), i.e.
p∗ ≡ argmaxW (p) + C∗(p).
• Each lobby maximizes its utility level through the choice of a contribu-
tion function C∗i (p), given the set of contribution functions of the other
lobbies, C∗−i(p), and the resulting policy vector p
∗.3
The setup assumes that individual utility levels are separable in money in-
come and the policy eﬀect, which will be discussed in more detail later.
Furthermore, any contribution oﬀer is reliable in the sense that contribution
payments are indeed made after the policy choice. Finally, lobbies are fully
informed about the payoﬀ functions of all players: The equilibrium depends
on the ability of all lobbies to calculate how policies aﬀect the other lobbies,
and the payoﬀ to the politician. In contrast, the politician only needs to
observe the contribution oﬀers. Hence his behavior does not depend on his
knowledge of the utility functions of the lobbies. Nonetheless, the equilibrium
exists even if he is imperfectly informed.
Note that the common agency framework is characterized by non-cooperative
behavior on behalf of all players, i.e. the lobby groups behave non-cooperatively
vis a vis each other and vis a vis the politician. This approach is very gen-
eral, and there is no restriction on how policy choices aﬀect the payoﬀs to the
2Hence money payments have the ﬂavor of bribes to the politician, which are paid in
exchange for favorable policies.
3This can be formalized as follows: Each lobby chooses a function C∗i (p), given C
∗
−i(p),
such that the following properties hold:
– p∗ ≡ argmaxW (p) + C∗(p).
– There exists no function Coi (p) and an action p
o, such that
(i) po ≡ argmaxW (p) + Coi (p) + C∗−i(p), and
(ii) Ui(po)− Coi (po) > Ui(p∗)− C∗i (p∗).
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lobbies. Consider for instance the case of a proﬁt decreasing environmental
regulation, and assume that only industry lobbies are organized. All lobbies
prefer less regulation to more, i.e. they follow a common interest in low
regulation. In this case, lobbying competition does not entail competition
about the policy choice, but only concerning the money payments necessary
to induce a certain level of regulation. As each lobby has an incentive to pay
as little as possible, incentives to free ride exist. Next, consider an extension
introducing green lobbies which prefer high regulation. Then beside the free-
riding aspect, lobbies compete against each other concerning the policy itself.
The equilibrium of the common agency framework, which will be discussed
below, captures all these aspects.
Properties of the equilibrium: Bernheim and Whinston characterize any pos-
sible subgame perfect Nash-Equilibrium [p∗, {C∗i (p)}i] for the class of com-
mon agency games: Apart from some feasibility constraints, the equilibrium
policy choice p∗ maximizes the utility level of the politician, given the set of
optimal contribution functions C∗i (p). (This shouldn’t surprise you much).
Second, for no lobby exists a policy po which increases its payoﬀ to such an
extent that it is able to compensate the politician for a deviation towards
po. If this were the case, the lobby would be able to modify its contribu-
tion schedule and induce the politician to choose po instead. As a result,
both would be better oﬀ and [p∗, {C∗i (p)}i] cannot be an equilibrium. The
condition can also be interpreted in an alternative way: The optimal policy
maximizes the joint payoﬀs to the politician and any one lobby, given the
contribution payments of all other lobbies. If this were not the case, then
the lobby and the politician could jointly increase their payoﬀs by a policy
deviation and an appropriate compensation.4 The third property is a condi-
tion on the contribution function of each lobby, which states that each lobby
oﬀers zero contributions for at least one policy choice. Suppose this condi-
tion did not hold for any lobby. Then this lobby could slightly reduce all
its contribution oﬀers by the same amount, without aﬀecting the behavior of
the politician: The politician compares all possible policy outcomes and the
associated contribution payments. This optimization problem is not aﬀected
if a lobby reduces all contribution oﬀers uniformly. Thus a lobby is able
to increase its payoﬀ without aﬀecting the policy choice, if not at least one
contribution oﬀer is zero. This cannot be an equilibrium.5
4To be precise, note that the model does not incorporate cooperative behavior, which
is necessary to form such a coalition. Rather, think of the ’joint deviation’ as a deviation
which is induced by the lobby through an appropriate modiﬁcation of the contribution
function.
5The ﬁnal two properties can be formalized as follows: (a) The equilibrium satisﬁes
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Truthful strategies and existence: Many equilibrium sets of policy choices and
contribution functions may exist. The question thus arises if some of these are
focal. This leads to the introduction of a reﬁnement to the Nash-equilibrium,
i.e. the notion of ”truthfulness”: A principal’s strategy is truthful relative
to some reference policy p′ if his contribution function reﬂects his true will-
ingness to pay for a deviation from p′ to any policy alternative p. Thus, a
truthful contribution schedule consists of oﬀers which make a lobby indif-
ferent between the reference policy and any policy alternative p for which
it oﬀers positive contributions.6 A truthful Nash equilibrium is character-
ized by truthful strategies of all principals, and the reference policy is the
equilibrium policy p∗.
The authors further show that the set of best response correspondences of
any principal contains a truthful strategy.7 This implies that all individuals
can do best and reveal their true willingness to pay for any possible policy
alternative, given the opponents’ anticipated contribution oﬀers C−i(p), and
the implied policy choice by the politician.8 Hence truthful Nash equilibria
may be interpreted as being focal. However, they are not necessarily unique.
Moreover, truthful Nash equilibria have two properties, which help to iden-
tify whether an equilibrium is unique. First, any truthful Nash equilibrium
implies an eﬃcient policy choice, and each eﬃcient policy choice can be sup-
ported by a truthful Nash equilibrium. That is, the policy outcome of the
lobbying game is the same as the policy choice of a benevolent politician!9.
p∗ = argmaxUi(p) +W (p) + C∗−i(p) for all i, and (b) for any lobby i exists an individual
policy pi, such that this policy is chosen by the politician (pi = argmaxW (p)+C(p)) and
C∗i (p
i) = 0.
6Note that there may be policy alternatives which reduce the utility level of the indi-
vidual compared to the reference policy. The principal oﬀers zero contributions for these
alternatives, because contributions are restricted to be non-negative. His payoﬀ for these
policy alternatives is then smaller than the payoﬀ of the reference policy.
7The concept of truthful Nash equilibria is related to the revelation principle in the
context of mechanism design, which states that any equilibrium in a Bayesian game can
be represented by a truthful direct mechanism (a well known application is the Groves-
Clark mechanism). The authors show that we can restrict attention to a certain type
of equilibrium strategies in the menu auction game, namely truthful strategies. However,
note two diﬀerences: We do not search for mechanisms which implement a certain outcome,
but reﬁne the set of Nash equilibria for a certain mechanism. Moreover, we do not focus
on equilibria in dominant strategies but on Nash-equilibria.
8Note the importance of the assumption that all principals are fully informed. Only
then is it possible to compute truthful contribution schedules accordingly.
9Eﬃciency here refers to the policy choice and the resulting payoﬀs to the principals
and the agent, but not necessarily to eﬃciency measures related to aggregate welfare: An
eﬃcient policy has the property that no other policy exists, such that the payoﬀ to one
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For instance, if free trade is the ﬁrst best policy among a set of organized in-
terest groups, competition between lobbies leads to a free trade equilibrium.
Or, if lump sum transfers and alternative ineﬃcient redistributive means
among interest groups are available, lump sum transfers will be used. The
intuition is as follows: All lobbies consider only their private beneﬁts and
costs arising from any policy deviation, but ignore its social eﬀects. But the
politician internalizes these eﬀects, as all lobbies reveal their true assessment
of each policy alternative and how it aﬀects their utility levels. Hence the re-
sulting policy is eﬃcient. This result is also important in order to determine
whether an equilibrium is unique: If the common agency model is applied to
a policy setup which has a unique ﬁrst best policy, this policy is also realized
in the lobbying game as a unique truthful Nash equilibrium.
Second, suppose lobbies are able to communicate with each other and form
coalitions in order to achieve a deviation from a certain political outcome. An
equilibrium is coalition-proof if no coalition exists such that its members can
jointly deviate from this equilibrium and thereby increase their payoﬀs. The
authors show that all truthful Nash equilibria are coalition-proof, and the set
of payoﬀs to the players in coalition proof Nash equilibria coincide with the set
of payoﬀs in truthful Nash equilibria. Hence if a unique coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium can be identiﬁed in a cooperative game theory setting in which
lobbies are able to communicate, this equilibrium is also the unique truthful
Nash equilibrium in a non-cooperative game if lobbies cannot communicate.
Digression: New approaches to common agency theory10
Bernheim and Whinston derive their results under the assumption that prin-
cipals’ payoﬀs are separable with respect to income and the policy eﬀect:
Gi(p) = Ui(p) − Ci(p). This assumption leads to equilibria which are in-
dependent of distributive concerns, as money can be costlessly transferred
across all agents. Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997) suspend this as-
sumption and show that the main results still hold: Each individual has a
truthful strategy among its set of best response correspondences, truthful
equilibria always exist and are Pareto-eﬃcient. Moreover, the authors apply
their model to a lobbying game, which oﬀers an interesting insight: Re-
member that the common agency game yields an eﬃcient policy choice with
respect to all principals of the game. This implies that an eﬃcient policy will
be realized, such as for instance free trade, even if special interest groups in-
principal can be increased without a reduction in the payoﬀ to at least one other principal.
10This digression is not essential to the understanding of the following lobbying appli-
cations.
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ﬂuence the policy decision and all individuals are organized as lobbies. This
result can be extended: Even if not all individuals are organized as lobby
groups, policy eﬃciency results as long as the agent cares at least a little
bit about aggregate welfare. This is a strong result. It implies that if the
politician is not completely opportunistic and benevolent at least to a small
extent, lobbying leads to eﬃcient policy choices in any case. The reason is
that if the politician considers aggregate welfare, he internalizes the eﬀects
of the policy on all individuals and chooses an eﬃcient policy.
What determines the payoﬀs to principals and agents?11 As is obvious, pay-
oﬀs to the agent and the principals depend on the degree of competition
between the interest groups. For instance, if lobbies follow a common inter-
est, they uniformly prefer a certain policy vector. In this case, there is no
incentive for any group to induce a deviation from this policy through contri-
butions. Hence, if conﬂict of interest among lobbies is weak, low contribution
payments can be expected in equilibrium. In contrast, if competition between
interest groups is intensive, competitive bidding may lead to a high payoﬀ for
the politician, and low payoﬀs to the lobbies. Laussel and Le Breton (2001)
derive general conditions in a cooperative game setting which determine the
coalition-proof Nash equilibrium payoﬀ to the agent. The main insight is
that the agent may get no rent if the core of the game is non-empty. Non-
emptiness of the core means that a policy and a resulting set of payoﬀs exist
such that no possible coalition of principals has an incentive to deviate from
this equilibrium. Hence non-emptiness of the core reﬂects the fact that inter-
est groups follow a common interest. This in turn implies that a zero payoﬀ
equilibrium for the agent exists. However, as multiple equilibria may arise,
the pure existence of this kind of equilibrium does not imply that it is in
fact realized. The authors state additional conditions such that a zero-payoﬀ
equilibrium for the agent is indeed realized. Moreover, they characterize the
payoﬀ to the agent for the event that these conditions are not satisﬁed and
the agent receives a positive payoﬀ.
Konishi, Le Breton and Weber (1999) focus on the relationship between
coalition-proof Nash equilibria and the truthful Nash equilibria of the com-
mon agency game. They ﬁrst note that two types of coalition-proofness can
be distinguished: A ”weakly coalition proof equilibrium” is immune to the
deviation of a coalition, which strictly increases the payoﬀ to all participants
in the coalition. This is a rather weak requirement, as possible deviations
may exists which increase the payoﬀ to some members of the coalition, but
11This question has also been elaborated in some applications, which will be discussed
in chapter 3.3.
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not all. An equilibrium which is immune to the latter type of deviation is
called ”strictly coalition-proof equilibrium”. The authors show that these two
types of coalition-proof equilibria are related to each other in the common
agency setup, because each strictly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium is also
weakly coalition-proof. The reverse does not hold. Moreover, the authors
consider the relationship between strictly coalition-proof Nash equilibria and
strong Nash equilibria. The latter are characterized by the requirement that
any possible coalition is a candidate for a deviating coalition, whereas the
strictly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium requires this only for a subset of the
winning coalition. The authors show that these sets coincide if the politician
receives no payoﬀ in equilibrium. Intuitively, the payoﬀ to the politician is a
measure for the degree of competition between the interest groups. A small
payoﬀ coincides with weak conﬂict of interest, i.e. small lobbying competi-
tion. The stricter requirement of a strong Nash equilibrium does not further
restrict the set of equilibria, as lobbies with a common interest can not gain
even if they can form a coalition with groups outside the winning coalition.
Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2001) extend the static common agency game to
a dynamic setup. They employ the equilibrium concept of truthful Markov
Perfect equilibria and show that a result related to the static model can be
derived, namely that the set of truthful Markov Perfect equilibria is outcome
equivalent to the set of dynamic coalition-proof Markov Perfect equilibria.
Moreover, the introduction of the dynamic setting allows for the agent to
become more powerful vis a vis the principals, as he may possibly be able to
inﬂuence the amount of competition between the interest groups over time
through his policy choices in the past. As strong competition between the
interest groups increases his payoﬀ, he may be willing to accept ineﬃcient
policy outcomes in the ﬁrst stages of the game in order to increase competi-
tion. The authors state conditions on the payoﬀ structure of the model such
that these types of ineﬃciencies can not arise.
Kirchsteiger and Prat (2002) propose an alternative equilibrium concept for
the class of common agency games, which they call ”natural equilibrium”.
The authors believe that truthful strategies are too complex to be played
in real world situations, as these strategies consist of complex oﬀers of gives
and takes for an entire set of policy alternatives. The proposed alternative
equilibrium relies on ’natural’ strategies: A natural strategy consists of a
positive contribution oﬀer for at most one policy alternative, and zero for all
others. The idea is that principals focus on one preferred policy alternative
and ignore all others. It is shown that natural equilibria always exist, but
that they are not necessarily eﬃcient and coalition-proof. Moreover, the
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authors provide experimental evidence suggesting that neither truthful nor
natural equilibria are played by individuals in laboratories.
3.2 The basic lobbying model
The ﬁrst application of the common agency framework to a lobbying game
is due to Grossman and Helpman (1994a).12 The authors determine the
structure of protection in a small open economy, where import competing
and exporting sectors organize as lobbies. I will start with a sketch of the
model and discuss extensions in chapter 3.3. These also refer to the context of
international trade. The rest of this chapter will therefore be biased towards
trade theory, as other policy applications are still rare.
Assume a small open economy which takes world market prices as given.
The economy consists of an exogenous set of sectors. Each sector produces
a homogenous product with labor and a sector speciﬁc input. A good is
considered importable if imports and domestic production satisfy domestic
demand for that good, and domestic producers compete with foreign ﬁrms.
A good is called exportable if the domestic sector exports the good and
competes with foreign ﬁrms in the foreign market. Individuals have identical
indirect utility functions which are separable in income and consumer surplus
from consumption. Each individual owns speciﬁc factors of one sector. Factor
speciﬁc income increases in the domestic price level of that particular good.
Income consists of factor income, wage income, and tariﬀ revenue.
Individuals diﬀer only with respect to their sector speciﬁc income. They
are grouped along sectoral lines, where each group or sector consists of a
fraction αi of individuals, with
∑
i αi = 1. By assumption, an exogenous
number of sectors organize lobbies and inﬂuence the political process. αL
is the fraction of all organized individuals.13 Each lobby faces a trade-oﬀ
concerning the structure of protection, which determines domestic prices:
The factor income of a group depends positively on the output price of that
speciﬁc sector; moreover tariﬀ revenue increases in the prices of all sectors,
and decreases in the size of the export subsidies. These two aspects work
12For empirical evidence consult Goldberg and Maggi (1999), and Gawande and Bandy-
opadhyay (2000).
13The model abstracts from incentives to organize as lobbies, and assumes that a set
of lobbies is given exogenously. Mitra (1999) extends the basic model to consider group
formation, which will be discussed later in this chapter.
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towards higher protection. But the members of a lobby act as consumers
as well, and consumer surplus decreases in output prices. This eﬀect tends
towards lower protection.
The politician determines domestic prices through the choice of the tariﬀ
structure.14 The timing of the game is familiar from the common agency
setup: In the ﬁrst stage of the game, each lobby determines its contribution
schedule non-cooperatively, which maps every possible domestic price struc-
ture into a contribution oﬀer. In the second stage of the game, the politician
observes these oﬀers and decides on the structure of protection. He maxi-
mizes a weighted sum of aggregate welfare and contribution payments. The
relative weight put on aggregate welfare is denoted by α.
Besides the general results of the former chapter, which characterize the equi-
librium, the following main insights are worth mentioning: First, the model
gives a microeconomic foundation for the reduced form regulatory approach
discussed in chapter 2.1: The reduced form approaches assumes that the
government determines the tariﬀ structure in order to maximize a weighted
sum of aggregate welfare and contribution payments. The common agency
theory tells us to focus on truthful contribution schedules, which reﬂect the
eﬀect of a marginal policy change on the payoﬀ to that particular group.
Hence if the politician maximizes a weighted sum of aggregate welfare and
truthful contribution schedules in the common agency approach, he in fact
maximizes a weighted sum of aggregate welfare and special interest utility.
This is exactly what the reduced form regulatory approach assumes.










where ti is the tariﬀ or subsidy in that sector, Ii is a dummy variable which
equals one if the sector is organized (and zero otherwise), z∗i is the equilibrium
ratio of domestic outputs to imports, and ε∗i is the (positively deﬁned) im-
port demand elasticity in the sector. The equilibrium tariﬀ is positive if the
group is organized as a lobby, and negative otherwise, i.e. organized import
competing sectors receive positive protection through import tariﬀs; unorga-
nized import competing sectors receive negative protection through import
subsidies.15 Intuitively, lobbies care for income and consumption. The in-
14Note that world market prices are exogenously given and independent of the home
country.
15Analogous results hold for the exporting sectors.
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come interest dominates with respect to the own sector: A high output price
increases factor incomes, which outweighs the loss in consumer surplus of
that good. The consumption eﬀect dominates in all other sectors, as a lobby
receives no factor income there and the gain from tariﬀ revenue is too small.
As a result, each lobby prefers consumption subsidies in all other sectors
except its own, where it prefers a tariﬀ. This is where conﬂict of interest be-
tween lobbies comes into play: From a lobby’s perspective, some of the other
sectors are also organized and lobby for high prices of their good and low
prices in all other sectors. Thus lobbying eﬀorts partly oﬀsets each other. In
sum, all organized sectors obtain positive protection. Sectors which are not
organized do not inﬂuence the politician. They receive negative protection.
The resulting equilibrium tariﬀ of an organized sector increases in the share
of domestic production, because large sectors gain much from a marginal
increase in protection and have an incentive to lobby intensively. But high
protection also entails a two-fold cost: First, the social cost of protection is
high in sectors with large import demand elasticities. The equilibrium tariﬀ
structure entails some Ramsey-like elements. Sectors facing inelastic import
demand receive more protection, because the welfare loss through protection
is relatively small. Moreover, this aspect becomes unimportant if the politi-
cian does not care much about aggregate welfare, and protection increases.
Second, high protection also implies a cost for the organized interest groups
in their role as consumers. If the fraction of organized individuals is large,
consumer interests become more important and protection declines in orga-
nized sectors. In unorganized sectors, negative protection increases as the
consumption interests of organized lobbies become more important. Note
that even if the politician has no concern for aggregate welfare at all, the
level of protection is limited due to the fact that lobbies partially internalize
the cost of protection.
How does conﬂict of interest aﬀect the equilibrium policy? Suppose only
one sector is organized as a lobby. The equilibrium policy is a tariﬀ in the
organized sector, and negative protection in all others. The lobby increases
its income through high protection in its own, and consumption rents through
negative protection in all other sectors. This is politically feasible, because
there are no opposing forces if only one lobby exists. It also implies that if the
size of the organized lobby is negligibly small (αL = 0), lobbies’ consumption
interests become unimportant, and the political equilibrium entails positive
protection in the organized sector and free trade in all others. Moreover, the
lobby receives the full surplus of its inﬂuence: Each lobby pays contributions
which exactly compensate the politician for the policy he would have chosen
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if that lobby was not active. If only one lobby exists, this reference policy
is the free trade equilibrium. The lobby compensates the politician for the
protectionist policy deviation, and the politician receives a payoﬀ which is
equivalent to his free trade payoﬀ. The lobby gets all the extra rent through
the political interaction.
Note that the general common agency framework predicts that lobbying com-
petition yields an eﬃcient policy choice. Eﬃciency refers to the set of prin-
cipals and the agent, notably the politician and all existing lobbies. If only a
fraction of sectors organize as lobbies, the politically eﬃcient outcome is not
equivalent to the eﬃcient welfare maximizing policy, which is free trade. The
reason is that the politician and the lobby can increase their joint payoﬀ by
a deviation from free trade. This deviation imposes costs on all other indi-
viduals, which is only fully internalized if all individuals organize as lobbies.
If this is not the case, ineﬃcient outcomes occur.
Suppose next that all sectors organize as interest groups. Each group tries
to increase protection in its own sector and reduce protection in all others.
Special interests are fully opposed in this case. Free trade emerges in the
political equilibrium. Intuitively, each lobby ignores social costs and tries to
induce high protection in its own, and low protection in all other sectors.
Truthful contribution oﬀers reﬂect these incentives. The politician is thus
able to internalize all eﬀects through policy deviations. He implements the
free trade outcome if all groups participate in the political contest. More-
over, he captures a rent through the political context. The politician will
implement the same policy as without lobbying, and receives contribution
payments in equilibrium. The reason is that each lobby must engage in lob-
bying to prevent an individually disadvantageous outcome. If a lobby does
not participate, lobbying by its competitors implies negative protection in
its own and positive protection in all other sectors. Lobbying engagement
is thus necessary to prevent this unfavorable outcome, and the best possible
policy from a lobby’s point of view is free trade. Hence lobbies are trapped in
a prisoner’s dilemma. I now discuss if there is scope for lobbying cooperation
in this case.
3.3 Extensions
The basic lobbying model makes some particular assumptions which will
be suspended in the following. It abstracts from lobby cooperation, but
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indicates that scope for cooperation exists if lobbies with opposing interest
are organized. It assumes that a single policy instrument is available to the
politician and abstracts from the question of instrument choice. Finally, the
analysis is restricted to a small country with a given world market price.
This implies that the politician (as the agent) can uniformly decide on the
policy without taking strategic interaction with other agents into account.
3.3.1 Policy choice
Consider ﬁrst the question of policy instrument choice. The basic lobbying
model abstracts from this question, because there is only one instrument
available. But it leaves room for conjectures. Suppose an eﬃcient and an
ineﬃcient policy instrument are available. The conjecture is that the amount
of lobbying competition determines the instrument choice: Suppose that a
single group is organized and no lobbying competition prevails. In equilib-
rium, the lobby receives all of the surplus resulting from the political game.
It compensates the politician for the cost of providing the service, which is
lower if the eﬃcient instrument is employed. Hence a lobby facing low com-
petition prefers a more eﬃcient instrument, because this decreases contribu-
tion payments to the politician. Next, suppose that all groups are organized
and compete with each other. The contribution payment of each lobby is a
compensation for not deviating from free trade. The deviation (and hence
compensation) is smaller if the policy instrument is ineﬃcient, because the
costs of providing services is higher for the politician. Hence compensations
are smaller with ineﬃcient instruments. Consequently, lobbies prefer inef-
ﬁcient policy instruments when competition is severe.16 In other words: If
competition among lobbies is weak, the ability to lobby is a beneﬁt, and
more eﬃcient instruments decrease compensation payments. In contrast, if
competition among lobbies is severe, the ability to lobby is a necessary duty
16This conjecture conﬂicts with the insight of Becker (1983) (compare also chapter
2.1), who ﬁnds that competing lobbies prefer eﬃcient instruments to ineﬃcient ones. The
reason for these diﬀerent ﬁndings is the type of eﬃciency enhancement under consideration:
Becker considers redistribution between tax payers and tax recipients. In his model, a
policy becomes more eﬃcient if one group can increase its utility level without harming
its opponent. For example, more eﬃcient means to collect taxes reduce shadow costs,
which allows a lobby to increase its payoﬀ given the utility level of its opponent. This has
a competition reducing eﬀect. In contrast, in the Grossman and Helpman setting with
strong conﬂict of interest, more eﬃcient policy instruments increase lobbying competition.
Each lobby compensates the politician according to the joint utility level of a coalition of
the politician and his opponents. This payoﬀ, and the induced compensation payments
by each lobby, increases with more eﬃcient policy means.
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in order not to remain unheard in the political process. In this case, lob-
bies prefer ineﬃcient means, because this reduces obligatory compensation
payments.
Several authors extend the basic lobbying game to the choice between vari-
ous policy instruments but do not explicitly discuss the relationship between
the degree of competition and policy eﬃciency (Maggi and Rodriguez Clare
2000, Rama and Tabellini 1998, Dixit 1996) For instance, Dixit (1996) ex-
tends the analysis to production subsidies and taxes, and consumption sub-
sidies and taxes. This separates the diﬀerent motives for lobbying: Interest
groups lobby for high producer prices in one’s own sector, and high pro-
duction taxes in all other sectors in order to increase factor income. Note
that production taxes and subsidies do not aﬀect consumption prices, because
these are determined through consumption taxes and consumption subsidies.
Hence, incentives to lobby for high factor incomes are separated from incen-
tives to lobby for low consumption prices. In equilibrium, organized sectors
face production subsidies, and unorganized sectors face production taxes.
This tax structure determines producer prices, which increases the income of
the organized sectors on behalf of the unorganized. Consumption prices in
turn depend on consumption taxes and consumption subsidies. Their equi-
librium structure depends on the trade-oﬀ between higher consumption rents
through consumption subsidies, and higher tax revenue through consumption
taxes. In equilibrium, goods which are consumed by organized lobbies above
average face consumption subsidies. Goods which are unimportant to lobbies
face consumption taxes. If all individuals are identical, this latter trade-oﬀ
is exactly oﬀsetting and no consumption taxes and subsidies result.
Rama and Tabellini (1998) analyze two interest groups which compete with
respect to one policy variable and coincide with respect to the other. The
economy consists of two sectors. The unorganized sector produces only with
labor. The import competing organized sector produces with labor and capi-
tal. Factor owners of the latter sector organize along factor lines, i.e. a lobby
of workers and a lobby of capitalists exist. The available policies are a price
increasing tariﬀ, which beneﬁts the workers and the capitalist alike, and a
minimum wage in the import competing sector, which increases the payoﬀ
to the workers at the expense of capital owners. The authors show that a
tariﬀ redistributes income towards capitalists, and leads to allocative ineﬃ-
ciencies: The organized sector expands if protection is high, which attracts
labor from the unorganized sector. The minimum wage works against the
allocative ineﬃciency. Labor becomes more expensive, which tends to oﬀ-
set the initial incentive to expand production. The minimum wage corrects
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for the allocative ineﬃciency, given that a tariﬀ exists. Hence labor politics
redistribute income between capitalists and organized workers, and imply a
second best outcome. Moreover, these policy instruments are strategic com-
plements: The politician has an incentive to increase the minimum wage if
the tariﬀ is high, because it corrects for allocative ineﬃciencies.
Maggi and Rodriguez Clare (2000) analyze the choice between voluntary
export restraints, import taxes and import quotas. They derive conditions
for the use of each instrument. Resulting policies depend on the relative
political weights of foreign lobbies to domestic importers, and on the shadow
costs of taxation.
3.3.2 Strategic interaction between governments
The basic common agency game and the basic lobbying model assume that
the agent can set the policy independently. There is only one agent, who
therefore takes no strategic interaction with other agents into account. For
instance, the basic lobbying model assumes that the country is small and
world market prices are given. This implies that the government is able to
set trade policies uniformly. It can ignore possible countervailing measures
of foreign governments.
Grossman and Helpman (1995b) consider strategic interaction between two
governments, and extend the basic lobbying model accordingly.17 The exten-
sion is relevant to the common agency model more generally: The govern-
ments now constitute two agents, which face inﬂuence from distinct sets of
principals (the lobbies) in their home countries. Countries trade with each
other, which establishes the link between domestic tariﬀ structures. As a
consequence, governments can no longer independently respond to lobbying
activities, but need to take strategic interactions with the other government
into account.
There are two countries, which have the same characteristics as in chapter
3.2. Countries trade exclusively with each other, which means that import
17Other models analyze the eﬀects of trade protection and incentives to join a free
trade agreement, without considering strategic interaction between agents. For instance,
Grossman and Helpman (1995a), and Maggi and Rodriguez Clare (1998) analyze the
incentives of governments to join a free trade agreement when governments are subject
to lobbying. For an empirical investigation of these questions, see Baldwin and Magee
(2000).
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demand and export supply as well as the endogenous tariﬀ structures deter-
mine world market prices. The tariﬀ structure in each country is a result of
the political interaction between domestic lobbies and the government, and of
the strategic interaction between both governments. The timing of the game
corresponds to that of the basic lobbying game. The model assumes that
lobbies inﬂuence only their domestic governments, but not the government
of the foreign country.
Consider the case in which governments set trade policies non-cooperatively.
Each lobby’s payoﬀ now depends on the trade policies of both countries, and
not only on the domestic country. Accordingly, a contribution schedule maps
each domestic tariﬀ structure into money oﬀers for any given trade structure
of the foreign country. An equilibrium of this modiﬁed game is deﬁned by
a set of truthful contribution schedules of lobbies in each country and the
resulting structures of protection in each country, such that the contribution
oﬀers and the resulting trade policies are mutual best responses.18
The resulting structure of protection reﬂects two elements. The ﬁrst is the
political aspect, which is the same as in the basic lobbying model: Due to
political pressures, organized sectors tend to gain protection at the expense
of unorganized sectors. Protection in a sector is high if the politician cares
much for money, the group is small, and the sector is large. The second
aspect is that protection also depends on strategic considerations by the
governments. The outcome is an additional tariﬀ component, which mod-
iﬁes the tariﬀ structure through a terms of trade component. This terms
of trade eﬀect, which increases domestic tariﬀ revenue, is familiar from the
early strategic trade literature (Johnson 1954): It implies an export tariﬀ
for exporting sectors, and an import tariﬀ for importing industries, which
decreases in the import demand or export supply elasticities of the foreign
country. Intuitively, high foreign elasticities imply strong foreign quantity
reactions to domestic trade measures, which increases the deadweight loss of
protection.19
The political element and the terms of trade eﬀect may reinforce or dampen
18Note that domestic contribution oﬀers are not observed by the foreign country. This
implies that governments cannot set their trade policies dependent on the contribution
oﬀers of the foreign lobbies, which in turn implies that lobbies do not set their contribution
oﬀers to inﬂuence the foreign country. The deﬁnition of the equilibrium reﬂects this:
Contribution oﬀers and trade policies are best responses to the other country’s trade
policy, but not to foreign contribution oﬀers.
19Note that the small country assumption of the basic lobbying model can be interpreted
as inﬁnite foreign supply and demand elasticities.
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each other. Consider for instance an organized importing industry. Political
pressures work towards an import tariﬀ. So does the terms of trade eﬀect,
and both reinforce each other. Next consider an organized exporting industry.
The political element works towards an export subsidy, but the terms of trade
motive favors an export tax. In this case, the eﬀects work against each other.
The resulting trade structure depends on the relative strength of both eﬀects.
How do political parameters aﬀect protection? Consider for instance a case
in which the domestic government becomes less benevolent, and contribu-
tions become more important.20 This implies that lobbying costs decrease
and protection increases (compare chapter 3.2). But a change in the domestic
trade structure now also aﬀects the foreign country, because lobbies oﬀer con-
tributions in anticipation of the resulting tariﬀ structures. Organized foreign
exporters face an incentive to oﬀset increased domestic protection through
an increase in export subsidies, or a decrease in export taxes. Hence, the
strategic interaction of both governments works against the initial eﬀect of
increased protection, and trade enhancement by the exporting country tends
to oﬀset the initial increase of trade protection by the importing country. As
a result, increased domestic government sensitivity to special interests then
beneﬁts organized lobbies of that country. Moreover, the terms of trade and
domestic welfare of this country increases. This is a surprising result: A
government which gets more aligned to special interests tends to increase do-
mestic welfare through the implied strategic reaction of the foreign country.
However, this result depends crucially on the assumption that the foreign
government does not change its own responsiveness to special interests in
response.
Consider next a setting allowing governments to set trade policies coopera-
tively, and assume lump sum transfers between countries are feasible. In this
case, protection results only as a reaction to political pressures, but not for
terms of trade reasons. The terms of trade aspect has a mere redistributive
eﬀect between both countries, and implies a deadweight loss. Not surpris-
ingly, a corresponding lump sum transfer is a Pareto-improvement for both
countries. It will be realized if cooperation is possible. The structure of
protection is as follows: A lobby which competes with an unorganized sector
in the foreign country receives positive protection. If both lobbies are orga-
nized, the politically stronger sector faces protection. A sector is stronger vis
a vis the foreign lobby if the domestic government is more aligned to special
interests, the sector is large, or the domestic supply and demand elasticities
20Moreover, assume that import demand and export supply elasticities are constant,
such that we can abstract from terms of trade considerations in the following.
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are small. In the case of identical countries, strategic interactions fully oﬀset
each other and free trade emerges.21
3.3.3 Incentives to cooperate
The common agency framework and the basic lobbying model indicate that
lobbies face incentives to cooperate. Lobbying leads to excessive contribu-
tions if interest groups compete with each other. Consider for instance the
basic lobbying model if all sectors organize as interest groups: Each lobby
pays contributions, but the equilibrium policy remains free trade. This is
the same outcome as if no contributions where paid at all. However, the
zero contributions outcome is not a non-cooperative equilibrium, as lobbies
face incentives to deviate from it. Hence, scope for cooperation exists. In
contrast, suppose that lobbies do not compete at all, which is the case if the
consumption share of each lobby is negligibly small. Then, the joint payoﬀ to
all lobbies is the sum of the individual payoﬀs in the non-cooperative game
setting. Hence no scope for cooperation among lobbies exists.
Rama and Tabellini (1998) analyze the incentives of labor and capitalist lob-
bies to cooperate. Tariﬀs and minimum wages make up the available policy
instruments (compare the preceding paragraphs about the topic of instru-
ment choice). The authors derive conditions such that cooperative lobbying
leads to higher payoﬀs than non-cooperative lobbying. Particularly, this
tends to be the case if the sum of the joint payoﬀs between the government
and any of the lobbies is high compared to the payoﬀ to a coalition consisting
of all lobbies and the government. Intuitively, if the government achieves a
high joint payoﬀ with any of the two lobbies alone, it is able to outplay the
lobbies against each other and beneﬁt from ﬁrm conﬂict of interest between
lobbies. In contrast, if the joint payoﬀ to a coalition of all players, that is the
government and both lobbies, is high, there is an interest to include all rele-
vant groups in the political process, even if lobbies behave non-cooperatively.
This is the case of low lobbying competition, where gains from cooperation
are small.22
21Compare Levy (1999) for an analysis of cooperative trade policy determination in a
dynamic lobbying framework.
22Compare Laussel and Le Breton (2001), and the digression in chapter 3.3, on the
general intuition underlying this argument. In this speciﬁc setup, both groups follow the
same interest with respect to the tariﬀ, but opposing interests with respect to the minimum
wage.
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Aidt (1997) analyzes cooperation between labor interests and capitalists in a
Heckscher/Ohlin-framework. The author does not apply the common agency
framework, but uses a reduced form policy formation function approach.
There is always scope for cooperation because both lobbies engage in costly
counteractive lobbying. Free trade is more likely to occur with cooperative
lobbying than with non-cooperative lobbying. Moreover, trade protection
occurs in the cooperative setting, only if lobbies diﬀer substantially with
respect to their lobbying power when they compete, or with respect to the
bargaining positions if they cooperate.
3.3.4 Group formation
Lobby groups are not single entities, but rather consist of individuals who
contribute to the group’s activities. This is of importance, because the beneﬁt
of lobbying has the characteristic of a public good if the induced policy
change through lobbying aﬀects all individuals in society and it is not possible
to exclude anybody from it. Hence incentives to free-ride within lobbies
may result, and the question arises under which conditions interest groups
emerge.23 Although this question has been raised and discussed by Olson
(1965) in the early beginning of public choice theory, this ﬁeld of research
has long been left aside, but recently faces greater interest again.
Olson (1965) asks which groups are more likely to overcome the free-rider
problem and thus may be able to form a lobby. He focuses on two factors,
namely group size and social pressure. His idea is that the beneﬁts of lobby-
ing dilute with an increasing number of group members. Hence, individual
incentives to provide the public good are higher in small groups than in large
groups. It is more likely that small groups are able to overcome the free-
riding problem if group formation is to be expected at all. Moreover, social
pressure may be a means of inhibiting free-riding. As it is easier exerted in
small groups, this aspect also tends to increase the likelihood that if interest
groups emerge, then they are small.
Damania and Fredriksson (2000) analyze the incentives to free-ride in a setup
where two ﬁrms have a common interest in low environmental regulation.
Each ﬁrm may either abstain from lobbying, lobby alone, or join an industry
wide lobby consisting of both ﬁrms. In the latter case, lobbying costs are
evenly shared across both ﬁrms. Hence, if lobbying occurs, the politician
23If lobbying serves to provide a private good to the members of the lobby, and individual
members can be excluded, free riding is of no concern (Baron 1989).
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always faces one lobby and is exactly compensated for a policy deviation
(compare chapter 3.2). The authors state conditions such that free-riding on
the other ﬁrm’s lobbying expenditures, joint lobbying, or unilateral lobbying
occurs. The outcome depends on the eﬀect of environmental regulation on
aggregate welfare and proﬁts.
The static setup is then extended to an inﬁnitely repeated game. The idea is
that even though free-riding may be optimal in the single stage game, joint
lobbying may occur with the inﬁnite time horizon. Firms may ﬁnd it optimal
to play a trigger strategy: contribute as long as the other one does, but if
the opponent defects from cooperation, return to the optimal behavior of
the one-shot Nash-equilibrium from then on. Thus defection results in free-
riding by both ﬁrms, hence no lobbying occurs. With this strategy, each ﬁrm
faces a trade-oﬀ when it has to decide whether to defect from cooperation or
not: Defection increases proﬁts of that ﬁrm in the single stage game, because
it beneﬁts from the opponent’s lobbying without contributing. The cost of
defection is that nobody lobbies in the future, and proﬁts in all future stages
of the game decrease. Hence cooperation depends on the relative amounts
of proﬁts with and without lobbying, and on the ﬁrms’ discount rate. If the
latter is small, future proﬁts are important and the cost of defection tends
to be high. It is more likely that ﬁrms overcome the free-riding problem in
this case.24
Mitra (1999) abstracts from incentives to free-ride within interest groups. He
extends the basic lobbying model (compare chapter 3.2) and focuses on the
entry decision of lobbies to participate in the political process to determine
the equilibrium number of active lobbies and the resulting degree of lobby-
ing competition.25 Groups are heterogenous with respect to ﬁxed costs of
organization, but identical otherwise. Moreover, each group knows how high
the entry costs of the potential participants are. The idea is that lobbies are
able to anticipate who enters in equilibrium, which allows them to derive the
beneﬁt of one’s own entry. Then, each group enters if the beneﬁt of entry
exceeds the ﬁxed costs of organization in equilibrium.
The beneﬁt of participation (gross of entry costs) consists of the utility gain
from the induced policy change and the contribution payments necessary to
24Moreover, the authors show how collusion in the output market aﬀects lobbying coop-
eration. It becomes more likely if collusion is strong, because the cost of defection increases
in this case. A high degree of collusion also increases equilibrium contribution payments,
which reduces environmental taxes.
25The approach is closely related to the analysis of endogenous market structure in
industrial organization theory.
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achieve it. The utility gain is positive, because policies deviate to its beneﬁt
if a group becomes active. Contribution payments are costly. In equilibrium,
they reﬂect the eﬀect of the induced policy change on all other interest groups
and aggregate welfare (compare chapter 3.1).26
The author shows that the beneﬁt of entry declines in the number of ac-
tive lobbies: On the one hand, lobbying competition aﬀects the structure
of protection: Positive protection for organized groups decrease because op-
posing interests tend to cancel each other out if many sectors organize. In
contrast, negative protection of unorganized sectors increases, because the
beneﬁt on behalf of the organized increases. It can be shown that the ﬁrst
eﬀect dominates the second, and active lobby groups gain from low lobby-
ing competition. Hence the political beneﬁt of being active is small if many
groups are present. On the other hand, beneﬁts of entry depend negatively
on the necessary equilibrium contribution payments. If many groups are ac-
tive, contribution payments tend to be high due to pure number counting.
But necessary compensation payments per lobby decrease if lobbying com-
petition is strong, as well as the compensation for the decline in aggregate
welfare. The total eﬀect on contributions is thus ambiguous, but it can be
shown that the negative eﬀects dominate the positive ones. Hence the beneﬁt
of entry declines if the number of active groups is large.
As all groups diﬀer only with respect to their ﬁxed costs of entry but are
identical with respect to all other variables, each group is able to calculate
how many groups will enter and how many will stay out. Hence in equilib-
rium, the number of lobbies as well as who enters is uniformly determined.
Those lobbies who do not organize anticipate that the cost of organization
exceeds its net beneﬁts, whereas those who enter anticipate that the degree of
lobbying competition is small enough such that the beneﬁt of entry exceeds
its costs.
The author extends the model and derives comparative static results. For
instance, if more individuals gain from factor speciﬁc income, the degree of
lobbying competition declines. Intuitively, if more individuals beneﬁt from
high factor income through positive protection, less individuals can be ex-
ploited through negative protection. The net beneﬁt of being active declines.
Thus less interest groups organize. Moreover, if the concern for contribution
payments increases, the number of lobbies increases. The politician caters
26If this was not the case, the interest group could decrease contribution payments for
all possible policy outcomes, which increases its payoﬀ without aﬀecting the equilibrium
policy choice.
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more to active lobbies in this case, which increases incentives to organize.27
Finally, if the assumption of homogenous groups is relaxed, it can be shown
that sectors beneﬁt more form organization if they are small, face inelastic
demand, and have large capital stocks.
27Note that the eﬀect on the equilibrium structure of protection is ambiguous in this
case, and positive protection of the organized may increase or decrease: If the politician
caters more to interest groups, positive protection increases for a given number of interest
groups. But more groups organize and lobbying competition increases, which tends to
decrease protection. The total eﬀect is ambiguous. Negative protection of the unorganized
increases in any case, because more individuals gain from exploitation of the unorganized,





Models which analyze contribution payments assume that the politician is
perfectly informed about the eﬀect of the policy at stance. Lobbying serves
as a means to bribe a self interested politician who is willing to deviate from
the ﬁrst best policy in exchange for money. But this incentive motive for
lobbying is not necessarily the only reason why politicians listen to interest
groups. This is especially the case when policies are chosen under imperfect
information. For such a setting, this chapter gives an alternative explana-
tion of why politicians respond to interest groups. An important feature of
this approach is that the argument does not rely on the assumption that
politicians are self-interested. Rather, even benevolent politicians have an
incentive to listen to interest groups when they are imperfectly informed.
This is the information motive to listen to interest groups, because it gives
politicians a chance to improve political decisions .
If lobbying serves as a signalling device, it may help to improve political
decisions. For instance, the politician might be unsure about the preferences
of the electorate, or about the state of the world in which the policy takes
eﬀect. Lobbies may be better informed, either because they are ”closer” to
the preferences of their members, or they have speciﬁc expertise in certain
policy ﬁelds. In this case a welfare maximizing politician has an incentive to
listen to interest groups in order to improve the information upon which the
policy choice is based.
However, interest groups are of course still self interested, and thus politicians
cannot simply trust their speeches. Rather, politicians need to discount
what they hear. They have to extract the informative part of the received
43
The Economics of Lobbying Signalling Models
messages, based on available a priori information. The lobby groups, on
the other hand, know the way politicians discount their messages. They
adjust their strategies accordingly to appear trustworthy. Hence lobbying
has informative aspects and serves as a means to transmit information which
the policy maker is unable to acquire himself. Formally, the relationship
between interest groups and a politician is modelled as a signalling game in
which these groups try to persuade a benevolent policy maker on a certain
policy, who in turn improves the informational basis of his decision.
The following signalling models analyze a benevolent politician who decides
about a policy under imperfect information. One or more self-interested lob-
bies transmit information strategically and try to inﬂuence his decision. The
models can be categorized according to the following table.
policy discrete continuous
number of lobbies one many
access to the politician costless costly
lobby’s information perfect imperfect
message can be veriﬁed can not be veriﬁed
signal informative uninformative
signalling costs sunk productive
Table 4.1: Categorization of signalling models.
Chapter 4.1 explains the basic signalling model as well as some extensions.
Access to the politician is costless in these approaches. I ﬁrst outline the
basic model in chapter 4.1.1. It analyzes a single interest group which sub-
mits information strategically. Chapter 4.1.2 extends this model to lobbying
competition. These approaches can also be reinterpreted as models of ”mass
movement”, if we interpret each lobby as an individual deciding whether to
send a costly message or not. For instance, this message may be the decision
to participate in public demonstrations, or it may consist of individual activi-
ties like sending postcards, writing letters etc. Chapter 4.2 surveys models in
which interest groups must buy access to the politician through contribution
payments. Access is not costless, whereas signalling itself may be. Chap-
ter 4.3 ﬁnally surveys miscellaneous signalling models which do not ﬁt well
into one of the above categories. These are models focusing on institutional
aspects or intermediation.
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4.1 Signalling models with costless access to
the politician
All existing signalling models rely on the equilibrium concept of Sequential
or Perfect Bayesian Equilibria and, depending on the speciﬁc model char-
acteristics, speciﬁc reﬁnements.1 Equilibria are characterized by strategies
for each player and beliefs about the uncertain states of the world at the
time a player is called upon to act. The equilibrium strategies are chosen
such that each player’s expected payoﬀ is maximized, given the other play-
ers’ equilibrium strategies and their beliefs about the states of the world.
Beliefs are derived from the a priori knowledge and observed behavior when
a player moves. Updating takes place according to Bayes’ rule. This rule is
only applicable to situations which occur with strictly positive probability
in equilibrium. Hence the formation of out-of-equilibrium beliefs, that is,
about game situations which will never be reached in equilibrium, is arbi-
trary according to this concept. Implausible equilibria may occur, some of
which may be eliminated through the use of reﬁnements, restricting the way
out-of-equilibrium beliefs can be formed.
Despite the use of reﬁnements or intuitive plausibility arguments, signalling
models are often plagued by a variety of suitable equilibria.2 Unique results
are often diﬃcult to obtain, especially with regard to comparative statics. In
order to increase the legibility of this chapter, I will not state every equilib-
rium which might occur. Rather, I shall restrict myself to the most important
and relatively robust results which are necessary to grasp the intuition be-
hind the models. If it seems appropriate or necessary, I will indicate which
results lack generality or are speciﬁc to certain equilibrium properties.
4.1.1 Basic models with one interest group
The models of Potters and van Winden (1992), and Ainsworth (1993) and
Sloof (1997b) are basic signalling models whose intuition is broadly valid.
There are two states of the world, denoted by θ1 and θ2, whose realization
is not known to the politician, but known to the lobby. The politician has
prior beliefs about the probability that a certain state occurs. Further, he
1Compare for instance Gibbons (1992), Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), Mas-Collel,
Whinston and Green (1995).
2A good example is Sloof and van Winden (2000).
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implements one of the policy alternatives τ1 or τ2. Each alternative ”ﬁts”
one state. The payoﬀ to the politician is high if he implements the correct
policy in each state and low if he implements the wrong one. Hence, the task
of the politician is to choose a correct policy under uncertainty.
A single lobby guides the politician in his choice. This lobby observes the
realized state of the world and has perfect information. It can inform the
politician about the realized state by sending a costly signal. The cost of the
signal is denoted by c. The politician, who observes only the signal but not
the true state of the world, anticipates that sending a signal is only worth
for certain types of interest groups. He updates his beliefs accordingly.3 The
payoﬀ to the lobby depends on the realized state of the world and may conﬂict
with the interests of the politician.
Examples of these types of lobbying games are profuse. Consider for instance
a politician who has to decide about the extent of environmental regulation,
which negatively aﬀects proﬁts of a ﬁrm. The policy maker takes account
of the welfare eﬀects of environmental regulation. He prefers lax regulation
if the marginal eﬀect of regulation on proﬁts is high, and strict regulation
if the marginal eﬀect on proﬁts is low. The ﬁrm is assumed to be better
informed than the politician about how regulation eﬀects costs, and hence
has an incentive to overstate its negative eﬀects. Thus, if regulation aﬀects
proﬁts heavily, the politician and the ﬁrm have a common interest. They
have opposing interests if regulation aﬀects costs only to a smaller extent.
Other examples are the regulation of multinational ﬁrms when the politician
is imperfectly informed about how regulation aﬀects plant relocation and
employment; or trade protection for industries, when the politician is only
imperfectly informed about the eﬀect of protection of a speciﬁc industry, or
about the extent of industry decline.4
The payoﬀ matrix of the game and the ex ante probabilities are common
knowledge. The ﬁrst entry denotes the payoﬀ to the politician. The second
denotes the payoﬀ to the lobby:
3Chapter 4.2 discusses models in which the politician does not listen to the signal of
the lobbies without being paid to listen. In these models, lobbies buy access to induce the
politician to listen.
4Applications of imperfect information models are scare. Some authors consider these
examples in perfect information models, for instance Polk (2002b) for regulation of multi-
national ﬁrms (compare chapter 7), Hillman (1982) and Long van and Vousden (1991) for
trade protection for declining industries.
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θ1 θ2
τ1 a, 0 0, 0
τ2 0, d a, e
The payoﬀ to the politician is always positive, that is a > 0 . The payoﬀs to
the lobby are arbitrary and will be discussed in the following.
Suppose ﬁrst that d < 0 < e. In this case, there is no conﬂict of interest
between the politician and the lobby. They share the same interest, which
is to ﬁnd the policy suitable for each state of the world. There may or may
not be an incentive for the lobby to send a message. This depends on the
lobbying costs and on the politician’s ex ante beliefs. What is of importance
for this parameter range is that the politician can always trust the signal if
he receives one. Thus in this situation, the policy maker is perfectly informed
at the time he must implement the policy, since he knows that the lobby has
no incentive to mislead him. Without a signal, he knows that the lobby has
no incentive to send one, which indicates that the choice based on his a priori
belief is the correct one.
Suppose next that d > 0 > e. This is the case of full conﬂict of interest,
because the politician knows that he is better oﬀ mistrusting any signal he
receives. Since he knows that, he will always ignore any signal. The lobby,
anticipating the ignorance of the politician, knows that whatever it does, it
has no eﬀect. Hence it will never send a signal, because this is costly.5 In
this setup, there is no scope for information transmission, since the interest
of the two players are fully opposed.
The most interesting case is when d, e > 0. This is the case of partial conﬂict
between the lobby and the politician. Now it depends on the state of the
world whether the two players have the same interest. Note that the lobby
always prefers policy τ2, independent of the realized state of the world. If
the state is θ2, the politician and the lobby follow a common interest. In the
following, I shall denote the lobby in this particular state of the world as the
”good type” and the corresponding state as the ”good state”. In contrast, if
θ1 is relevant, the politician prefers τ1 and the lobby prefers τ2, and scope for
conﬂict arises. The lobby and the stage will be denoted as ”bad type” and
”bad state” respectively. In contrast to the full conﬂict of interest case, the
politician will not systematically ignore any message, because he knows well
that in some cases truth-telling is the preferred strategy of the lobby. Hence
5If the signalling costs are zero, then ”babbling” is also an equilibrium, where the lobby
group randomly sends messages which are always ignored by the politician.
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he can learn something from the signal he receives.
This parameter range is the model variant in which signalling is a matter
of interest. The models in this chapter all correspond to this setup unless
stated otherwise. Before I discuss the various equilibria of the basic model,
let me ﬁrst state two further characteristics.
First, in order to make information revelation through signalling possible,
we need to assume that the payoﬀ to the bad type is smaller then the payoﬀ
to the good type, d < e. This condition is commonly known as the ”sorting
condition”. It assures that the bad type can not always mimic the good
type. Suppose the sorting condition does not hold: Then the payoﬀ to the
bad type is always weakly higher than the payoﬀ to the good type. To achieve
this, the bad type must only mimic the behavior of the good type (which
he can always do if d > e). The politician anticipates this and should thus
mistrust any signal. Information revelation is not possible in this case. But
if the sorting condition is satisﬁed, mimicry is not possible in any state of
the world. The good type has an incentive to send a signal in some states of
the world, which the bad type does not have.
Second, note that the content of the signal is meaningless in this setup. The
only informational content of the signal is the cost it induces. The intuition
is as follows: If the message can be chosen arbitrarily, for instance ”the state
is θ1” or ”the state is θ2”, the politician is able to derive the optimal contents
of the message if one is sent. This is due to the fact that the politician knows
the decision problem of the lobby, and is able to infer its best message. Since
he can do so, not the choice of contents is important, but only the decision
to send a signal or not. Hence all that matters are the signalling costs, but
not the contents of the signal themselves.
High signalling costs : The resulting equilibria depend on the signalling costs
c, and on the politician’s ex ante belief. If signalling costs are high (c > e),
a unique pooling equilibrium exists in which lobbies never send a signal, and
the policy maker makes a choice based on his ex ante beliefs.6
Intermediate signalling costs: In contrast, if lobbying costs are intermediate
(d < c < e), then two types of equilibria exist, depending on the ex ante
belief of the politician. Note ﬁrst that the bad type will never send a message,
since this induces a negative payoﬀ even if it persuades the politician. So the
focus is on the good type and its incentive to send a signal, which in turn
depends on the ex ante belief of the politician concerning τ2. If the politician
6The term ”lobbies” refers to a realized type of lobby.
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chooses the bad policy based on his a priori belief, the unique equilibrium is
separating, and the good type always lobbies. Since the politician anticipates
this, he trusts the signal and chooses policy τ2 after receiving a message, and
the alternative policy otherwise. The good type has no incentive to deviate,
because not sending a signal induces the unfavorable policy and zero payoﬀ.
However, if the ex ante belief of the politician induces the good policy without
signalling, two equilibria exist. The ﬁrst and most obvious equilibrium is a
pooling one, in which no signal is sent. If the politician anticipates this, he
chooses the policy based on his prior beliefs which is the appropriate one.
Moreover, there is also a separating equilibrium: If the politician assumes
that the good type always indicates that θ2 is relevant, he only selects the
good policy if this is aﬃrmed. In this case, signalling is optimal only for the
good type.7
Low signalling costs : If signalling costs are low (c < d), the bad lobby may
try to mislead the politician. But it must consider the fact that the politician
knows its incentive to do so. Hence the lobby needs to provide an incentive
for the politician to listen to the signal. This incentive is not given if the bad
type always signals, because the politician would anticipate this strategy and
did not react. Thus signalling by the bad type is only a good strategy if it
leaves a chance to extract some information from the signal. This is the case
if the probability of a signal being sent by the good type is higher than the
respective probability for the bad type.
If the politician’s ex ante belief of the politician favors the bad policy, the
good type has an incentive to always send a signal. Otherwise the bad type
could mimic the good one. A unique semi-pooling equilibrium exists in which
the good type always sends a signal, and the bad type plays a mixed strategy
and mimics the good type every now and then. In this case, the politician is
able to extract some (but not all) information from the signal. After having
observed a signal, it is not optimal to choose the good policy in any case,
because this also gives the bad type an incentive to send a signal in any
case. Hence in equilibrium, the policy maker will sometimes choose the good
policy if a signal is received, and otherwise not. Accordingly, the bad type
will send a message now and then.
Next, consider the case where the politician chooses the good policy if he has
to decide based on his a priori belief. In this case, no separating equilibrium
7These two equilibria induce diﬀerent expected payoﬀs and have diﬀerent welfare im-
plications, which is discussed below.
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exists, since a separating equilibrium requires that the good type always
sends a message, whereas the bad type never does. But as argued above,
this is no good strategy for the bad type if signalling costs are suﬃciently
low. Thus, only pooling and semi-pooling equilibria exist. There are two
pooling equilibria. In the ﬁrst, both types never lobby and the politician
always chooses the good policy. No lobby has an incentive to send a costly
signal, and the politician chooses the best policy based on his a priori beliefs.
In the second pooling equilibrium, both types always lobby and the politician
chooses the good policy only if he receives a signal. Note that not sending a
signal cannot be optimal, because this would induce policy τ1, which yields
a strictly lower payoﬀ for the lobby. In the semi-separating equilibrium, the
bad type never sends a message and the good type sends one every now
and then. The politician anticipates these signalling strategies. He knows
that a signal is a sure indicator of a good state of the world, but that the
state of the world is not necessarily bad if no signal is sent. Accordingly, he
chooses the good policy if he observes a signal; if he does not observe one, he
occasionally chooses the good policy, because he knows that the good type
sometimes remains silent.
Welfare implications
How can welfare eﬀects be measured in these models? Since the politician
is benevolent, welfare is maximized if he implements the policy which maxi-
mizes his payoﬀ. Note that welfare can be measured in one of two ways, either
by the (ex ante) probability that the politician chooses the correct policy, or
by observing whether the correct policy is implemented ex post. As a bench-
mark, consider the case without lobbying. In this case, the politician chooses
the policy according to his a priori beliefs and maximizes expected welfare.
Note that this does not imply that the correct policy is indeed implemented
when the actual state of the world becomes known. The probability of an
error depends on the a priori knowledge and the payoﬀ of both policy choices.
Does lobbying reduce the probability of an error? Welfare implications de-
pend on the realized equilibrium and lobbying costs. Multiple equilibria exist
for some parameter ranges. Thus, only some rather general results can be
stated in the following. I focus on the eﬀect of lobbying on welfare and
abstract from lobbying costs.
In separating equilibria, full information is revealed through lobbying. In
this case, welfare is maximized and no error occurs. This makes the politi-
cian (and welfare net of lobbying costs) strictly better oﬀ compared to the
case when no lobbying is allowed. There is only one separating equilibrium,
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namely when lobbying costs are intermediate. Observe that the lobby is not
necessarily happy about its ability to lobby ex post: If the politician chooses
the good policy based on his a priori belief, then the possibility to lobby de-
creases the payoﬀ to both the good and the bad type: The good type lobbies
and incurs costs in order to induce the good policy. But the politician would
choose the good policy anyhow if the decision were solely based on his a priori
knowledge and he knew that no lobbying is allowed. The bad type never re-
alizes the positive payoﬀ with lobbying (which on average it sometimes could
without lobbying, depending on the a priori beliefs of the politician). Thus
the good type is trapped into obligatory signalling and the bad type loses
payoﬀ. Hence the lobby would, ex ante and ex post, strictly prefer a regime
without lobbying. This is not necessarily the case if the politician chooses
the bad policy based on his a priori belief. In this case, the good type gets
the chance to induce the good policy, and the bad type neither gains nor
looses. Thus the expected beneﬁt is strictly higher and the realized beneﬁt
is weakly higher when lobbying is allowed.
In contrast to the separating equilibrium, the politician does not gain any
additional information if the types pool. Pooling equilibria only exist if the
politician’s ex ante belief favors the good policy. In this case, the politician’s
payoﬀ and welfare are left unchanged if lobbying is possible. If the pooling
equilibrium induces no lobbying by any type, then the no lobbying outcome is
completely replicated and the expected payoﬀ to the lobby does not change.
If the pooling equilibrium induces lobbying of both types, then both types
of lobbies are strictly worse oﬀ with lobbying and the expected payoﬀ to the
lobbies decreases. Note that pooling equilibria exist for low and intermediate
signalling costs if the politician prefers the good policy based on his ex ante
beliefs, and in general with high signalling costs.
Semi-separating equilibria occur only if lobbying costs are low. In these
equilibria information is revealed, but the politician still retains a degree of
uncertainty about the realized state. Moreover, the politician is sometimes
mislead by the bad type. It turns out that the beneﬁt of better information
and the cost of sometimes being mislead cancel out. Hence the politician
receives the same expected payoﬀ as in the case without lobbying, and ex-
pected welfare remains unchanged. The payoﬀ to the lobby depends on the
politician’s ex ante belief and the equilibrium strategies. If the politician
choose the bad state, both types beneﬁt in expectation. Hence the lobby
beneﬁts in expectation even before it knows its type. Note that this does not
necessarily imply that it beneﬁts ex post: Since the politician will sometimes
choose policy τ1 despite signalling, the good type sometimes invests in lob-
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bying without beneﬁt. If the politician chooses the good policy based on his
a priori beliefs, the good and the bad types lose in expectation, although the
payoﬀ to the bad type may ex post equal the payoﬀ without lobbying. The
good type looses for two reasons: The politician chooses the good policy less
often and the lobby sometimes has to bear signalling costs. Thus the lobby’s
expected beneﬁt decreases.
In short, lobbying tends to increase welfare if we abstract from lobbying
costs. The politician learns the true state of the world in separating equilib-
ria with certainty, and increases his knowledge if semi-separating equilibria
emerge. Only if the types pool, do welfare eﬀects tend to be negative. In this
case, lobbies engage in costly activities without any eﬀect on the politician’s
decision.
Comparative statics
General comparative static results are diﬃcult to obtain when multiple equi-
libria exists because a slight change in any variable may lead to a jump from
one equilibrium to another. For this reason, only one general result is stated
here.8
The likelihood that lobbying occurs tends to increase in the payoﬀs to the
lobbies and decrease in the signalling costs. This result seems plausible at
ﬁrst glance and is valid in most cases. The reason is that the lobbies have
to weigh the expected beneﬁt against the costs of lobbying. However, this
relationship may be less clear cut in certain circumstances. In the assessment
of their lobbying strategies, the lobbies must take account of the politician’s
reaction. If for instance the beneﬁt of the bad type increases, the politician
anticipates its higher incentive to lobby. This in turn makes him less willing
to react to lobbying, which again decreases the lobbying incentives of the bad
type. The general likelihood of lobbying depends on the magnitude of these
eﬀects, but tends to increase in payoﬀs.
Extensions
Two extensions of the basic model are discussed in this chapter. Suppose
ﬁrst that the policy maker has the opportunity to obtain information inde-
pendently, as analyzed in a model by Rasmusen (1993).9 The politician is
able to get perfectly informed about the state of the world either by ver-
8For details consult Potters and van Winden (1992).
9See also Rasmusen (1997), Sloof (1997c). For a variation of the following theme consult
also Potters and van Winden (1992), Austen-Smith and Wright (1992), and Sloof (1997a).
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iﬁcation of a received signal, or, if he receives no signal, by investigation.
Thus veriﬁcation and investigation are means for the politician to overcome
his uncertainty. Investigation and veriﬁcation are costly and by assumption,
investigation costs are higher than veriﬁcation costs. We focus on the semi-
separating equilibrium which results if lobbying costs are small and the policy
maker chooses the policy which is unfavorable to the lobby, based on his a
priori beliefs.
Obviously, the resulting equilibria depend on the relation between investi-
gation and veriﬁcation costs. If veriﬁcation costs are suﬃciently high, veri-
ﬁcation is no option and the equilibrium does not change compared to the
basic model. The more interesting case is when veriﬁcation costs are low. If,
additionally, investigation costs are high, the lobby knows that the politician
will never investigate. Since the choice of the politician tends towards the
bad state, the lobby has incentives to signal. Investigation by the politician
is no substitute for lobbying in this case. Thus, the only equilibrium is a
semi-separating one with analogous characteristics as above: The good type
always lobbies and the bad type lobbies sometimes. The politician in turn
veriﬁes the received signal sometimes, but not always. Investigation never
occurs in this case. Lobbying is successful in the sense that the politician
always chooses the best policy for the lobby whenever he receives a signal
and the signal is not veriﬁed. If he doesn’t receive a signal, he chooses the
policy to the disadvantage of the lobby.
The probability that the bad type lobbies increases with veriﬁcation costs, as
high veriﬁcation costs undermine the power of the politician vis a vis the bad
type. Rasmusen (1993) discusses various characteristics of the equilibrium
and compares it to the case when no lobbying is allowed. In our context, it
is important to investigate whether welfare increases if the politician is able
to verify the message. Even without a formal analysis, we can conclude that
expected welfare (gross of veriﬁcation costs) increases, since the bad type
knows that the politician sometimes veriﬁes. This reduces the bad type’s
expected beneﬁt from lobbying. It thus lobbies less often, which in turn
reduces the probability of a mistake by the politician. The payoﬀ to the
good type is not aﬀected, because it never lies. The expected payoﬀ to the
bad type decreases because it can fool the politician less often.
The above equilibrium also holds if investigation costs are low. Moreover, two
additional equilibria exist with interesting properties.10 Both types refrain
10I give the intuition for the pooling equilibrium. The intuition for the semi-separating
equilibrium is analogous.
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from lobbying in the pooling equilibrium. The politician learns nothing,
always investigates, and always implements the correct policy. In this case,
welfare strictly increases compared to the basic model, because uncertainty is
completely eliminated. But the payoﬀ to the politician does not necessarily
increase. He has to bear information costs even though he always chooses the
correct policy. The payoﬀ to the good type increases, since the good policy is
always implemented without lobbying. The payoﬀ to the bad type decreases,
since there is no scope for misleading anymore. Hence the expected payoﬀ to
the lobby (before it knows its type) is ambiguous. Note that this equilibrium
is characterized by the fact that the good type passes on signalling costs to
the politician.
The second extension to the basic model by Lagerlof (1997) uses a somewhat
diﬀerent setup. The author assumes that the interest group is also imper-
fectly informed about the true state of the world. It has to decide if it wants
to invest in information acquisition, which is only sometimes successful: If
the lobby investigates, it learns the true state of the world with an exoge-
nously given probability and nothing otherwise. After having investigated,
the lobby decides whether it wants to send a signal about the state of the
world. The politician cannot observe if the lobby investigates or not.
This model has two pure strategy equilibria. The ﬁrst is a pooling equi-
librium. The lobby never investigates and the politician chooses the policy
based on his a priori belief. The second equilibrium is an investigation equi-
librium. The lobby only sends a signal if it learns the true state of the
world, and this information is beneﬁcial. In this case, the expected payoﬀ
to the politician increases compared to the case without lobbying, because
the politician’s beliefs are updated. He is therefore more likely to choose
the correct policy. The expected payoﬀ to the lobby may increase or de-
crease, depending on investigation costs: Without considering the politician,
the lobby prefers no investigation if the expected beneﬁt from investigation is
lower than costs. However, if the politician expects investigation to occur, no
investigation implies no signal. The politician then updates his belief to the
disadvantage of the lobby. In order to prevent this, the lobby might investi-
gate because it knows that the politician expects it to. Thus the possibility
to investigate might lead to an equilibrium in which the lobby’s expected
payoﬀ declines.
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4.1.2 Lobbying competition and models of mass move-
ment
The results of the previous chapter abstract from competition between dif-
ferent lobby groups. Models by Lohmann (1993), Lohmann (1995b) and
Austen-Smith and Wright (1992)11 use similar setups to focus on lobbying
competition.12 For instance, the paper by Austen-Smith and Wright (1992)
focuses on lobbying competition between two lobbies in a setup where the
politician decides between two diﬀerent policy alternatives. The lobbies have
opposing interests concerning the two policy alternatives. They prefer either
one policy, which is independent of the support provided by the population.
The politician cares about public support, but is imperfectly informed about
which policy is best. If the politician makes his choice based on his a priori
beliefs, he chooses the policy preferred by one lobby. Hence the other lobby,
denoted as the opposing group, has an incentive to induce a policy devia-
tion through signalling. This in turn may induce counteractive lobbying by
the a priori beneﬁtted group in order to prevent the politician from a policy
deviation.
The model incorporates costly information acquisition by the lobbies and
costly veriﬁcation of the signals by the politician. The main result of the
paper is that the beneﬁtted group will never lobby solely to back up the
politician’s belief. Instead, lobbying occurs either by the opposing group
alone, or by both groups. The opposing group has an incentive to acquire
costly information and send a signal if veriﬁcation costs are suﬃciently low.
In this case, the politician occasionally veriﬁes the message. If he does not
verify, he listens to the opposing lobby and modiﬁes his policy decision ac-
cordingly. The initially beneﬁtted group does not lobby, because the cost
of acquiring information is excessive compared to the beneﬁt of not loosing
support occasionally. However, if veriﬁcation costs are high, the politician
will never verify if he receives a single signal, and will always verify if he
receives two contrasting ones. As a consequence, he will always listen to
the opposing group if he does not receive a second signal as well. Since the
beneﬁtted group does not want to lose its support entirely, it also engages
in lobbying. Thus the only lobbying incentive for the beneﬁtted group is
a counteractive lobbying motive, aimed at oﬀsetting the lobbying eﬀorts of
the opponent. In this situation both lobby groups might thus be trapped in
11A comment on this paper is found in Sloof (1997a).
12For an empirical investigation of the results in Austen-Smith and Wright (1992), con-
sult Austen-Smith and Wright (1994).
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a lobbying equilibrium which induces lower expected payoﬀs to each group.
The beneﬁciary is the policy maker, who errs less frequently.
The analysis of Lohmann (1993) deviates from the basic setup and yields
some interesting new results.13 Again, the policy maker decides between
two given policy alternatives, which are now elements of a continuous policy
interval. There is a ﬁnite number of lobby groups, which are distributed along
this interval. They are characterized by single peaked preferences about the
policy in question, and each group prefers the policy alternative which is
closer to its ideal point. The distribution of the groups along the interval
is known to the politician. He is benevolent and seeks to maximize welfare
through implementation of the median policy.
The median voter setup is modiﬁed in the following way: Each lobby (and
the politician) knows that the eﬀect of the policy does not only depend on
the known part of the utility function, but also on the realized state of the
world. The realized state is unobservable to the groups and the politician. It
is drawn from the unit interval, and its distribution is common knowledge. In
contrast to the policy maker, each group receives an imperfect signal about
the state of the world and updates its belief about its preferences accordingly.
The signal serves as a ”shifting” parameter which might aﬀect the preferred
policy of each group. After the groups observe the signal, each decides to
send a costly signal to the politician. This signal has no content and is
interpreted (without loss of generality) as a vote for policy alternative τ1.
The politician observes the number of signals, updates his belief concerning
the preferred policy of the median voter, and chooses accordingly.
Before I characterize the resulting equilibrium, let me ﬁrst provide some
intuition for the lobbying decision of the groups if lobbying costs are zero.
Consider an interest group which has strong preferences for or against one
of the two policy alternatives. This group will always prefer this alternative,
independent of the signal it receives about the state of the world. These
groups are called ”extremists”, because their preferences are independent of
the signal they receive. Since the message indicates that policy alternative
τ1 should be chosen, extremists which favor this alternative send a message.
Extremists who favor the alternative will not signal. Next, consider interest
groups which have moderate policy preferences, meaning that their preferred
policy critically depends on the received signal about the state of the world.
13I describe the basic model. An almost similar but slightly modiﬁed model can be
found in Lohmann (1995b). This latter model yields the same qualitative insights, but
also entails a counteractive lobbying eﬀect.
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Thus ”moderates” who receive a signal in favor of τ1 send a message and
those who receive a signal in favor of τ2 do not.
Now consider the case of positive (but not prohibitive) lobbying costs. Each
group must compare the cost of lobbying with its expected beneﬁt, which
depends on the utility diﬀerence between the policy alternative, weighted by
the probability that its lobbying eﬀort is pivotal for the politician’s choice.
By deﬁnition, extremists always have an incentive to lobby. This is inde-
pendent of their received signal. Note that lobbying by extremists conveys
no information if the politician knows that it is lobbied by extremists. The
reason is that extremists lobby independently of the received signal. Thus
the policy maker is unable to infer anything about the state of the world
form their signal. Hence only lobbying by moderates is important for the
politician, because their decision depends on the received signal and con-
tains information about the state of the world. Now consider the lobbying
decision of a moderate who receives a signal in favor of τ1. He updates his
belief about the preferred policy, which switches from τ0 to τ1. This gives him
the incentive to send a message. However this message is costly. Hence it will
only be sent if the individual thinks that the expected beneﬁt is high enough.
Thus, some individuals send a message and some do not, even though the
latter would if sending a message were costless. Hence some moderates free
ride on those who send a message.
Next consider the choice of the politician. He knows the incentives of the
individuals, but not the particular realizations of their received signals. He
is able to calculate the number of lobbying and abstaining extremists. More-
over, the policy maker is able to infer how many moderates will lobby given
any possible realization of the state of the world. The diﬀerence between the
observed number of lobbyists and the calculated number of extremists bears
information about the state of the world. Hence the politician is able to
extract information by observing of the lobbying movement. He updates his
beliefs accordingly. This in turn gives groups incentives to engage in costly
lobbying, because they know that the politician is able to extract information
from it.
The author shows that the critical parameter which determine the amount of
information revelation are the lobbying costs and the dispersion of preferences
across the groups. Consider the benchmark case with almost homogenous
individuals and no lobbying costs. Then all individuals lobby according to
their received signal, which means that all lobbyists are moderates. Thus
by observation of the number of lobbyists, the politician knows how many
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individuals received a signal in favor of policy τ1. Hence he is able to extract
all the information which is dispersed across the population.14 Full informa-
tion revelation is not possible if preferences are heterogenous, because then
some lobbyists are extremists. Number counting of extremists delivers no
new information. Hence the politician learns nothing from signals of extrem-
ists, and extremists are more likely to occur if preferences are dispersed. Less
information is revealed if more extremists exist, which is more likely if prefer-
ences are widely spread. Next consider lobbying costs. Lobbying costs reduce
moderates’ incentives to lobby. More moderates abstain from lobbying al-
though they could use their signal to induce a (to them) favorable outcome.
Thus fewer moderates lobby, and the politician gets less information.
This analysis suggest that all available information can only be revealed if
lobbying costs are zero and preferences homogenous. If lobbying costs are
positive, then some individuals abstain from lobbying (due to free rider mo-
tives). Information is revealed in part. Less information is revealed if the
population is more heterogenous, because uninformative lobbying by extrem-
ists occurs more often. Thus lobbying is more likely to increase welfare if the
population is homogenous and lobbying costs are small.
Two remarks shall be made. First, note that there is a kind of ”policy
neutrality”, because exogenous asymmetries between lobby groups have no
eﬀect on the induced policy change of the politician. As long as he knows
about these asymmetries, he infers the diﬀerent incentives for lobbying and
discounts the observed number accordingly.15 Second, in Lohmann (1995b)
two types of signals can be sent by the lobbyists, either in favor of τ1 or τ2.
Then extremists on both sides of the preference spectrum engage in costly and
uninformative lobbying. This is a replication of the counteractive lobbying
result, because each extremists knows that the politician is informed about
his identity, and lobbying has no eﬀect. But each extremist is forced to engage
in lobbying in order to compensate for the lobbying eﬀorts of the opposing
14Note that this is not equivalent to full information, because the aggregate dispersed
information is itself a signal about the true state of the world.
15An example for this idea can be found in Lohmann (1995b): It discusses diﬀerent
impacts of Anti-Gulf-War protests in the USA. In some liberal areas like San Francisco,
demonstrations where expected. Accordingly, politicians have not been much impressed
when they indeed took place. In other areas, politicians did not expect much anticipation.
They learned that the movement took more attention than anticipated, although it was
not larger than those in the liberal areas. Statements of the politicians indicate that those
expecting high anticipation did not change their mind much. In contrast, those of the
less liberal areas stated that they paid attention to the protest movements, because they
where bigger than expected. That they were not larger compared to other areas did not
play a role.
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extremists. Abstaining is no option, because the politician would update
his belief to the extremists’ disadvantage in this case. Hence extremists are
trapped in uninformative lobbying.
4.2 Signalling models with access buying
The signalling models of the former chapter assume that the politician con-
siders any signal he receives and attempts to extract information from it.
The underlying assumption is that access to the politician, that is the pos-
sibility of being heard by the politician, is costless for the lobbies. Under
these circumstances, we identiﬁed the cost of sending a signal as the crucial
information. Hence signals without costs cannot reveal any information.
However, costless signals may convey information if access to the politician
is costly. Hence access costs may serve as a signal, informing the politician
about a lobby’s value of being heard. This is independent of the lobby’s
policy preferences. Hence access costs serve as a selection device in order
to discriminate between groups. Some groups oﬀer useful information, even
if the message itself incurs no costs. In contrast, other groups oﬀer useless
information.
Lohmann (1995a) uses a slightly modiﬁed setup of her model of mass move-
ment to focus on contributions as an access device (compare chapter 4.1.2).
In this modiﬁcation, each lobby either sends one of two costless messages,
which indicates the preferred policy alternative, or no message at all. The
groups do not know if the politician listens to the signals. To convince the
politician that it is worthwhile to do so, each group determines a level of
contributions paid to the politician, which serves as an access device.16 The
choice of an informative message and the cost of signalling are separated in
this setup, because interest groups may also send messages which are not
accompanied by contributions.
Two key insights result from this modiﬁcation: First, some individuals send
inﬂuential messages without a need to buy access to the politician. As in the
previous model, interest groups split between moderates and extremists at
16In order to focus on the mere signalling eﬀect of contributions, contributions do not
increase the payoﬀ to the politician. Ball (1995), Austen-Smith (1998) and Bennedsen
and Feldmann (2002) analyze a setup in which contributions increase the welfare of the
politician. He faces a trade-oﬀ between a high level of contributions and a high amount
of information revelation (compare chapter 4.3).
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both sides of the policy spectrum. Consider their incentives to lie: Moderates
prefer the policy choice according to their received signal about the state of
the world. They have an incentive to reveal this information truthfully, and
never lie. Since the politician anticipates this, he has an incentive to grant
costless access to moderates in order to extract all information available to
them. Thus their messages are inﬂuential, even if contributions are zero.
In contrast, extremists may have incentives to lie: Those who receive a back-
ing signal have an incentive to signal this truthfully. But those extremists
who receive a signal which contradicts their prior preference have an incentive
to lie. Hence the politician likes to diﬀerentiate between these two groups.
He can achieve this through the use of contributions as an access device:
Since both types of extremists update their beliefs about the expected gain
from either policy, extremists who receive an encouraging signal and update
their beliefs accordingly have a higher stake in the preferred policy than ex-
tremists who receive an unfavorable signal. Full separation between these
groups is possible: The politician listens only to those messages which are
accompanied by contributions worth to be paid only for non-lying extremists.
Second and more surprisingly, full information is revealed in this setup, be-
cause all moderates send inﬂuential and costless messages (free-riding is no
problem since signalling costs are zero). Moreover, extremists separate them-
selves completely, because the politician grants only access to those who do
not lie. Those who do not gain access to the politician choose not to do so ei-
ther because they prefer to free-ride, or because it is not worthwhile for them
due to the unfavorable signal they received. Since the politician anticipates
this, full information is revealed in equilibrium. Note that contributions are
indeed a pure access device, because they are a means of separating lobby
groups ”who have something to say”, independently of what they will say.
Moreover, if the amount of contribution payments where not independent of
the sent message, access costs would not only lock out lying extremists, but
also moderates.
Austen-Smith (1998) analyzes a modiﬁed version, where only one interest
group gains access to the politician although many groups will try to do
so.17 His model focuses on the idea that a politician selects those to whom
he wants to listen. Although this stresses the power of the politician, the
model generally yields similar results. The politician, who is interested in
information and money, decides about a unique access charge for the interest
groups. Lobbies again consist of moderates and extremists. Each group
17Also compare Austen-Smith (1995).
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decides whether to seek costly access. However, if the charge is paid, access
is not granted automatically: From the pool of access seeking groups, the
politician chooses exactly one, which strategically reveals information to the
politician. Without going into details, the setup is such that the politician
always prefers access to a moderate group instead of extremists, because
the moderate will always reveal full information. However, even though the
selection mechanism of the politician is detrimental for extremists, they still
have an incentive to gain access. The reason is that the probability of no
moderate seeking access turns out to be strictly positive in equilibrium.
In contrast to the model by Lohmann, full information is not necessarily re-
vealed in equilibrium ex post. The (ex ante) probability that informational
ineﬃciency occurs is strictly positive. This result is mainly driven by the as-
sumption that access charges increase the payoﬀ to the politician. Hence he
faces a trade-oﬀ between informational eﬃciency and high contributions.18
This trade-oﬀ is solved through a positive access charge, which gives ex-
tremists an incentive to seek access. Since extremists only seek access if the
probability that no moderate seeks access is high enough, the expected prob-
ability that information is not fully revealed is strictly positive. Moreover, if
only extremists seek access, full information revelation is not possible. Thus,
in contrast to the model by Lohmann (1995a), the model by Austen-Smith
(1998) explains why access charges might deter complete information revela-
tion. However, his argument leaves scope for further research for two reasons:
First it relies heavily on the assumed trade-oﬀ between contributions and in-
formation. Second, even though the probability that full information is not
revealed is strictly positive ex ante, information is fully revealed ex post if at
least one moderate seeks access, which is a relatively strong assumption.
4.3 Miscellaneous
Some analysis of signalling do not ﬁt well into one of the above categoriza-
tions. For completeness, I will shortly describe them here. For instance,
Sloof and van Winden (2000) analyze a model of reputation building. The
single lobby is either weak or strong, which is unknown to the politician. It
tries to inﬂuence the political decision in a repeated lobbying stage game.
Without going into details, the lobby can choose between the instruments
”pressure” and ”lobbying”. Lobbying is a soft instrument in the sense that it
18Without this trade-oﬀ, full information can be achieved by setting the access charge
to zero. Then all moderates seek access and the politician becomes fully informed.
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is less costly and both types can use this instrument to their beneﬁt in each
stage game, whereas pressure is more costly and only beneﬁcial in the stage
game if the lobby is strong. However, the weak type may also use pressure in
order to build up reputation: Even though pressure yields negative payoﬀs
in the stage game for the weak type, it pays oﬀ in the long run if it induces
the politician to belief that the lobby is strong.
The paper analyzes under which conditions each instrument is chosen. Due
to the variety of setups and equilibria which emerge, only a handful of general
results can be obtained. First, lobbying may always occur, whereas to exert
costly pressure pays only if the ex ante belief that the lobby is strong is
small. In this case it pays for the weak lobby to invest in costly pressure
in order to build up reputation. Second, pressure is a means to increase
reputation, whereas lobbying is a means to maintain reputation. Only if it
is not possible to exercise pressure may lobbying be a substitute and used to
build up reputation. This is the reason why lobbies must ”show their teeth
ﬁrst”, as the title of the paper suggests.
Bennedsen and Feldman (2000) analyze the incentives to lobby in two diﬀer-
ent multi-member legislations: The parliamentary legislature is characterized
by a high voting cohesion, because members of the legislature beneﬁt if they
are a part of the winning coalition. In contrast, being a member of the ma-
jority coalition in a system with low voting cohesion brings no beneﬁt to
the politician. Lobbying has the eﬀect of signalling which policy should be
chosen and who should be part part of the majority. Since the members of
the majority are more eager to stick to their policy proposal and the chosen
majority in a parliamentary system, the incentives to lobby are dampened.
Ainsworth and Sened (1993) analyze a lobby which is distinct from the pop-
ulation and acts as a mere intermediary between the politician and the pop-
ulation. The lobby seeks its own interest which increases if a high fraction of
the population believes that a certain policy alternative is good and decides
to engage in costly signalling to the politician. Hence it behaves strategically
vis a vis the politician and the population. The authors show that signalling
costs for the lobby must be intermediate for lobbying equilibria to exist. In
this case, lobbying tends to increase welfare, since all protagonists are better
informed and the politician chooses the right policy with higher probability.
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The instrument choice of
lobbies
The literature on lobbying divides into two broad strands as the preceding
chapters indicate: Lobbying is analyzed either as contribution payments to
the government, or as a means of transmitting valuable information. The
question arises which type of lobbying interest groups prefer. To my best
knowledge, there are only two recent approaches which pick this question as a
central theme. These will be discussed in the following. However, many open
questions for further research remain. For instance, what determines which
type of lobbying occurs? Does this depend on the policy at stance, the degree
of lobbying competition, or public concern about the policy? The general
task is to combine these two independent approaches towards lobbying, at
which end of line a general lobbying model possibly emerges. I will indicate
the ﬁrst steps of this promising direction of research in the following.
Some studies conceptualize contribution payments and informational lob-
bying in a single framework. The idea is that contribution payments may
embody two purposes: They buy goodwill and serve as a signalling device.
Depending on the relevant setup, either the politician sets an access charge
which reﬂects his interest in information and money (Austen-Smith 1998),
or the lobby oﬀers a contribution schedule which both serves to buy good-
will and contains information about the lobby’s type (Ball 1995).1 Both
models diﬀer with respect to their particular setup2, but the resulting equi-
1Compare Prat (2001), Mueller and Stratmann (1994) for models in the context of
electoral competition.
2Ball (1995) analyzes the interaction between a politician and a single interest group.
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libria reﬂect a general insight: Contributions deteriorate policies, because
self-interested politicians are willing to sacriﬁce aggregate welfare for money.
However, contributions also serve as a signalling device and entail helpful
information for the politician. The equilibria reﬂect this trade-oﬀ: Lobbying
tends to increase welfare for informational reasons, but not as much as if
the politician was completely benevolent and did not care for contribution
payments.
Note that these models assume that a single lobbying instrument embodies
both channels of inﬂuence, i.e. the incentive motive and the information mo-
tive, and that both motives for lobbying may play a role at the same time.
However, the question of instrument choice is left aside. In contrast, Benned-
sen and Feldmann (2002) focus on the instrument choice of lobbying. They
assume that an interest group may inﬂuence a political decision in two ways:
It may engage in costly information acquisition, which yields a signal about
the true state of the world. The lobby prefers one policy outcome independent
of the received signal. So it may report the search result either truthfully, or
send no signal at all if it entails disadvantageous news. Moreover, the lobby
is able to determine a contribution payment, which compensates the politi-
cian for a deviation towards its preferred policy choice. The question then
arises in which type of lobbying the interest group invests: Does it prefer to
engage in informational lobbying, or are contribution payments the better
choice? Moreover, may it be eﬃcient to engage in both types of lobbying at
the same time? Do these diﬀerent types of lobbying aﬀect each other?
First, the approach resembles some insights from the signalling literature: If
we abstract from the possibility of lobbying via contributions for the moment,
the interest group is c.p. more likely to engage in informational lobbying if
the cost of information acquisition is small, the beneﬁt of the preferred policy
is large, and the probability of successful investigation is high. The intuition
The lobby oﬀers a type-speciﬁc contribution payment which is contingent on the realized
policy choice. In this setup, information is always revealed and the politician learns which
policy is welfare maximizing. But he prefers to deviate from this policy in order to increase
contribution payments.
Austen-Smith (1998) analyzes this trade-oﬀ in a model of mass movement (compare chap-
ter 4.1.2). Without going into details, the politician faces an incentive to foreclose access
of informative moderates in order to extract money from uninformative extremists. In
equilibrium, information is revealed only sometimes, although full information was always
possible by granting costless access to moderates. Hence the politician is willing to stay
uninformed now and then in order to increase contribution payments.
The two models diﬀer to this respect: The politician gets fully informed in the ﬁrst model
and decides to deviate for money motives, whereas he prefers to stay partly uninformed
in the second model, choosing the best policy then.
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is as follows: The politician updates his belief to the beneﬁt of the lobby
if he receives a signal, but to its disadvantage if he receives none. Hence
the decision to investigate entails indirect search costs, which consist of the
expected utility loss due to disadvantageous search results. Investigation is
then more likely if the possible beneﬁt is high and indirect search costs are
low, which gives the stated results.
Consider now contribution payments as a second means of lobbying. The
lobby exactly compensates the politician for the welfare loss through the
policy deviation if it pays contributions. Hence, the decision to invest in
information acquisition may render contribution payments unnecessary if it
turns out to be successful, but it increases necessary contribution payments
in the case of bad news. As the expected utility loss with bad news is
high if the lobby has high stakes in the preferred policy outcome, indirect
search costs increase. Moreover, indirect costs increase if the probability
of success is small. In sum, informational lobbying becomes less likely if the
lobby has high stakes in the preferred policy, and the probability of successful
informational lobbying is small.3 Note that both types of lobbying may occur
if informational lobbying is beneﬁcial in expectation, but turns out to be
unsuccessful ex post. However, the possibility to inﬂuence the policy decision
via contributions decreases incentives to engage in informational lobbying,
because informational lobbying entails indirect costs if contributions are an
alternative lobbying instruments which makes it less likely to occur.
Polk (2002c) follows a diﬀerent approach (compare chapter 6). Two interest
groups engage in lobbying against environmental regulation. Two types of
lobbying exist, both of which serve to increase individual pollution standards:
General lobbying leads to higher pollution standards for all interest groups.
Hence lobbies provide a public good with respect to each other if they engage
in general lobbying. For instance, general lobbying eﬀorts may be informa-
tional lobbying, which informs the politician about negative consequences of
environmental regulation in general. Moreover, a ﬁrm may also engage in
private lobbying. Firms compete with respect to private lobbying eﬀorts,
because it increases the individual pollution standard of the lobbying ﬁrm on
account of its opponent. For instance, private lobbying may consist of contri-
bution payments inducing favors to one interest group at the expense of the
other. Alternatively, private lobbying may induce loopholes granted to one
3Investigation is more likely if the politician is not able to observe whether the lobby
investigates or not. The expected loss of a disadvantageous search is smaller in this case,
because the politician is left with uncertainty over whether the absent signal is due to no
search eﬀort instead of bad news.
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group, which restricts the possibility of loopholes to the other group. In sum,
groups engage in diﬀerent types of lobbying. They follow a common interest
through general lobbying, but compete through private lobbying eﬀorts.
The question arises in which lobbying type the interest groups engage, and
what is the policy outcome. Suppose that the politician becomes more re-
sponsive to private lobbying. Direct and indirect eﬀects occur: The direct
eﬀect is an increase of the marginal beneﬁt of private lobbying, which in-
creases private lobbying eﬀorts. But private lobbying eﬀorts are strategic
substitutes, which dampens the direct eﬀect. It turns out that both interest
groups increase private lobbying in a symmetric equilibrium, but that it may
occur that both ﬁrms react diﬀerently in an asymmetric equilibrium. Hence,
if the politician increases lobbying competition between the groups by get-
ting more responsive to private lobbying, it may occur that a lobby diverts
to general lobbying for strategic reasons.
Moreover, the environment tends to beneﬁt if the politician becomes more
responsive to private lobbying: Both groups may focus on private lobbying
if lobbying competition increases. In this case, counteractive activities domi-
nate and interest groups divert from their original interest. Instead of jointly
lobbying against environmental regulation, they are trapped in activities for
distributional reasons. Hence, the model indicates that the politician’s abil-
ity to react to a certain type of lobbying may aﬀect the lobbying instruments
employed by interest groups. It is crucial to note that the politician’s re-
sponsiveness towards private lobbying does not just depend on his own pref-
erences: It may also depend on the type of regulation under consideration.
For instance, a certain type of regulation may be achieved through diﬀerent
policy alternatives, leaving more discretion to the politician. In this case, it
is likely that interest groups engage in private lobbying, and general lobbying
becomes unimportant. On the other hand, if only a single policy instrument
is available to achieve a certain policy outcome, policy discretion is small.
It is likely that interest groups will focus on general lobbying in this case,







1Environmental regulation is often accompanied by loopholes for individ-
ual economic agents. For instance, the German ”Abwasserabgabengesetz”
grants large loopholes to the chemical industry, an important user of water.2
The German energy tax foresees loopholes for energy intensive sectors, such
as agribusiness and the chemical industry.3 In Switzerland, the LSVA was
recently introduced as a charge on trucks and heavy transportation, which
serves to reduce emissions from transportation. However, the charge is not
levied on personal transportation and rates for coaches are reduced, although
these vehicles play also an important role as pollutants.4
Given that environmental regulation should aim at reducing pollution, loop-
holes are usually criticized from an environmental point of view. They tend
1This chapter is closely related to joint work with Armin Schmutzler.
2The German ”Abwasserabgebengesetz” is a waste water charge (Roth 1991, Berendes
and Winters 1989).
3Compare for instance Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (1999), Chapt. 1, Tab. 1. The report
can also be found at http://library.fes.de/fulltext/fowirtschaft/00952003.htm#E10E1.
4The LSVA is a heavy vehicle fee, a charge intended to reduce the emissions of CO2 and
other pollutants (www.zoll.admin.ch/d/steuern/lsva/lsva konkret/ekonkret/estart.htm).
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to undermine the original aim of regulation, and they are often granted to
the most important polluters. In this paper, I want to discuss the idea that
the possibility of loopholes may well help to serve environmental concerns: If
ﬁrms attempt to inﬂuence environmental regulation through lobbying, they
not only try to reduce the total amount of allowed pollution. In addition,
they may try to reduce the individual burden induced through this regula-
tion. Accordingly, ﬁrms may privately lobby for loopholes. Loopholes serve
to reduce the individual burden of a given regulation, and are granted exclu-
sively to speciﬁc ﬁrms. They are costly to other ﬁrms, because the overall
ability of the politician to grant speciﬁc loopholes may be limited. If this is
the case, lobbying not only serves to determine the total amount of environ-
mental regulation, but also the distribution of its costs among ﬁrms. I show
that the existence of loopholes may beneﬁt the environment: If ﬁrms expect
that politicians pay more attention to private lobbying for loopholes, they
will tend to focus lobbying activities on distributive aims. Their activities
may then tend to oﬀset each other, and small environmental damage results.
If a focus on private lobbying leads to a reduction of general lobbying against
strict regulation, the existence of loopholes may beneﬁt the environment.
The political contest is modelled as a static game. Both ﬁrms set private and
general lobbying eﬀorts simultaneously in order to maximize the individual
standard of allowed pollution. Lobbying eﬀorts and the resulting individual
and total pollution levels determine the Nash-equilibrium. The politician
is represented by a policy formation function, which sets ﬁrms’ pollution
standards based on individual levels of private and general lobbying eﬀorts
(Becker 1983, Becker 1985). I show that the existence of loopholes may ben-
eﬁt the environment, if ﬁrms focus on private lobbying. Hence, if loopholes
are important, ﬁrms may tend to focus on ineﬀective counteractive lobby-
ing.5 The environment beneﬁts if this goes hand in hand with a reduction in
harmful general lobbying.
The model relates to existing literature, which determines the extent of envi-
ronmental regulation when interest groups inﬂuence political decisions. For
instance, Hahn (1990) determines the eﬀect of lobbying on the amount of
environmental pollution in a simple political economy framework.6 The
politician maximizes a weighted sum of an industry’s and a green lobby’s
5Compare Austen-Smith and Wright (1994) for a model which focusses on counteractive
lobbying eﬀects.
6Other contributions are Fredriksson (1997), Damania (1999) and Aidt (1998), which
determine environmental policy when lobbies inﬂuence the political decision. Except
Fredriksson (1997), these approaches do not focus on the eﬀect of lobbying on environ-
mental quality.
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utility levels. The weights are exogenous and represent an unspeciﬁed lob-
bying game. The resulting pollution depends on the available policy instru-
ments, groups’ preferences about these instruments and their relative politi-
cal weights: Suppose that both lobbies have opposing interests with respect
to one policy dimension and coincide about the other. For instance, a green
lobby might have an interest in high environmental taxes, which opposes the
interests of an industry lobby. But both lobbies may favor a high degree
of ear-marking the tax to pollution abatement, or of ear-marking the tax
to reduce associated employer outlays. Then, environmental pollution may
probably decrease, if the politician attaches a higher political weight to the
(anti-environmentalist) industry lobby: An increase in the relative strength
of the industry lobby c.p. leads to a lower tax and more environmental pol-
lution. If the policy dimensions are substitutes, a smaller tax increases the
beneﬁt of a higher degree of ear-marking. If the latter eﬀect dominates, the
negative eﬀect through lower taxes are overcompensated by a higher degree
of ear-marking. Accordingly, an increase of the political weight of an anti-
environmentalist lobby may lead to a decrease of environmental pollution.
The model is similar in that both lobbying groups coincide with respect to
one policy dimension (the amount of allowed pollution) and disagree about
the other (the speciﬁcation of loopholes). I assume that two diﬀerent types
of lobbying activities are available, and analyze their eﬀect on the political
equilibrium and the resulting pollution.
Many lobbying models analyze distributional aspects implicitly, especially
those in the line of Bernheim and Whinston (1986b) and Grossman and
Helpman (1994a). In these models, contribution payments are contingent on
realized policies, which often entail both allocative and distributional aspects.
Lobbying serves both purposes at the same time, and it is diﬃcult to sep-
arate distributional lobbying from allocative one. For instance, Aidt (1998)
determines the amount of diﬀerent input and output taxes in an environmen-
tal setup. Output taxes are primarily levied for distributional purposes, and
environmental taxes mainly serve to reduce emissions. But all these taxes
nevertheless entail allocative and distributional aspects. So it is diﬃcult to
separate lobbying with mere distributional purposes from allocative lobby-
ing. The model relates to this literature. It explicitly models the incentives of
ﬁrms to give up general lobbying against environmental regulation, in order
to increase the inﬂuence on distributional decisions.
To my knowledge, Bennedsen and Feldmann (2002) is the only approach
which analyzes diﬀerent types of lobbying activities. They consider inﬂuence
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through informational lobbying and contribution payments.7 Compared to
this paper, their approach has a diﬀerent general scope. The authors analyze
the incentives to costly acquire information if contribution payments are an
alternative way to inﬂuence the politician. The general insight of their pa-
per is the following: Informational lobbying has indirect costs, which reduce
incentives to engage in this type of lobbying. The reason is that the lobby
refrains from sending prejudicial information; but no signal is bad news,
and the politician learns that a ﬁrm friendly policy has negative welfare ef-
fects. This implies that the ﬁrm needs to increase the amount of necessary
contribution payments, which compensate the politician for a policy devia-
tion. Hence information gathering induces indirect search costs in the form
of higher contribution payments, if bad news occur when the ﬁrm acquired
information. This may lead to higher expected contribution payments, and
lower eﬀorts to acquire information. The analysis provides no application to
environmental policy formation.
The chapter is organized as follows: Chapter 6.2 derives comparative static
results if ﬁrms employ a ﬁxed lobbying budget to inﬂuence environmental reg-
ulation. I introduce two diﬀerent speciﬁcations in chapters 6.2.1 and 6.2.2.
Chapter 6.2.3 introduces speciﬁc functional forms for the loophole and the
share lobbying functions. I parameterize the model and describe which re-
sults occur. Chapter 6.3 describes an extension to the model, where ﬁrms
determine their lobbying budget endogenously. Chapter 6.4 discusses the
scope of the analysis and concludes.
6.2 Environmental regulation with an exoge-
nous lobbying budget
I analyze two ﬁrms whose production induces environmental pollution. Each
ﬁrm uses an abatement technology to reduce pollution. Abatement cost
functions Ai(Ei) are exogenous and bounded above. For simplicity, I assume
that regulation takes the form of individual pollution standards Ei. I assume
that the actual emissions standard is always binding. The abatement cost
functions decrease in the emission level Ei and are convex: Ai′ < 0, Ai′′ > 0.
Assumption 6.1 Abatement costs are bounded above, that is Ai(Ei) ≤ A
for all possible Ei.
7Compare chapter 5.
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I abstract from market particularities and focus on the eﬀect of environmen-
tal regulation on abatement costs and proﬁts. Individual pollution standards
Ei(p1, p2, g1, g2) are functions of private and general lobbying eﬀorts of both
ﬁrms, pi and gi. Throughout the analysis, I maintain the following assump-
tion:
Assumption 6.2 Individual pollution standards increase in own private and
general lobbying eﬀorts. General lobbying of the opponent increases, and













Both types increase the level of allowable emissions for the lobbying ﬁrm,
but they have diﬀerent eﬀects on the total level of allowed emissions and
on the distribution among the ﬁrms: General lobbying of a ﬁrm increases
the total level of allowed emissions, and the individual pollution standard
Ei. It beneﬁts the lobbying ﬁrm and the other ﬁrm subject to regulation.
General lobbying eﬀorts are perfect substitutes and bear no competitive el-
ement. Firms provide a public good through general lobbying, because an
increase in general lobbying increases the individual pollution standard of
the other ﬁrm as well. In contrast, private lobbying of a ﬁrm increases its
individual pollution standard on the cost of the other.8 But it does not in-
crease the total level of allowed pollution, or only to a smaller extent. Both
ﬁrms compete for individual high standards through private lobbying, given
the total amount of environmental regulation induced through general lob-
bying eﬀorts. Private lobbying thus bears a strong competitive element: An
increase of private lobbying of one ﬁrm decreases the individual pollution
standard of the opponent.
The lobbying budget of each ﬁrm is ﬁxed and normalized to one (this assump-
tion is relaxed in chapter 6.3). Each ﬁrm determines the optimal amount of
private and general lobbying, and minimizes abatement costs. For instance,
ﬁrm 1 maximizes9
Π1(p1, p2, g1, g2, θ) = −A1(E1(p1, p2, g1, g2, θ))− p1 − g1,
8I discuss two speciﬁcations for the general setup, which diﬀer slightly according to the
eﬀect of private lobbying on the total level of allowed pollution.
9Note that proﬁts are negative in this setup. Alternatively I can write proﬁts as πi =
Di−Ai(Ei), where Di is some gross beneﬁt resulting from market competition. I assume
that this component Di is independent of the level of allowed pollution by assumption.
Therefore I drop it.
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subject to
p1 + g1 = 1.
Exact speciﬁcations for the individual pollution standard functions Ei will
be given in chapters 6.2.1 and 6.2.2. Note that the standard also depends on
an exogenous parameter θ. It reﬂects the politician’s responsiveness towards
private lobbying and will also be closer speciﬁed in the following chapters. I
derive comparative static results and state how a change in the politician’s
responsiveness towards private lobbying inﬂuences the equilibrium lobbying
eﬀorts and the total amount of pollution.
I analyze two diﬀerent speciﬁcations for individual pollution standards in
chapter 6.2.1 and 6.2.2. These speciﬁcations reﬂect two distinct applica-
tions of the general framework. I use the loophole speciﬁcation to focus on
private lobbying as a means to receive individual exemption rules from en-
vironmental regulation. For instance, consider a government that wants to
reduce emissions of a certain pollutant. Pollution results from production in
several sectors. Private lobbying may then serve to receive sectoral exemp-
tions, given that the level of total regulation is ﬁxed. As an example, the
German chemical industry faces important exemptions from the charge on
sewage water, which reduces the tax burden in that speciﬁc sector compre-
hensively. The common characteristic of the loophole speciﬁcation is that
private lobbying leads to individual exemptions from regulation, without de-
creasing the allowed base level of emissions of the other parties. Accordingly,
private lobbying tends to increase the total amount of pollution, because
larger loopholes increase the total amount of environmental pollution.
This is diﬀerent in the share lobbying speciﬁcation. In this speciﬁcation,
private lobbying is entirely distributional. Private lobbying has no environ-
mental eﬀect. Consider for instance that a government restricts the total level
of allowed pollution through tradable emission permits. It decides about the
total amount of pollution permits, and about its initial distribution across
ﬁrms. Firms may try to increase the total amount of allowed emissions
through general lobbying, which tends to beneﬁt all ﬁrms. In contrast, pri-
vate lobbying serves to increase the individual permit share of a ﬁrm. It
does not aﬀect the total amount of pollution rights. Hence, it reduces the
pollution shares of the other party. Both speciﬁcations have in common that
ﬁrms compete in private lobbying. A permit may be granted either to one or
the other, but not to both if the total amount is ﬁxed. Chapters 6.2.1 and
6.2.2 will make these arguments more precise.
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Both speciﬁcations have some joint elements. For instance, the predisposition
of the politician towards strict regulation can be inﬂuenced through general
lobbying by each ﬁrm. It determines how lax or strict environmental regula-
tion is in general. For instance, in the share lobbying speciﬁcation, general
lobbying determines the total level of emitted pollution permits. This is in-
dependent of the distribution of these permits across ﬁrms. Similarly, in the
loophole lobbying case, general lobbying for instance determines the level of
an ecological tax, which lets individual exemption rules aside and ﬁrst serves
as a regulation policy towards all ﬁrms. Firms have a common interest that
this predisposition is low, because lax regulation leads to smaller abatement
costs.
As a further example, general lobbying eﬀorts may be informational cam-
paigns which ”inform” the politician about negative consequences of strict
environmental regulation. Suppose that one ﬁrm engages in such a cam-
paign, and low regulation results. This beneﬁts the other ﬁrm as well. The
sum of the individual levels of general lobbying eﬀorts determines how strict
environmental regulation is. Hence general lobbying eﬀorts are perfect sub-
stitutes. Firms provide a public good with respect to each other if they
engage in general lobbying. More general lobbying by a ﬁrm leads to lower
regulation, which beneﬁts the other ﬁrm as well.
Since the lobbying budget is ﬁxed, ﬁrms face a trade-oﬀ when they deter-
mine their lobbying levels: An increase of private lobbying leads to a higher
individual pollution standard, given that the predisposition of the politician
towards environmental regulation is ﬁxed. But an increase in private lob-
bying decreases general lobbying, which increases the predisposition towards
strict regulation. Substitution of the budget constraint yields the following
optimization problem for ﬁrm 1 (ﬁrm 2 accordingly):
max
p1
Π1(p1, p2, θ) = −A1(E1(p1, p2, θ))
max
p2
Π2(p1, p2, θ) = −A2(E2(p1, p2, θ))
All relevant functions depend on private lobbying eﬀorts of both ﬁrms. A
suﬃx i indicates the derivative of the respective function with respect to
private lobbying of ﬁrm i. For instance, Πiij is the cross derivative of proﬁts
of ﬁrm i with respect to its own private lobbying eﬀort and that of the other
ﬁrm.
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Assumption 6.3 Private lobbying eﬀorts are strategic substitutes: Πiij < 0
for all i 	= j.
This assumption assures that the reaction functions are negatively sloped. If
a ﬁrm increases private lobbying, incentives for private lobbying of the other
ﬁrm decrease. Without the assumption, private lobbying eﬀorts may be
strategic complements. I want to exclude this case, because it leads to rather
simple insights: If a ﬁrm faces incentives to increase private lobbying due to
an exogenous parameter change, the opponent increases private lobbying as
well. In this case, interesting strategic interactions between both ﬁrms cannot
occur. An exogenous parameter change aﬀects both ﬁrms in the same way,
and both ﬁrms reinforce the reaction of each other. I exclude it here and
assume that private lobbying eﬀorts are strategic substitutes.10
Assumption 6.4 The following condition holds in the neighborhood of the
equilibrium: Π111Π
2
22 − Π112Π221 > 0.
This assumption assures that the equilibrium under consideration is locally
stable.11
I show in the appendix that a Nash equilibrium [p1∗, p2∗] exists for the spec-
iﬁcations of Ei, which follow in chapters 6.2.1 and 6.2.2. Moreover I assume
parameter ranges for all relevant functions such that interior equilibria occur.
I also show in the appendix that the implicit function theorem is applicable
and comparative static results can be derived. Straightforward calculations
















10I will discuss this assumption in the context of speciﬁc examples below.
11The equilibrium is locally stable if the reaction function of ﬁrm 1 is steeper than
the reaction function of ﬁrm 2 around the equilibrium. The slope of ﬁrm 1’s reaction
function is dp2dp1 = −
Π111
Π112
, that of ﬁrm 2 is dp2dp1 = −
Π221
Π222
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6.2.1 Loophole lobbying
In this chapter, I focus on the incentives of the politician to grant loopholes.
Loopholes are selective measures to speciﬁc ﬁrms, which serve as individual
exemption rules. The individual pollution standard of ﬁrm i is speciﬁed as
Ei(p1, p2, g1, g2, θ) = B(g1 + g2) + li(p1, p2, θ).
B(g1 + g2) is the basic level of allowed pollution to each ﬁrm. It depends on
the sum of general lobbying eﬀorts. I assume that B(g1+g2) is an increasing
and concave function (B′ > 0, B′′ < 0). This speciﬁcation reﬂects the idea
that general lobbying eﬀorts determine the predisposition of the politician
towards environmental regulation, which aﬀects both ﬁrms in the same way.
If a single ﬁrm increases general lobbying, regulation becomes laxer and the
basic amounts of individual pollution rights for both ﬁrms increase. As stated
above, both ﬁrms have a common interest in low regulation, and general
lobbying eﬀorts are perfect substitutes.
li(p1, p2) > 0 is a loophole to ﬁrm i, which the politician grants in return
for private lobbying. Private lobbying may consist of legal or illegal contri-
bution payments, but also job guarantees for after-legislature employment,
informational lobbying, or the promise of cooperation in other policy rele-
vant ﬁelds. A loophole increases the individual pollution standard of a ﬁrm
above the basic level. Its size depends on private lobbying eﬀorts. The idea
is that both ﬁrms compete for loopholes, because the politician has only a
limited ability to undermine regulation through individual exemption rules.
He is willing to increase individual pollution standards above the basic level
of allowed pollution if he receives private money from a ﬁrm, but he cannot
do so arbitrarily. For instance, the politician may be able to care for speciﬁc
ﬁrm interests without getting much public attention, but this ability may be
limited. Or the politician might care about his reputation, which decreases
if he appears to be too closely aligned to speciﬁc ﬁrms.
So ﬁrms compete for special treatments, and individual loopholes result from
this lobbying competition. Consistent with assumption 6.2, a loophole in-
creases if the respective ﬁrm increases private lobbying; it decreases if the
opponent increases private lobbying: lii > 0, l
i
j < 0. Hence an increases of
private lobbying by a ﬁrm has two eﬀects: It increases the own loophole,
which leads to a higher individual pollution standard. Abatement costs de-
cline. Moreover it has an external eﬀect on the opponent, whose loophole
declines.12 I assume that li is increasing and concave in pi, and decreasing
12Note that I assume that ﬁrms are active in diﬀerent industries. Firms have no in-
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and convex in pj in the neighborhood of the equilibrium.
By assumption 6.3, private lobbying eﬀorts are strategic substitutes. This
assumption implies B′′ + liij < 0. Thus concavity of B is a natural force
towards strategic substitutes: If the opponent increases private lobbying,
general lobbying eﬀorts decrease. The marginal beneﬁt of general lobbying
increases, which works towards a decrease of private lobbying by ﬁrm i. In
contrast, the marginal eﬀect of the opponents’ private lobbying on one’s own
private lobbying eﬀect may be positive. I assume that it is not too strong, and
the condition applies.13 Moreover, I assume that the own increase in private
lobbying has a stronger eﬀect on one’s own loophole, than an increase of the
opponent. The following restriction applies: liii < l
i
ij < −B′′.
θ is an exogenous parameter which indicates the responsiveness of the politi-
cian to private lobbying. I say that the politician gets more responsive to
private lobbying if the marginal eﬀect of private lobbying on individual loop-
hole levels increases, i.e. liiθ > 0 for all i. For instance, a high θ may indicate
that the politician can more easily provide individual loopholes, perhaps be-
cause public monitoring is less eﬀective or the politician cares less about
public reputation at the end of his incumbency. The following results state
how an increase of the responsiveness to private lobbying aﬀects the equilib-
rium, namely the equilibrium levels of private and general lobbying and the
resulting environmental pollution.
Proposition 6.1 If the politician gets more responsive to private lobbying,














centives to decrease the loophole of the opponent. It’s proﬁts depend solely on the own
pollution standard, and accordingly on the own loophole. There is no incentive to increase
the cost of the opponent, because abatement costs have no eﬀect on gross market beneﬁts
in this model.
13If this condition would not hold, private lobbying eﬀorts were strategic complements.
This would reasonably simplify the analysis. In this case, reaction functions would be
upward sloping. If the politician gets then more responsive to private lobbying, private
lobbying eﬀorts of both ﬁrms always increase. Proposition 6.1 would simplify accordingly
(Compare assumption 6.3).
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= sign{−[Ai′liiθ][Aj′(B′′ + ljjj)] + [Aj′ljjθ][Ai′(B′′ + liij)]}
= sign{−liiθ(B′′ + ljjj) + ljjθ(B′′ + liij)}.
This yields the result.
In equilibrium, both ﬁrms trade-oﬀ the marginal eﬀect of an additional
amount of private lobbying with its marginal costs. The marginal cost of
private lobbying is the necessary induced reduction of general lobbying and
the resulting decrease of the basic level of allowed pollution. The marginal
beneﬁt is an increase of the individual loophole. If the politician gets more
responsive to private lobbying of both ﬁrms, three eﬀects determine how each
ﬁrm reacts: There is a direct eﬀect: Each ﬁrm faces an incentive to increase
private lobbying, because the marginal beneﬁt of private lobbying increases.
The extent of this eﬀect depends on the increase of the politician’s lobbying
responsiveness towards ﬁrm i (i.e. on the extent of liiθ) and on the weight
(B′′ + ljjj), which reﬂects the curvature of Π
j.14 The direct eﬀect reﬂects the
change in private lobbying if we abstract from strategic interaction between
both ﬁrms. In this case, reaction functions are horizontal, and each ﬁrm de-
termines private lobbying eﬀorts independently. But reaction functions are
negatively sloped if ﬁrms behave strategically towards each other. This re-
ﬂects the second eﬀect, which is an indirect one: Imagine that the exogenous
parameter change aﬀects only ﬁrm i, but not the opponent. If ﬁrm i increases
private lobbying, the opponent has an incentive to react. He decreases pri-
vate lobbying as a reaction towards the increase of ﬁrm i, which reﬂects the
indirect eﬀect. Thirdly, the exogenous parameter change aﬀects the other
ﬁrm as well. Accordingly, this ﬁrm also faces a direct incentive to increase
private lobbying, which works against the indirect eﬀect. Moreover, it also
works against the direct eﬀect of ﬁrm i, because lobbying eﬀorts are strategic
substitutes by assumption 6.3. The strategic eﬀect on ﬁrm i is stronger if
the parameter change has a strong impact on ﬁrm j (ljjθ is high), or if private
lobbying eﬀorts are strong strategic substitutes (B′′ + liij) is high.
Proposition 6.1 reﬂects this intuition: The relative extent of the politician’s
responsiveness increase and the degree of substitutability between private
14It is obscure how this term can be interpreted economically. Economic intuition be-
comes clearer in the symmetric case (compare corollary 6.1).
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lobbying of both ﬁrms determine if a ﬁrm i increases or decreases private
lobbying. If the own responsiveness increase is high compared to the other
ﬁrm, private lobbying of ﬁrm i tends to increase. It tends to decrease if it is
low, or private lobbying eﬀorts are strong strategic substitutes.15 Note that
the substitution eﬀect determines the curvature of the reaction functions.
The proposition states that private lobbying of a ﬁrm increases, if lobbying
eﬀorts are weak strategic substitutes (then (B′′ + ljjj)/(B
′′ + liij) is high).
In this case, reaction functions are relatively steep and strategic interaction
between both ﬁrms plays no important role.
Corollary 6.1 If both ﬁrms and the equilibrium are symmetric, an increase
in θ results in identical increases in private lobbying eﬀorts for both ﬁrms.





















)2 − (Πiij)2 > 0 ⇔ (B′′ + ljjj)2 − (B′′ + liij)2 > 0





In a symmetric equilibrium, the change of the politician’s responsiveness
towards private lobbying aﬀects both ﬁrms in the same way. The direct and
strategic eﬀects are the same for both ﬁrms. An increase of θ gives both
ﬁrms the same direct incentive to increase private lobbying. Strategic eﬀects
dampen this incentives, but do not reverse it: An increase of private lobbying
by a ﬁrm has a higher marginal eﬀect on its own loophole, compared to the
external eﬀect it induces on the opponent’s loophole. Hence direct eﬀects
15Moreover, note that an increase of private lobbying induces a decrease in general
lobbying. This cost is higher, if the curvature ofB is high. Since the basic emission function
is identical for both ﬁrms, this term enters in the direct and the indirect eﬀect. Suppose




iθ is close to one, and only the marginal responsiveness towards private lobbying
matters. In contrast, if the curvature eﬀect plays no role, the diﬀerence between an
increase of the opponent’s private lobbying and own private lobbying eﬀorts becomes
more important.
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dominate strategic eﬀects, and private lobbying of both ﬁrms increase.16
The increase in private lobbying is higher if the dampening strategic eﬀect
is small, or the direct eﬀect is important: The strategic eﬀect is small if the
externality through private lobbying is relatively unimportant. The direct
eﬀect is high if a further increase in private lobbying leads to a large increase
of the individual loophole.
If the politician becomes more responsive to private lobbying, proposition 6.1
states that a ﬁrm may react by a reduction in private lobbying under certain
circumstances. As stated above, this can only be the case if the indirect
strategic eﬀect dominates the direct eﬀect to increase it. This is more likely
if private lobbying eﬀorts are strong strategic substitutes and the politician’s
change aﬀects both ﬁrms asymmetrically. However, it can never be the case
that both ﬁrm decrease private lobbying simultaneously. Suppose that a ﬁrm
decreases private lobbying as a reaction to a change in θ. This implicates
that the dampening strategic eﬀect must be so strong and dominates the
direct incentive to increase private lobbying. This can only be the case if
the opponent increases private lobbying, because private lobbying eﬀorts are
strategic substitutes. The following result states this idea:
Corollary 6.2 If the politician becomes more responsive to private lobbying,
there is always at least one ﬁrm which increases private lobbying.































, which implies (B′′+ l111)(B
′′+ l222) < (B
′′+ l112)(B
′′+ l221). This
is a contradiction to assumption 6.4, which states that (B′′+ l111)(B
′′+ l222) >
(B′′+l112)(B
′′+l221). Thus both ﬁrms can not jointly decrease private lobbying.
Do ﬁrms beneﬁt if the politician gets more responsive to private lobbying?
What is the eﬀect on the environment? Remember that total lobbying ex-
penditures do not change, because lobbying budgets are ﬁxed by assumption.
16The following corollary 6.2 implies this result in a straight forward manner: It is never
the case that both ﬁrms decreases private lobbying. Hence in a symmetric equilibrium,
both ﬁrms must necessarily increase private lobbying.
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Accordingly, a ﬁrm beneﬁts from a change of θ if the induced lobbying re-
sponses lead to higher individual pollution standards. The total eﬀect on the
environment depends on how both individual pollution standards change.
Total emissions in the loophole case are:
TEL = 2B(2− p1 − p2) + l1(p1, p2, θ) + l2(p1, p2, θ).
In principle, the eﬀect on TEL can be ambiguous. But the following propo-
sition gives a strong argument that an increase in the marginal response to
private lobbying beneﬁts the environment:
Proposition 6.2 Environmental pollution decreases,
• if both ﬁrms increase private lobbying, or
• if ﬁrm i decreases private lobbying (i.e. ﬁrm j increases private lobby-
ing), and −dpi(B′ − lji ) < −dpj(−B′ + lij).
Environmental pollution increases, if ﬁrm i decreases private lobbying,
and −dpi(B′ − lji ) > −dpj(−B′ + lij).
Proof. The eﬀect of private lobbying on the total amount of pollution is
dTEL = −2B′(dp1 + dp2) + (l11 + l21)dp1 + (l22 + l12)dp2.
By the ﬁrst order conditions, B′ = l11 = l
2
2 in equilibrium, thus
dTEL = [−B′ + l21]dp1 + [−B′ + l12]dp2.
Then dTEL < 0, iﬀ
−dp1(B′ − l21) < −dp2(−B′ + l12)
and positive otherwise, which gives the stated result.





Note that the right hand side is negative and the left hand side is positive.
Environmental quality always improves if both ﬁrms increase private lobby-
ing.
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The proposition gives a strong argument that an increase in the marginal
response to private lobbying beneﬁts the environment: Environmental qual-
ity improves if both ﬁrms increase private lobbying.17 The reason is that an
increase in private lobbying decreases general lobbying, which leads to lower
basic emission rights B. On the other hand, an increase in private lobbying
leads to bigger loopholes, which tends to decrease environmental quality. The
proposition states that, in a symmetric equilibrium, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates
the second, and environmental quality improves.
To be more precise, three eﬀects occur if a ﬁrm increases private lobbying:
First, private lobbying increases individual loopholes, which harms the en-
vironment. Second, it decreases the loophole of the opponent, which tends
to beneﬁt the environment. Third, an increase in private lobbying implies
a decrease in general lobbying. The base level of allowed pollution declines.
This latter eﬀect aﬀects both ﬁrms. Thus the only eﬀect which might harm
the environment is the increase of the individual loophole. Note that ﬁrms
equate the marginal beneﬁt of private lobbying (lii) with its cost (−B′) in
equilibrium. Hence the negative eﬀect through an increase of the individual
loophole oﬀsets with the positive eﬀect through the decrease of one’s own
base level of pollution. Positive environmental eﬀects through a smaller base
level and a smaller loophole of the opponent remain. In a symmetric equi-
librium, both ﬁrms increase private lobbying. As a result, environmental
quality improves. In sum, ﬁrms spend more resources in lobbying activities
which have strong counteractive eﬀects, but only small environmental eﬀects.
Hence environmental quality improves.
The eﬀect on total emissions is ambiguous if only one ﬁrm increases private
lobbying eﬀorts. An increase in private lobbying by a ﬁrm tends to decrease
the basic pollution levels of both ﬁrms, and the loophole of the opponent.
Moreover, the opponent decreases private lobbying, which results in smaller
loopholes of this ﬁrm. These eﬀects beneﬁt the environment. On the other
side, an increase in private lobbying by one ﬁrm leads to a higher individual
loophole. This eﬀect is ampliﬁed by the fact that the opponent decreases
private lobbying eﬀorts. Moreover, a decrease in private lobbying by the
opponent leads to more general lobbying. These eﬀects work towards a higher
level of total pollution.
In sum, the relative strength of these pollution increasing and decreasing
eﬀects determines whether the environmental quality improves or declines.
17I discuss a speciﬁc form for the loophole function in chapter 6.2.3. The results indicate
that an increase of private lobbying of both ﬁrms occurs for a large parameter range.
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Proposition 6.2 reﬂects this idea. Consider for instance the case that envi-
ronmental quality improves if ﬁrm i increases and ﬁrm j decreases private
lobbying eﬀorts. The left hand side of the inequality reﬂects the negative ef-
fect of a decrease of private lobbying on the environment: General lobbying
increases, which tends to increase the basic level of allowed pollution (B′).
The loophole of ﬁrm j increases (lji ). The right hand side reﬂects the positive
environmental eﬀect: If ﬁrm j increases private lobbying, general lobbying
and the basic level of allowed pollution decrease (−B′). Due to the external
eﬀect of private lobbying, the individual loophole of ﬁrm i increases (lij).
Proposition 6.2 is the central result. It indicates that an increasing impor-
tance of loopholes tends to beneﬁt the environment, at least in a symmetric
situation. If lobbying becomes more important, ﬁrms focus on lobbying activ-
ities which tend to be ineﬀective. They divert money from general lobbying
activities, although these are more eﬀective with respect to resulting pol-
lution rights. Firms face incentives to form a lobbying cooperation in this
case, which overcomes these ineﬃciencies from non-cooperative behavior.18
If they can agree to jointly reduce private lobbying eﬀorts, oﬀsetting eﬀects
become less important. They can can then divert more money to general
lobbying activities. However, since ﬁrms are not able to communicate in a
non-cooperative game setting, the best individual response to an increase
of private lobbying by the opponent is an increase of own private lobby-
ing eﬀorts. This eﬀect strengthens lobbying competition, which beneﬁts the
environment.
6.2.2 Share lobbying
I consider an alternative speciﬁcation for the individual pollution standards
Ei in this speciﬁcation. Private lobbying is fully redistributive, that is, it
does not eﬀect emissions at all. I assume that the politician decides about
the total level of allowed emissions E, which depends on the sum of general
lobbying eﬀorts gi. Individual pollution standards are then determined by a
share function, which splits the level of total pollution between the two ﬁrms.
Private lobbying eﬀorts determine the share of each ﬁrm and the distribu-
tion of pollution rights. As an example, consider environmental regulation
through emission permits: General lobbying aﬀects the total amount of per-
mits, which is granted to ﬁrms in a speciﬁc sector, or to diﬀerent sectors.
18Aidt (1997) analyzes incentives to cooperate in a common agency framework, where
interest groups lobby for tariﬀs.
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Private lobbying inﬂuences the initial distribution of permits across ﬁrms,
given that the total amount is ﬁxed. It serves to determine the initial in-
dividual pollution standard of each ﬁrm, without aﬀecting the total level of
allowed pollution. In this speciﬁcation, individual pollution standards are
given as
E1(p1, p2, g1, g2, θA) = s(p1, p2, θA)E(g1 + g2)
E2(p1, p2, g1, g2, θA) =
[
1− s(p1, p2, θA)]E(g1 + g2)
E is the total level of allowed pollution, which depends on the sum of general
lobbying eﬀorts gi. General lobbying eﬀorts are strategic substitutes. Each
ﬁrm provides a public good for the other ﬁrm by general lobbying. Firms
provide a public good with respect to the other ﬁrm through general lobbying.
E has the same properties as the basic pollution function of chapter 6.2.1,
namely E ′ > 0, E ′′ < 0. Firm 1 receives a share s(p1, p2, θ) ∈ [0, 1] of the
total amount of pollution E. All pollution rights are fully granted to both
ﬁrms, and ﬁrm 2 receives a share of [1− s(p1, p2, θ)].
Again, ﬁrms follow a common interest through general lobbying. General
lobbying eﬀorts increase the total level of allowed pollution and individual
pollution standards weighted by the share of each ﬁrm. Private lobbying
eﬀorts determine the distribution of E across both ﬁrms. Firms compete
through private lobbying for high shares. Following the spirit of chapter
6.2.1, I assume that an increase of private lobbying by a ﬁrm leads to a higher
share of that ﬁrm, given that the opponent holds private lobbying constant.
If the opponent increases private lobbying, the own share decreases. I assume
that the individual share functions are increasing and concave in one’s own
private lobbying eﬀorts, and decreasing and convex in the lobbying eﬀorts of
the opponent in the neighborhood of the equilibrium: s1 > 0, s11 < 0, s2 <
0, s22 > 0. Assumption 6.3 implies that an increase of private lobbying by a
ﬁrm may increase or decrease the marginal eﬀect on the opponent’s private
lobbying eﬀort. In case of an increase, the extent must be suﬃciently small,
which implies that private lobbying may be weak (but not strong) strategic
complements.19 I assume that the politician has no bias towards one ﬁrm: If
both ﬁrms choose the same amount of private lobbying, both ﬁrms get equal
shares and s = 0.5.
With this speciﬁcation we can focus on the eﬀect of lobbying competition.
19The following condition must be satisﬁed, otherwise private lobbying eﬀorts become
strategic complements: s12 <
−E′′s+E′(s1+s2)
E . A similar condition applies for ﬁrm 2.
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As in chapter 6.2.1, θ is a parameter which indicates the politician’s respon-
siveness towards private lobbying. He gets more responsive towards private
lobbying, if the marginal beneﬁt of private lobbying increases for each ﬁrm:
s1θ > 0, s2θ < 0.
20 The following results show that the general insights
of the former chapter remain valid with the share lobbying speciﬁcation: If
the politician becomes more responsive to private lobbying, ﬁrms tend to
increase private lobbying eﬀorts. General lobbying declines, and the level
of total pollution falls. Thus, if lobbying for distributive purposes becomes
more important, environmental quality improves.
Proposition 6.3 If the politician becomes more responsive to private lobby-

















. By assumption 6.4, the denomi-







= sign{−[Ai′Eiiθ][Aj′Ejjj] + [Aj′Ejjθ][Ai′Eiij)]}
= sign{−EiiθEjjj + EjjθEiij}.
The numerator is positive iﬀ Eiij >
Eiiθ
Ejjθ





, the stated conditions follow.
The intuition for this result is familiar from proposition 6.1: If the politician
gets more responsive to private lobbying, direct and indirect eﬀects occur.
The direct eﬀect is that private lobbying becomes more attractive and c.p.
increases. The extent of this eﬀect depends on the induced responsiveness
change siθ, and on the curvature of the opponent’s proﬁt function E
j
jj. The
indirect strategic eﬀects dampens the direct eﬀect: Due to the increase of the
20Note that the share of ﬁrm 2 is the residual of the share of ﬁrm 2. The marginal eﬀect
of private lobbying of ﬁrm 2 on its share increases if s2θ < 0.
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politician’s responsiveness sjθ, the opponent faces an incentive to increase
private lobbying as well. Private lobbying eﬀorts are strategic substitutes
and pi tends to fall.
To be more precise, several terms inﬂuence the extent of the direct and
the strategic eﬀect. For instance, consider the strategic eﬀect of ﬁrm 2’s
private lobbying increase on ﬁrm 1, E112. Straightforward calculations yield
E112 = s12E−E ′(s1+s2)+E ′′s. The ﬁrst term on the right hand side (s12E) is
the change of ﬁrm 1’s incentives to increase private lobbying as a result of an
increase in ﬁrm 2’s private lobbying eﬀorts. This eﬀect depends on the form
of the share function and may be positive or negative. If s12 < 0, a marginal
increase of private lobbying by ﬁrm 2 c.p. reduces the incentives for ﬁrm 1 to
increase private lobbying. If s12 > 0, the opposite holds. Second, the share
of ﬁrm 1 decreases if the opponent increases private lobbying. This leads
to reduced incentives to engage in general lobbying, because the marginal
beneﬁt of g1 depends on the realized share of ﬁrm 1. This eﬀect works
towards an increase of private lobbying (−E ′s2). Finally, the increase of
private lobbying by the opponent reduces general lobbying. The level of
total pollution c.p. decreases. As a consequence, a marginal increase of
ﬁrm 1’s share has less value, and the marginal beneﬁt of private lobbying
decreases (−E ′s1). But the emission function E is concave, and incentives
for general lobbying also increase. This is reﬂected in the term E ′′s, which
is a natural force towards strategic substitutes and tends to decrease p1. By
assumption 6.3, private lobbying eﬀorts are strategic substitutes, and eﬀects
tending towards a decrease in private lobbying dominate. The indirect eﬀect
dampens the direct one.
It can also be shown that at least one ﬁrm increases private lobbying if the
politician gets more responsive to private lobbying. Moreover, in a symmetric
equilibrium both ﬁrm increase private lobbying eﬀorts. These results parallel
those of chapter 6.2.1. I present them here without further remarks:
Corollary 6.3 In a symmetric equilibrium with symmetric ﬁrms, private
lobbying of both ﬁrms increases if the politician get more responsive to private
lobbying eﬀorts.











Equations (6.1), (6.2), and assumption 6.4 yield:
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Note that assumption 6.4 implies that
(
Ejjj
)2 − (Eiij)2 > 0, and dpidθ > 0
follows.
Corollary 6.4 At least one ﬁrm increase private lobbying if the politician
gets more responsive to private lobbying eﬀorts.
Proof. Suppose that both ﬁrms decrease private lobbying. By proposition






















11 − E112E221 < 0 and a contradiction to assumption 6.4.
Hence private lobbying of both ﬁrms can not jointly decrease.
The following proposition states how the level of total pollution changes
if the politician gets more responsive to private lobbying. Note that the
environmental quality depends only on the change of E, and total emissions
in the share lobbying case are:
TES = E(2− p1 − p2).
In contrast to chapter 6.2.1, private lobbying has no direct eﬀect on the
realized environmental quality in this speciﬁcation, because it serves mere
redistributive means. Accordingly, environmental quality improves if and
only if the sum of general lobbying eﬀorts declines.
Proposition 6.4 Environmental pollution decreases,
• if both ﬁrms increase private lobbying, or
• one ﬁrm decreases private lobbying and E11θ(−E222+E221)+E22θ(−E111+
E112) > 0.
Otherwise environmental pollution increases.
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Proof. The total amount of pollution is Et = E(2− p1 − p2). Hence
dEt = −E ′(dp1 + dp2),
which is negative if dp1 + dp2 > 0 and positive otherwise.
If both ﬁrms increase private lobbying, dEt < 0. By corollary 6.4, it is not
possible that both ﬁrms decrease private lobbying. Thus dEt > 0 can only be
the case if one ﬁrm increases and the other ﬁrm decreases private lobbying.
From equation (6.1), (6.2), and assumption 6.4, we get
sign {dp1 + dp2} = sign {E11θ(−E222 + E221) + E22θ(−E111 + E112)}.
The intuition for the result coincides with the insights of the loophole spec-
iﬁcation: If the politician gets more responsive to private lobbying, ﬁrms
engage more in private lobbying and disregard general lobbying. The in-
creases in private lobbying eﬀorts have no environmental eﬀects, as private
lobbying merely determines the distribution of shares among ﬁrms.21 An
increase in private lobbying decreases general lobbying eﬀorts. The realized
level of allowed pollution is determined by the sum of general lobbying activ-
ities. Accordingly, an increase in total private lobbying eﬀorts beneﬁts the
environment, as the total level of allowed pollution declines.
Environmental eﬀects may be negative if a ﬁrm increases general lobbying
activities. This can only be the case if the strategic eﬀect of the respective
ﬁrm dominates the direct eﬀect to increase private lobbying. Moreover, this
eﬀect must be strong enough to compensate the increase of private lobbying
by the opponent. These conditions are not easy to satisfy, but may occur
if the equilibrium is not symmetric. Consider for instance that the increase
in θ has a rather small eﬀect on ﬁrm 1 (E11θ is small), but a high eﬀect on
ﬁrm 2 (E22θ is high). Then the strategic eﬀect induced through ﬁrm 2 may
dominate the direct eﬀect of ﬁrm 1, and private lobbying of ﬁrm 1 decreases.
Moreover, if the extent of the direct eﬀect of ﬁrm 2 is relatively small (E111 is
small), private lobbying of ﬁrm 2 may increase, but only to a smaller amount.
If these conditions hold, the total amount of general lobbying may increase
if the politician becomes more responsive to private lobbying. In this case,
the level of total pollution increases.
The last argument indicates that the total level of allowed emissions tends
21In the loophole speciﬁcation, private lobbying has also environmental eﬀects: A higher
amount of private lobbying leads to larger loopholes, and loopholes increase the level of
environmental pollution above the basic levels E.
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to decrease if the politician gets more responsive to private lobbying. Rather
restrictive conditions must be met for the opposite statement to hold. Ac-
cordingly, if the politician becomes more responsive to private lobbying, the
eﬀect on the environment is a decline of the total level of allowed pollution.
This indicates that a high extent of lobbying competition beneﬁts the envi-
ronment, because ﬁrms lose power in ineﬀective distributional ﬁghts. Politi-
cians who want to increase pollution standards should thus be responsive to
private lobbying eﬀorts.
6.2.3 Speciﬁc loophole and share functions
The results of chapters 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 indicate that private lobbying eﬀorts
and environmental quality tend to increase if the politician gets more respon-
sive to private lobbying. In this chapter, I consider speciﬁcations for loophole
and share functions, for which these statements hold generally.
I tried to simulate the comparative static results. My aim was to ﬁnd out
how robust the result is, namely that an increase of θ increases private lob-
bying eﬀorts which beneﬁts the environment. As propositions 6.2 and 6.4
state, environmental quality increases if both ﬁrms increase private lobby-
ing. Only under certain circumstances may environmental quality decrease,
which amongst other things necessitates that one ﬁrm decreases private lob-
bying.
Consider for instance the following speciﬁcations for the loophole lobbying
and share lobbying functions. α and β are parameters which introduce asym-
metries between the ﬁrms. Symmetric equilibria emerge if α = 1, or β = 0.5.
γ is a parameter which determines the curvatures of the respective functions:


















Straightforward calculations show that this speciﬁcation satisﬁes the condi-
tions on individual loophole functions globally (with α = 0.5). The sign of
the cross derivative is negative (liij < 0), which implies that private lobbying
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Figure 6.1: The left hand side shows reaction functions and comparative
statics results for the loophole speciﬁcation (α = 1.1, γ = 0.5; θ varies
between [0, 1]; θ = 0.5 above)
The right hand side shows reaction functions and comparative statics results
for the share lobbying speciﬁcation (β = 0.4, γ = 0.5; θ varies between [0, 1];
θ = 0.5 above)
eﬀorts are strategic substitutes.22,23 Both ﬁrms get equal shares with iden-
tical private lobbying eﬀorts. The function is increasing and concave in p1,
and decreasing and convex in p2. The cross derivative is positive if p1 > p2,
and negative otherwise.
The function for the base level of allowed pollution (loophole speciﬁcation)
and the total amount of allowed pollution (share lobbying speciﬁcation) are
identically speciﬁed as
B(p1, p2) = (2− p1 − p2) 1δ ,
22Note that with this speciﬁcation, li = αθ + 1, if pi = pj = 0. This is a slight
variation from the general approach. Remember that I consider only interior equilibria in
the analysis.
23An alternative speciﬁcation is l1(p1, p2, θ) = αθ ln(p1+1)+ ln(p
1+1)
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and
E(p1, p2) = (2− p1 − p2) 1δ .
δ > 1 parameterizes the curvature of these functions.
Figure 6.1 shows that it is likely in the model that an increase in the marginal
responsiveness towards private lobbying induces higher private lobbying ef-
forts of both ﬁrms. As a consequence, environmental quality improves.24
This is the case even in the loophole speciﬁcation, where private lobbying
leads to larger individual loopholes.
6.3 Extension: Loophole lobbying with an en-
dogenous lobbying budget
If lobbying budgets are exogenous, an increase in private lobbying necessarily
coincides with a decrease in general lobbying. Accordingly, if private lobbying
becomes more important, general lobbying decreases. This tends to increase
environmental quality. If ﬁrms can endogenously determine their lobbying
budget, it may well be the case that an increase in private lobbying increases
the incentives for general lobbying as well. Consider the share speciﬁcation
as an example: An increase in private lobbying increases the individual share
of the respective ﬁrm. General lobbying then becomes more important. A
marginal increase of the total level of allowed pollution leads to a higher
increase of the individual pollution standard if the share is high. Hence more
private lobbying may induce more general lobbying, and private and general
lobbying of a ﬁrm may be strategic complements. This chapter analyzes the
incentives to lobby if the lobbying budget is endogenous. For simplicity, I
restrict the analysis to the loophole speciﬁcation and consider a symmetric
equilibrium with identical abatement cost functions A.25 Moreover, I make
the following assumption:
Assumption 6.5 The marginal loophole eﬀect of an increase of one’s pri-
vate lobbying is the same as a marginal decrease of the opponent’s private
lobbying: lii = −lij.
24Using these speciﬁcations with several parameter constellations, I have not been able
to sort out asymmetric equilibria, which have the property that a marginal increase of θ
leads to a reduction of private lobbying by a ﬁrm.
25Hence in the following: p1∗ = p2∗ and g1∗ = g2∗.
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This assumption implies that the extent of a marginal increase of one’s own
private lobbying is the same as the negative extent of a marginal increase
of the opponent’s private lobbying. If both ﬁrm increase private lobbying
by the same amount, individual loopholes do not change.26In this case, mere
counteractive eﬀects prevail. The maximization problems of the ﬁrms are
given as follows. Note that we cannot substitute for pi anymore, as the
lobbying budgets are endogenous:
max
p1,g1
Π1(p1, p2, g1, g2, θ) = −A1 [E1(p1, p2, g1, g2, θ)]− p1 − g1, (6.3)
max
p2,g2
Π2(p1, p2, g1, g2, θ) = −A2 [E2(p1, p2, g1, g2, θ)]− p2 − g2. (6.4)
Again, θ is parameter which reﬂects the responsiveness of the politician to
private lobbying. The appendix describes properties of the equilibrium and
















In analogy to chapter 6.2.1, an increase of θ indicates that the politician gets
more responsive to private lobbying. The marginal eﬀect of private lobbying
on individual loopholes increases. Following chapter 6.2, I assume that both
ﬁrms are aﬀected in the same way if the politician gets more responsive to
private lobbying: liiθ > 0 and l
j
jθ > 0).
Proposition 6.5 With an endogenous budget and assumption 6.5, if the
politician gets more responsive to private lobbying of both ﬁrms, then private
lobbying eﬀorts of both ﬁrms increase.
Proof. As θ is a parameter for the responsiveness of the politician to private
lobbying, individual pollution standards can be written as
26If this assumption does not hold, a similar increase of private lobbying by both ﬁrms
inﬂuences the incentives for general lobbying as well. Interactions between private and
general lobbying emerge, which may aﬀect the results of this chapter in an important way.
This is subject to further research.
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Ei(p1, p2, g1, g2, θ) = B(g1 + g2) + li(p1, p2, θ),







) > 0 and dgi∗
dθ
= 0.
The intuition for the result is as follows: If the politician gets more respon-
sive to private lobbying, each ﬁrm has a direct incentive to increase private
lobbying. An increase of private lobbying tends to decrease incentives for
general lobbying, because the base level of allowed pollution becomes less
important.27 The competitor increases private lobbying as well, which c.p.
leads to a decline of the individual loophole. This makes general lobbying
more attractive. By assumption 6.5, these two eﬀects oﬀset each other, and
individual loopholes do not increase. As a result, a general increase in the re-
sponsiveness to private lobbying leads only to counteractive lobbying eﬀects,
but not to a change in regulation. There is no eﬀect on the equilibrium basic
levels of pollution, the individual loopholes and the overall level of pollution.
Firms lose if the politician gets more responsive to private lobbying, because
they increase lobbying eﬀorts without any gain. Firms may face an incentive
to form a lobbying coalition in order to overcome this situation. But in a
non-cooperative setting, an increase of one’s own private lobbying is the best
response to an increase of the competitor’s private lobbying.
6.4 Conclusions
The analysis shows that distributive concerns among anti-environmentalists
lobbies may lead to an improvement of environmental quality. Firms focus
on private lobbying if they expect politicians to supply loopholes - but these
private lobbying eﬀorts tend to cancel each other out. If the lobbying budget
is ﬁxed, an increase in private lobbying induces a decrease in general lobbying.
Environmental quality improves, as the total amount of allowed pollution
depends mainly on the amount of general lobbying. If the lobbying budget
is ﬂexible and private and general lobbying are substitutes, an increases in
private lobbying tends to induce a decrease in general lobbying. In this case
the same reasoning applies.
Although this model is formulated as a lobbying game against environmental
27Remember that private and general lobbying eﬀorts are strategic substitutes (compare
the appendix for details).
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regulation, the general idea is of broader scope: If loopholes become more
important, interest groups may focus their lobbying activities on counterac-
tive private lobbying. The increased importance of loopholes reduces general
lobbying eﬀorts, and the overall inﬂuence of special interests on the degree
of regulation declines.
Is this framework also applicable to international trade models where interest
groups inﬂuence the structure of protection (Grossman and Helpman 1994b,
Aidt 1997, Mitra 1999), or models where ﬁrms inﬂuence taxes or competition
policy (Dixit 1996, Neven and Ro¨ller 2000), or other models of environmental
regulation (Aidt 1998, Damania 1999, Fredriksson 1997)?
The main characteristic of the type of policies is that allocative policies and
distributive policies tend to be separated from each other. Firms agree about
the allocative dimension of policy making, namely low general emission stan-
dards. But they disagree about the distribution of its beneﬁts. The focus on
the separation of allocative and distributive eﬀects by diﬀerent policies is a
diﬀerence to the above mentioned models: For instance, if the policy under
consideration is the structure of protection, each ﬁrm prefers high protection
in its own sector and low protection in all other sectors. Therefore ﬁrms
compete for favorable policies, and allocative and distributive eﬀects are not
separated as clearly as in this model.28,29
In this model, the policy parameter itself entails no competitive element,
since all ﬁrms uniformly prefer high levels of allowed pollution. So this ap-
proach is not directly applicable to policies like protection rates and taxa-
tion, as these also entail competitive elements. Even though the policy itself
(namely low regulation) is not debatable between groups in this context, ﬁrms
compete about the distribution of gains from that policy. Hence the model
implements lobbying competition through the idea that individual pollution
standards can only increase by beggar-thy-neighbor behavior, given that the
total amount of pollution is ﬁxed.
To which type of policies does the framework apply? The policy must be
28Note that an increase of private lobbying aﬀects the allocation of emission rights
indirectly in this model, because less resources are used for general lobbying. Moreover,
private lobbying also has direct eﬀects on the total level of allowed emission in the loophole
speciﬁcation.
29To be more precise, consider two organized sectors: They compete about protection in
their own sectors, but agree that protection in all other sectors should be low. Accordingly,
there is also a common interest. However, if one focuses on lobbying for protection in one’s
own sector, ﬁrms have opposing interests.
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characterized by the property that interest groups have a common aim, but
compete about the distribution of its beneﬁt. Relevant policy setups may be
the following:
• International bargaining setups like trade, environmental or investment
agreements: Consider for instance governments who bargain in an in-
ternational investment agreement about the degree of protection of each
country. Then domestic lobby groups prefer a high general degree of
protection for their country. But given that a certain level of protection
is realized, ﬁrms compete about how protection should be distributed
across sectors.
• Federal systems and equalization of costs between local governments:
Consider net recipients in a federal system, like some countries in the
EU or some states in the German revenue equalization scheme. They
have a common interest in a high level of redistribution, but compete
about the distribution of these gains.
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6.5 Appendix
Existence of Equilibrium and Implicit Function Theorem
Lemma 6.1 (Existence of equilibrium): A pure Nash equilibrium exists in
any speciﬁcation of the game under assumptions 6.2-6.4.
Proof. A Nash equilibrium exists if the strategy space of any individual
is a non-empty, convex and compact subset of R, and the payoﬀ functions
are continuous and quasi-concave (Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995),
Prop. 8.D.3).
The strategy space in the ﬁxed budget cases is non-empty, convex and com-
pact, since pi ∈ [0, 1] and gi ∈ [0, 1]. The strategy space in the ﬂexible
budget cases is non-empty and convex, but not compact, since pi ∈ [0,∞(
and gi ∈ [0,∞(. But we can restrict the strategy space to a compact subset
without aﬀecting the results, if all strictly dominated strategies are elimi-
nated. Such a modiﬁed strategy space always exists, because lobbying is
costly and abatement costs are bounded above by assumption 6.1: Proﬁts
net of lobbying costs will never be below Πi = −A, independent of lobbying
eﬀorts of ﬁrm i and j. Thus it cannot be optimal to induce private and general
lobbying eﬀorts which exceed the maximum abatement costs. Any optimal
private lobbying eﬀort satisﬁes pi ≤ A, and gi ≤ A by the same reasoning.









which are non-empty, convex and compact subsets of R.
The payoﬀ function Πi is continuous and concave in pi and gi in each spec-
iﬁcation, as straight forward calculations show. Concavity implies quasi-
concavity, and hence an equilibrium exists.
Lemma 6.2 The implicit function theorem is applicable, and comparative
statics results can be derived.
Proof. The implicit function theorem is applicable, if the proﬁt functions
are twice continuously diﬀerentiable with respect to p1, p2 and θ, and the
determinant of the Jacobian matrix is non-zero. Diﬀerentiability applies,
because the proﬁt functions are continuous with respect to all variables. The
Jacobian matrix is non-zero by assumption 6.4.
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Flexible Lobbying Budget
The ﬁrst order conditions for each ﬁrm are
Πipi = −A′Eipi − 1
!
= 0,
Πigi = −A′Eigi − 1
!
= 0.
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Note that Π1g1p2 = −Π1g1p1 since the loophole function is symmetric with
respect to private lobbying eﬀorts around the equilibrium (lii = −lij).
Most signs of the derivatives are standard and as expected. Note that
Πigipi < 0, which means that the marginal eﬀect of general lobbying on proﬁts
decreases if private lobbying increases. This implies that private and general
lobbying are strategic substitutes with this speciﬁcation. The reason is an
(indirect) convexity eﬀect of the abatement cost function: Since the indi-
vidual pollution standards Ei are separable in private and general lobbying,
an increase in private lobbying has no (direct) marginal eﬀect on general
lobbying, and vice versa. But an increase in private lobbying increases the
level of allowed pollution for the ﬁrm. Since the abatement cost function is
convex in Ei, an increase through private lobbying decreases the marginal
cost reduction of an additional amount of general lobbying. Hence Πigipi < 0.
The same reasoning applies for Πigipj > 0: If ﬁrm j increases private lobbying,
the loophole of the ﬁrm i shrinks. This implies that an increase in general
lobbying leads to more cost savings, since an additional unit of allowed emis-
sions is more valuable if Ei is low.
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One aspect of globalization is the increasing importance of multinational
companies. Worldwide nominal in- and outﬂows of foreign direct investment
grew from about 40-60 billions of US dollar in 1982 to about 1200 billion
US dollar in 2000. The average growth rates of foreign direct investment are
much higher than comparable growth rates, i.e. productivity, GDP or even
trade (UNCTAD 2001, OECD 1999b). Some authors argue that economic
inﬂuence on the political process has grown due to this aspect of globalization
(e.g. Reich (1993), Summers (1999)). This perception sometimes culminates
in the notion of ’the loss of sovereignty’ of the nation state. It reﬂects the
idea that, due to the process of globalization, national governments lost al-
most any discretion to set national policy, because the bargaining position of
multinational companies vis a vis national governments has improved. The
reason is that ﬁrms relocate their production plants if governments set un-
wanted policies. As governments care about the presence of these ﬁrms, they
are caught in a ”race to the bottom” (Rauscher 1995), and there is almost
no discretion left to set national policy.1
An extensive literature exists which investigates lobbying activities of ﬁrms
in the context of international trade models. But only little attention has
1Compare also Janeba (2000) and the quoted literature there.
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been paid to the analysis of lobbying activities of multinational ﬁrms so
far.2 The aim of this paper is to analyze diﬀerences in lobbying incentives
between multinational and national ﬁrms, and show how they aﬀect the po-
litical outcome. The paper attempts to address the following questions: How
do lobbying incentives of multinationals diﬀer from those of national ﬁrms?
Will their inﬂuence be higher or smaller? What is the political outcome if
multinationals are present: Will regulation be more lax?
To answer these questions, the distinction between a national and a multi-
national ﬁrm needs to be clariﬁed. Obviously, a multinational ﬁrm produces
in at least two regions, in contrast to a national ﬁrm. But this distinction
lacks precision: Each national ﬁrm may also relocate production abroad as a
reaction towards rigid domestic regulation, and thus become a multinational.
Accordingly, each national must be regarded as a potential multinational.
In this approach, I deﬁne a multinational as a ﬁrm which can relocate pro-
duction with smaller moving costs than a national ﬁrm. To justify this view,
consider a ﬁrm which intends to relocate production. A multinational pos-
sesses general skills and knowledge which are essential for operation in foreign
countries. For instance, it possesses a network for cross-border communica-
tion, has knowledge how to handle cultural diﬀerences and is accustomed to
foreign law. A national ﬁrm lacks such knowledge. In addition, if the multi-
national already runs a plant in the foreign country, expanding this plant
will generally cause smaller costs than building a plant from scratch, which
is necessary if a national ﬁrm wants to move abroad.
I will show that it is not obvious in such a setup that multinationals have
more inﬂuence on the political process than national ﬁrms: On the one hand,
a multinational might have smaller stakes in the home market. It can move
at least a part of the production to a foreign country if the government
sets unwanted regulation. The option to escape national regulation tends
to reduce incentives to engage in lobbying activities against it. It should be
expected that this eﬀect leads to less political inﬂuence of multinationals.
On the other hand, a government might be interested that multinationals
produce at home. For instance, it might care about local production, the
number of ﬁrms in the domestic market, or tax revenue. This aspect tends to
improve the inﬂuence of multinational companies on national regulation. In
sum, even though lobbying activities of multinationals might be less intense,
they might also be more successful.
2Exceptions are Ellingsen and Warneryd (1999), Grossman and Helpman (1996), or
Konishi et al. (1999).
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The paper analyzes these aspects in a general lobbying game. The ﬁrst part
derives diﬀerences in lobbying incentives between national and multinational
ﬁrms. I employ a reduced form model of imperfect competition, which can
easily be applied to speciﬁc market forms. The second part describes the
lobbying game. It investigates how ﬁrms determine contributions to the
government, and derives the political outcome.
Two branches of recent literature are related to the analysis: Approaches
towards analyzing the location decisions of ﬁrms are used to derive the dif-
ferent incentives for plant relocation. For instance, Horstmann and Markusen
(1992) or Krugman (1991) are seminal papers in this ﬁeld. Lobbying games
in the context of international trade policy were pioneered by Hillman (1989),
Hillman and Ursprung (1988), Mayer (1984), Grossman and Helpman (1994a).
For recent research in this area compare e.g. Goldberg and Maggi (1999) or
Mitra (1999). Grossman and Helpman (2001) and chapters 2 to 5 (Polk
2002a) provide comprehensive surveys about the literature.
This paper is organized as follows: Chapter 7.2 introduces the basic set-up
of the model and gives relevant deﬁnitions. In chapter 7.3, I derive general
conditions which imply that national and multinational ﬁrms have diﬀerent
stakes in national regulation. These general results will be applied to speciﬁc
forms of competition thereafter. The insights of the general model then work
as a basis for the lobbying game in chapter 7.4. I use a slightly modiﬁed
framework and analyze the lobbying process. The choice of the optimal
contribution function and resulting regulation will be characterized. Chapter
7.5 concludes.
7.2 The basic set-up
There are two countries (’home’ and ’foreign’), which are separated by trans-
portation costs s. Production in the home country is subject to real valued
regulation r > 0, which decreases variable proﬁts. The producing ﬁrm is
either a national ﬁrm or a multinational. Production in the foreign country
is not subject to regulation. One might think of r as a tax, environmental
regulation, or a product standard which increases costs.3 The foreign coun-
3Note that the type of regulation in this model does not inﬂuence the characteristics
of the good. Goods produced at home and in the foreign country are homogenous, inde-
pendent of the level of domestic regulation. The idea is that regulation does not serve as
a means to diﬀerentiate domestic from foreign goods. This type of regulation applies for
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try does not set any policy, independent of the home country’s policy choice.
The home country can thus be interpreted as being small.4
I analyze the location decision of a multinational ﬁrm, which initially pro-
duces in the home country and serves the foreign country through exports.
The ﬁrm can react to a change in national regulation via relocation: It can
either stay in the home country and export to the other country, or it can
relocate partially or completely to the foreign country. In the latter case,
it serves the market of the home country through exports. Relocation has
two eﬀects on proﬁts. First, variable proﬁts change, because the marginal
costs of production depend on national regulation and transportation costs.
Second, total proﬁts are aﬀected, because the ﬁrm faces ﬁxed moving costs
if it relocates production.
I assume that the proﬁts of the ﬁrm depend on the policy choice r, on trans-
portation costs s and on the location decision l. Markets are imperfect, and
proﬁt functions are given in reduced form. It is assumed that a unique solu-
tion to the product market game exists, with equilibrium quantities denoted
as q(r).5 Firm’s proﬁts can then be written in reduced form as
Π = Πl(r, s)− δF l.
The superscript l ∈ {nr, pr, cr} denotes the location choice of the multina-
tional ﬁrm. nr means ’no relocation’, pr means ’partial relocation’ and cr
means ’complete relocation’. Location structure nr is the starting point of
the analysis. The ﬁrm produces in the home country and serves the foreign
market through exports. Parameter δ is a dummy, which is equal to one if
the ﬁrm relocates (partially or completely). If it does not relocate, then no
ﬁxed costs arise and δ = 0. Note that the ﬁxed moving costs F l are indexed
as well. The model allows for diﬀerent levels of these costs dependent on the
choice of location.
instance to environmental standards, which aﬀect the way a good is produced, but not the
good itself (i.e. water and air pollution, waste management, social security standards etc.).
Other examples are competition policies aﬀecting the degree of competition in a market
(and hence proﬁts), or tax policies. The model does not cover regulation policies which
diﬀerentiate the good subject to regulation from others, as for instance laws which pro-
hibit certain ingredients in food. Moreover, the model does not apply to regulation which
aﬀects production in both countries, as for instance general labor standards or tariﬀs.
4In this chapter I assume that regulation is exogenous. I will determine regulation
endogenously in chapter 7.4.
5Since the model allows for international trade, the amount of goods consumed in the
home country qD may diﬀer from the amount of goods produced in the home country, qS .
This distinction will not be used in this chapter, but in chapter 7.4.
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To analyze diﬀerences in lobbying incentives between a national and a multi-
national ﬁrm, I consider the eﬀect of a policy change on proﬁts for two types
of ﬁrms: (i) If the ﬁrm is a multinational, the location structure is an en-
dogenous choice variable. The multinational might react to the policy choice
through relocation. The location decision depends on transportation costs,
the amount of regulation, and ﬁxed moving costs. I will derive conditions in
chapter 7.3, such that the multinational takes advantage of this opportunity.
(ii) If the ﬁrm is a national ﬁrm, it cannot relocate production. The loca-
tion structure is given exogenously as l = nr in this case. A national ﬁrm
is restricted to produce in the home country and serve the foreign country
through exports, irrespective of the amount of regulation r.
The following deﬁnition summarizes the approach:
Deﬁnition 7.1 A national ﬁrm has location structure l = nr. Proﬁts of a
national ﬁrm are given by
ΠNAT (r, s) = Πnr (s, r) .
A multinational ﬁrm chooses its location structure endogenously. Proﬁts of
the multinational are
ΠMNE(r, s) = max
l
{
Πl (s, r)− δF l} , l ∈ {nr, pr, cr} .
The idea that the national ﬁrm cannot move may appear overly restrictive.
A national ﬁrm might also be able to relocate production and become a
multinational, although at higher costs. The reasons for this assumption is
tractability: If the national ﬁrm is also allowed to relocate production, the
following arguments are still valid if moving costs of the national ﬁrm are
higher than those of the multinational. The focus is on diﬀerences in proﬁts
between a multinational and a national ﬁrm, and the resulting diﬀerences
in lobbying incentives. These exist whenever moving costs diﬀer. Hence I
normalize moving costs to be prohibitively high, such that the national ﬁrm
will never relocate production, even though in principle it could.
Figure 7.1 illustrates an arbitrary proﬁt function of the multinational, which
is the upper bound of the proﬁt functions for each location decision. The
proﬁt function of the national ﬁrm is given by Πnr.
The aim is to derive some general principles on how multinational and na-
tional ﬁrms diﬀer in their inﬂuence on the political process. The structure of
- 102-












Figure 7.1: Proﬁts of the multinational depend on the location decision
l ∈ {nr, pr, cr}. It is the upper bound of national ﬁrm’s proﬁts (printed
in boldface).
the model is very general and does not rely on any speciﬁc form of competi-
tion at this stage. It entails only some general assumptions on the behavior
and shape of the proﬁt functions, which are satisﬁed in most models of com-
petition.
The ﬁrst assumption deﬁnes critical upper and lower bounds for transporta-
tion costs s and the regulation parameter r. It serves to exclude some rather
uninteresting cases: For instance, if transportation costs were allowed to be
very high, both markets would be completely separated. Then it could never
be the case that the multinational relocates completely and serves the do-
mestic market through exports. Hence, either the multinational produces in
the home country; then there is no diﬀerence between the national and the
multinational ﬁrm. Or the multinational produces abroad; but then national
regulation does not aﬀect it at all, because markets are completely separated.
To exclude this uninteresting case, transportation costs are bounded above,
and it is always possible to serve a market through exports.
The regulation parameter is also bounded above. Regulation increases the
cost of production. Thus very strict regulation can lead to negative variable
proﬁts of the national ﬁrm. To exclude this case, I restrict the parameter
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range or r. Regulation will never drive the national ﬁrm out of the market.6
Note that the upper bound for r may depend on the exogenous parameter
s, that is r = r(s). The same applies for s, which may be a function of the
realized level of regulation, s = s(r):
Assumption 7.1 a) Upper bounds for r and s exist: Variable proﬁts are
negative for any value of s, if r > r. Markets are completely separated by
transportation costs for any value of r, if s > s.
b) The government sets regulation, such that proﬁts are positive if production
takes place in the home country: r ∈ [0, r].
Transportation costs do not separate the markets completely, and both coun-
tries can be served through exports: s ∈ [0, s].
The next two assumptions state how regulation aﬀects proﬁts in the home
country. Regulation decreases proﬁts if the ﬁrm produces at least partly in
the home country. This is a rather intuitive assumption and is satisﬁed for
most forms of competition.7 If production takes place in the foreign country
only, regulation in the home country may increase or decrease proﬁts of the
multinational. The eﬀect is ambiguous and depends on the speciﬁc form of
competition. For instance, I allow for circumstances where ﬁrms beneﬁt from
raising rivals’ costs, as is the case in the application to Cournot competition
discussed in chapter 7.3.2.8
Assumption 7.2 If a ﬁrm produces at least partly in the home country, reg-
ulation decreases proﬁts: ∂Π
l(s,r)
∂r
< 0, if l ∈ {nr, pr}. If the multinational
does not produce in the home country, regulation aﬀects its proﬁts monoton-
ically.
Since regulation aﬀects only domestic production, but not production abroad,
it is intuitive to assume that regulation has a higher impact if more produc-
tion takes place in the home country. Note that the assumption allows that
6This implies that the multinational is not driven out of the market either, because it
can always perform at least as good as the national ﬁrm.
7A contrary view for the special case of environmental regulation is given by Porter
(1991) and Porter and van der Linde (1995). However, their argument relies on some spe-
ciﬁc conditions and cannot be sustained for environmental regulation in general (Schmut-
zler 2001).
8In a basic model of Cournot competition, proﬁts of the multinational increase if the
competitor in the home market faces higher variable costs through regulation.
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proﬁts depend positively on regulation if the multinational produces solely
in the foreign country. I make the following assumption on the impact of
regulation on proﬁts:9
Assumption 7.3 There is a positive relationship between the extent of pro-










Moving costs depend on the location structure in the following sense:
Assumption 7.4 Moving costs depend on the type of relocation: If the ﬁrm
relocates completely to the foreign country, ﬁxed moving costs are higher than
with partial relocation, i.e. F cr ≥ F pr. With no relocation, δ = 0, otherwise
δ = 1.
Assumption 7.4 is a ’monotonicity assumption’ on the amount of ﬁxed mov-
ing costs, which assures that each location structure is optimal for a speciﬁc
parameter range. If this assumption did not hold and F cr < F pr, it would
never be optimal to relocate partially: Suppose that regulation is low and
production in the home country is optimal. If regulation increases such that
it becomes optimal to relocate, partial relocation is no option. The reason
is that partial relocation has two negative eﬀects compared to complete re-
location: First, the ﬁrm escapes national regulation only partly, which leads
leads to lower variable proﬁts compared to complete relocation. Second,
ﬁxed moving costs are higher. However, transportation costs could be saved.
But since it was optimal to bear transportation costs in the ﬁrst place with
slightly lower regulation, transportation costs cannot be the sole reason to
relocate partially.10
Figure 7.2 provides examples on how the proﬁt functions of the multinational
and the national ﬁrm might look like.
I will denote the loss of proﬁts through regulation as the ’stakes’ of a ﬁrm
in the home market. The stakes of a ﬁrm deﬁne possible beneﬁts through
9Note that this assumption can be written in a more intuitive, but slightly less precise
way as
∣∣∣∂Πnr(r,s)∂r ∣∣∣ ≥ ∣∣∣∂Πpr(r,s)∂r ∣∣∣ ≥ ∣∣∣∂Πcr(r,s)∂r ∣∣∣.
10Note that proﬁts decrease continuously in regulation by assumption 7.2. Moreover,
they decrease faster with partial relocation by assumption 7.3.
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Figure 7.2: Possible proﬁt functions of the national and the multinational
ﬁrm satisfying assumptions 7.1 to 7.4.
lobbying. If the multinational has smaller stakes in the home market than
a national ﬁrm, regulation aﬀects the ﬁrm to a smaller extent. Other things
equal, this should result in a smaller interest for the multinational to engage
in costly lobbying.
The following deﬁnition states the idea of smaller stakes in the home market
formally. In the remainder of the paper, I will use the following notation:
∆ ≡ r − r0 is the change in regulation from r0 to r, ∆ΠMNE(r, s,∆) ≡
ΠMNE(r, s)−ΠMNE(r−∆, s) denotes the corresponding proﬁt change of the
multinational ﬁrm, and ∆ΠNAT (r, s,∆) ≡ ΠNAT (r, s)−ΠNAT (r−∆, s) for the
national. Note that if r > r0, ∆ΠNAT (r, s,∆) < 0, but ∆ΠMNE(r, s,∆) ≷ 0
by assumptions 7.2 and 7.3.11
Deﬁnition 7.2 For a given level of transportation costs s, the multinational
company has smaller stakes in the home country compared to a national ﬁrm,
if and only if∣∣∆ΠMNE(r, s,∆)∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∆ΠNAT (r, s,∆)∣∣ for all r, ∆
and ∣∣∆ΠMNE(r, s,∆)∣∣ < ∣∣∆ΠNAT (r, s,∆)∣∣ for at least one pair of r, ∆.
11Note that ΠMNE(r, s) denotes the proﬁts of the multinational which result from the
maximization problem over the location decision.
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7.3 The interest of MNEs in national policies
7.3.1 A general model
To analyze diﬀerences in lobbying between a multinational and a national
ﬁrm, incentives to lobby need to be distinguished from the impact of lobbying
on the policy decision. This chapter focusses on the incentives to inﬂuence
political decisions. I show that multinational companies have diﬀerent stakes
in domestic regulation than national ﬁrms. The result of this chapter will
then be used in chapter 7.4, which focusses on the eﬀectiveness of lobbying.
Whether a multinational has smaller stakes in the home market than a na-
tional ﬁrm depends on the relationship of the exogenous parameters for trans-
portation costs s, regulation r and ﬁxed moving costs F l. When the multi-
national decides if to relocate production, it has to take diﬀerent aspects into
account. First, if it relocates, ﬁxed moving costs reduce proﬁts. On the other
hand, relocation serves to escape national regulation, and proﬁts decline to
a smaller extent. Therefore the relation between ﬁxed moving costs and the
change in variable proﬁts through regulation is essential for the decision to
relocate production. Second, if the multinational relocates, variable costs
change because transportation costs become more or less important. For in-
stance, if the multinational relocates partially, transportation costs become
less important. If it relocates completely, the importance of transportation
costs increases.
To illustrate these aspects, take the initial location structure as a starting
point. The multinational produces in the home country only. If it relocates
partially, it saves transportation costs, because the foreign market tends to
be served by local production. The gain from relocation is two-fold: The
ﬁrm escapes national regulation and saves transportation costs. Next, sup-
pose the ﬁrm is present in both markets. When it decides if to relocate
completely, it has to bear increased transportation costs to serve the home
market, which cannot be served by local production anymore. Therefore, the
gain is to escape national regulation, but only at the cost of higher ﬁxed and
transportation costs.
The optimal location decision is determined by the amount of ﬁxed costs
which have to be paid for relocation, given speciﬁc values of transportation
costs and regulation.12 The following proposition speciﬁes this:
12Figure 7.2 shows that ﬁxed costs shift the proﬁt functions vertically. Their value is
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Proposition 7.1 Suppose the following conditions are satisﬁed:
(i) F pr < Πpr(r, s)− Πnr(r, s) or
F cr < Πcr(r, s)− Πnr(r, s).
(ii) F pr > Πpr(0, s)− Πnr(0, s).
The multinational has the same stakes in the home market compared to a
national ﬁrm if regulation is lax (i.e. for small r). If the regulation gets
tighter and reaches a critical level, the multinational has smaller stakes in
the home market than a national ﬁrm.
Proof. The proof is given in the appendix.
The multinational has the same stakes as a national ﬁrm if it produces in
the home country only. This is the case if it is optimal to produce at home
with the smallest possible regulation. If this was not the case, it would
never be optimal to produce in the home country only, because variable
proﬁts decline in r. Condition (ii) of the proposition states the respective
condition: If, for the smallest level of regulation, the diﬀerence in proﬁts
between partial relocation and no relocation is smaller than the amount of
necessary ﬁxed costs to relocate partially, it is not proﬁtable to relocate
production. Complete production in the home country is the best location
structure in this case.
If regulation becomes tighter, the multinational must have an incentive to
move abroad. If this is not the case, diﬀerences between multinational and
national companies do not exist. We must assure that the multinational
has an incentive to relocate production either partially or completely for
some regulation parameter r. It suﬃces to consider the upper bound r,
because variable proﬁts decline in r. Condition (i) states these requirements:
Fixed costs for either partial or complete relocation must be less than the
diﬀerence in proﬁts between some type of relocation and production at home,
if regulation is strictest. These conditions are suﬃcient, because proﬁts are
continuous and declining in r if production takes at least partially place in
the home country (assumption 7.2 and 7.3). An interval of regulation exists,
which induces relocation of the multinational. The national ﬁrm cannot
move by deﬁnition. As a result, both ﬁrms face diﬀerent proﬁts with high
regulation, if condition (i) of proposition 7.1 applies.
essential for the determination of the optimal location structure.
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Note that we are not primarily interested in the diﬀerence in proﬁts, but
in diﬀerent stakes between the national and the multinational ﬁrm. The
term ’stakes’ accrues to a change in proﬁts due to a change in regulation,
not to the height of proﬁts per se (compare deﬁnition 7.2). Proposition 7.1
implies that the multinational has higher proﬁts than the national ﬁrm if
regulation is tight, and that there is no diﬀerence in proﬁts if regulation is
lax. Trivially, the latter case implies that both types of ﬁrms have the same
stakes in the home market if regulation is low. If proﬁts are identical, both
ﬁrms have the same stakes. However, condition (i) alone does not imply
that the multinational has smaller stakes in the home market if regulation is
high. It only implies that proﬁts are diﬀerent; but even though the amount
of proﬁts is diﬀerent, the stakes of both ﬁrms may be the same if they are
aﬀected through a change in regulation in the same way.
It is assumptions 7.2 and 7.3 which assure that diﬀerent proﬁts lead to dif-
ferent stakes. Unequal proﬁts result from diﬀerent location structures. As-
sumption 7.2 implies that proﬁts decrease in regulation if the ﬁrm produces
in the home country. This assumption alone is not suﬃcient to induce dif-
ferent stakes between the ﬁrms. Assumption 7.3 assures that the extent of
regulation on proﬁts increases if more production takes place at home. The
combination of these two assumptions leads to the result of proposition 7.1.
Figure 7.3 illustrates it graphically.13
If the general model is applied to speciﬁc forms of competition, proposition
7.1 gives upper and lower bounds for ﬁxed moving costs, which depend on
transportation costs and regulation. If moving costs are above the upper
bound, relocation is no means to escape regulation. The cost of moving
abroad exceeds its beneﬁts, which is less impact of regulation and possibly
lower transportation costs. In this case no diﬀerences between a multinational
and a national ﬁrm exist.
The following corollary contrasts this to the case where the multinational has
always smaller stakes in the home market, independent of the regulation in
place. Intuitively, this is the case if moving costs are small relative to possible
gains of relocation. Corollary 7.1 gives conditions only on the upper bound of
ﬁxed costs. The intuition is analogous to the one of proposition 7.1. I simply
state the result, the left part of ﬁgure 7.2 plots a corresponding situation.
Note that a condition similar to condition (i) of the previous proposition is
not necessary. Proﬁts decline faster in regulation if more production takes
13Note that the argument does not rely on the type of relocation (partially or com-
pletely). The relevant condition is that production moves at all.
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Figure 7.3: A national and multinational ﬁrm have diﬀerent stakes in reg-
ulation if regulation is high. If it is low, both ﬁrms have the same stakes.
The multinational completely relocates if regulation is strict and ﬁxed costs
are small. In this case transportation costs tend to be small, such that com-
plete relocation becomes an option if regulation is suﬃciently high (left). If
ﬁxed costs for complete relocation are high, or transportation costs play an
important role, complete relocation is never optimal (right).
place in the home country. The stated condition thus also implies condition
(i) of proposition 7.1.
Corollary 7.1 Suppose the following condition is satisﬁed:
F pr < Πpr(0, s)− Πnr(0, s).
The multinational has smaller stakes in the home market compared to a na-
tional ﬁrm, independent of the regulation r.
Proof. Follows immediately from the proof of proposition 7.1.
7.3.2 An application to Cournot competition
This chapter applies the general model to a basic two-stage game. Firms play
Cournot competition and face linear demand. The regulation is an input tax
t which increases marginal costs. In the ﬁrst stage, the multinational chooses
a location structure for a given tax, as described in the previous chapter. In
the second stage, ﬁrms play Cournot competition. The game is solved by
backwards induction.
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The notation is as follows: There are two countries k ∈ {home, foreign}, and
two ﬁrms X and Y which produce a homogeneous good consumed in both
countries. The amount of the good produced by ﬁrm X (Y) and consumed
in country k is denoted by xk (yk). Consumers in each country have linear
demand pk = a − xk − yk, where p denotes the price of the good and a is a
market parameter. Firm Y produces in the foreign country. It is inactive and
cannot relocate in the ﬁrst stage of the game.14 The analysis focuses on ﬁrm
X, which is initially located in the home country. It can relocate production
if it is a multinational, and can not do so if it is a national ﬁrm.
The cost structures of both ﬁrms consist of two parts: There are constant
marginal costs, which consist of production costs m, transportation costs s
if the ﬁrm exports to the other country, and the input tax t of ﬁrm X if
it produces at home. Plant speciﬁc ﬁxed costs F arise if the multinational
moves production. For simplicity, I assume that F ≡ F pr = F cr. If part of
the production takes place in the foreign country, the multinational is able
to move production completely without further costs.
Standard calculations yield ﬁrm X’s variable proﬁts for a given tax in the
home country, and for each possible location structure:15 With two ﬁrms
having constant marginal costs cx and cy, and linear demand with slope -1,
standard derivations show that the multinational sells xk = 1
3
(a− 2ckx + cky),
and ﬁrm Y sells yk = 1
3
(a− 2cky + ckx) in each market. Variable proﬁts in each
market are Πkx =
1
9
(a− 2ckx + cky)2 and Πky = 19(a− 2cky + ckx)
2
respectively.
Straightforward application and accounting for ﬁxed costs yields the relevant
proﬁt functions for each location structure.16
Proposition 7.2 Suppose the following conditions are satisﬁed:
(i) s ≥ 0; t ≥ 0,
(ii) a−m ≥ 2(s+ t),





A multinational and a national ﬁrm have the same stakes in the home market
if the tax is small. If the tax reaches a critical level, a multinational ﬁrm has
14Firm Y can be interpreted as the rest of the market.
15Compare for instance Tirole (1988, Chapt. 5.4).
16Πnr(s, t) = 19 [(a−m+ s− 2t)2 + (a−m− 2s− 2t)2],
Πpr(s, t) = 19 [(a−m+ s− 2t)2 + (a−m)2]− F ,
Πcr(s, t) = 19 [(a−m− s)2 + (a−m)2]− F .
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smaller stakes in the home market.
Proof. The proof is given in the appendix.
The conditions of this proposition result from assumptions 7.1 to 7.4, and
from application of proposition 7.1:
Fixed costs for relocation are independent of the location structure, therefore
assumption 7.4 is trivially satisﬁed. Assumption 7.1 requests that upper and
lower bounds for s and t exist, such that all markets are served for parameters
within this range. Conditions (i) and (ii) of proposition 7.2 deﬁne these
bounds. Note that the upper bounds of s and t depend on each other.
The highest possible tax rate depends on the height of transportation costs
and vice versa. These conditions imply s(t) = (a − m)/2 − t, t(s) = (a −
m)/2 − s. Assumptions 7.2 and 7.3 are then satisﬁed as well, as is shown
in the appendix. The conditions of proposition 7.1 are satisﬁed if and only
if F lies within the stated parameter range. Therefore, the general result of
proposition 7.1 holds, and the result follows.17
One particular shape for the proﬁt functions is given in ﬁgure 7.3 above. This
is not the only possible shape. Three diﬀerent cases might arise, depending
of the values of s and t. To distinguish these, I deﬁne s∗ as a critical level
of transportation costs. If s > s∗, the multinational will never relocate
completely to the foreign country. The critical level of transportation costs
results from the condition Πpr(s, t) = Πcr(s, t), which deﬁnes s∗. It states
that proﬁts under complete relocation are the same as proﬁts with partial
relocation, given that the tax level reaches its maximum level t. In this case,
the multinational will never relocate completely. Even if regulation takes its
maximum value, proﬁts with partial relocation are at least as high as proﬁts




The following values of the tax parameter will be used in corollary 7.2. They
deﬁne critical levels of transportation costs, such that the multinational is
indiﬀerent between no relocation and partial relocation (t1), and partial relo-
cation and complete relocation (t2). These values depend on transportation
costs and moving costs. t1 results from the condition Πnr(s, t) = Πpr(s, t) ,
and t2 from Πpr(s, t) = Πcr(s, t):
17For derivations of the relevant parameter ranges consult the proof in the appendix.
18Note that markets are not separated completely if s > s∗, because partial relocation
may be optimal.
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The following corollary gives the explicit solutions of this Cournot model:
Corollary 7.2 Suppose that the conditions of proposition 7.2 are satisﬁed.
It is possible to distinguish three cases.
The multinational does not relocate completely if transportation costs are high
(s > s∗). It produces in the home country and exports to the foreign country
if taxes are low (t ≤ t1). If taxes are high (t > t1), the multinational relocates
partly and serves both markets through local production.
If transportation costs are small (s < s∗), but s > t1, three diﬀerent location
structure arise:
• The multinational does not relocate if t < t1 < s.
• The multinational relocates partly if t1 < t < s.
• The multinational relocates completely if t1 < s < t.
If transportation costs are low (s < s∗), and s < t1, the multinational will
never produce in both countries:
• The multinational does not relocate if t < t2.
• The multinational relocates completely if t > t2.
Proof. The proof is given in the appendix.
The intuition corresponds to the former chapter. For a graphical illustra-
tion compare ﬁgure 7.3: The right hand side illustrates the case of high
transportation costs (s > s∗). It never pays to relocate completely, even if
regulation is very high. The left hand side illustrates the case of low trans-
portation costs (t1 < s < s∗). If pays to relocate partially if regulation is
intermediate. If it is suﬃciently high, complete relocation is the best choice.
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Figure 7.4 shows how the relocation decision depends on transportation costs,

















t high transportation costs
case b
Figure 7.4: Optimal location decisions of a national ﬁrm in the Cournot
example. The location decision depends on transportation costs s and taxes
t, and ﬁxed costs.
Note that the decision between partial and complete relocation depends on
the comparison of transportation costs and taxes. It is independent of moving
costs, because partial and complete relocation induce the same amount of
ﬁxed costs. It never pays to relocate completely to the foreign country if
transportation costs are high, because tax savings cannot compensate for
transportation costs. If the tax reaches a critical level such that relocation
becomes optimal, the multinational considers whether to relocate completely
or partly in this case. This decision depends solely on the trade-oﬀ between
tax savings through complete relocation and higher transportation costs. If
transportation costs are high, tax savings are too small to induce complete
relocation. This is the case even if tax payments take on their highest possible
value.19
If transportation costs are low, two cases may arise: complete immediate
relocation (s < t1), and partial relocation ﬁrst (s > t1). In both cases it
is optimal to relocate completely if the tax is suﬃciently high. High tax
19Remember that the upper bound of t depends negatively on transportation costs.
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savings dominate transportation costs. The question remains whether the
multinational should relocate completely once the tax reaches a critical level.
This decision depends on the amount of moving costs: The critical tax level
t1 decreases if moving costs are low. Hence lower ﬁxed costs imply that the
multinational reacts faster towards a tax increase. If s > t1, moving costs
and the critical tax level which induces relocation are small. Transportation
costs are high enough such that it pays to move only partially. In such a
situation, it is better to face moving costs than to pay taxes, but it is also
better to pay taxes than to pay transportation costs. Only if the tax rises
further, complete relocation becomes optimal. If s < t1, transportation costs
are small enough such that complete relocation is optimal once the trade-oﬀ
between ﬁxed costs and lower taxes induces relocation. Hence transportation
costs are too small to play any role in the decision between complete and
partial relocation. Relocation reduces to the decision between ﬁxed costs
and tax payments, if transportation costs are low.
In sum, multinational enterprizes have smaller stakes in the home country
than national ﬁrms, if certain conditions are met. Low transportation costs
and low costs of relocation make this diﬀerence more likely. Regulation be-
comes more important and the multinational can easily relocate production,
which leads to diﬀerent stakes of both types of ﬁrms. This argument contrasts
with the perception that multinationals have a higher inﬂuence on the polit-
ical process than national ﬁrms. In contrast, it indicates that multinationals
have smaller stakes in the home country. They care less about national reg-
ulation, which tends to decrease lobbying incentives. But if multinationals
do not care about national politics, perhaps it is politicians who care about
multinationals?
7.4 The lobbying game
This chapter focuses on the eﬀectiveness of lobbying. It takes the results
of the previous chapter as a starting point. Multinationals have smaller
stakes in the home market, which tends to decrease lobbying incentives. But
incentives to engage in lobbying depend on its eﬀectiveness. Multinationals
might be more eﬀective in lobbying, compared to national ﬁrms. If this is
the case, higher eﬀectiveness might compensate for lower stakes, which leads
to more inﬂuence.
There are several possible reasons why politicians care more about multi-
- 115-
The Economics of Lobbying Lobbying Activities of Multinationals
nationals than about national ﬁrms. For instance, multinationals are quite
important as employers. People care about jobs, and so politicians do. Or
politicians might expect positive spillover eﬀects or tax revenue from the pres-
ence of multinational companies. But politicians are also interested in general
welfare, partly because they are benevolent, partly because they intend to
improve their chance of reelection. Moreover, they might be interested in
contribution payments. These can be used for election campaigns, personal
joy, or may be stuﬀed into anonymous bank accounts for harder times. This
analysis relies on a diﬀerent aspect of multinational ﬁrms. Multinationals can
relocate production at lower costs than national ﬁrms. I will determine how
this aspect aﬀects national regulation, if the politician cares about aggregate
welfare and contribution payments.
This chapter analyzes these issues in a two stage game.20 The game is solved
backwards. In the ﬁrst stage, the ﬁrm decides about an optimal contribu-
tion schedule oﬀered to the politician, C∗(r). The contribution schedule is
a menu, which maps regulation into money payments to the politician. The
ﬁrm decides about the contribution schedule and takes the politician’s be-
havior into account. In the second stage of the game, the politician observes
these oﬀers and decides about the optimal amount of regulation, r∗. Hence
[C∗(r), r∗] determines the political equilibrium. Money payments are made,
dependent on the oﬀered contribution schedule and the resulting choice of
regulation.21
I take the result of the previous chapter as a starting point. Proposition 7.1
states conditions such that a multinational has smaller stakes in the home
market with suﬃciently high regulation, compared to a national ﬁrm. Corol-
lary 7.2 applies the general result to a speciﬁc form of Cournot competition.
It derives critical values for the regulation parameter and transportation
costs, such that a multinational has smaller stakes in the home country com-
pared to a national ﬁrm (compare also ﬁgure 7.4). In both cases, if regulation
is suﬃciently low, both types of ﬁrms have the same stakes in the domestic
market. The focus of this chapter lies on diﬀerences between multinational
and national ﬁrms. Therefore, I restrict the analysis to parameter ranges






20The approach follows Bernheim and Whinston (1986b) and Grossman and Helpman
(1994a).
21Cheating is not possible, and money oﬀers are paid as soon as the respective regulation
is realized.
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holds.
Aggregate welfare depends on the net beneﬁt of regulation, B(r), and the
amount of goods produced and consumed in the home country, qS(r) and
qD(r). The net beneﬁt of regulation might be interpreted as reduced envi-
ronmental damage, higher labor standards, or welfare gains through a higher
degree of competition. The distinction between goods consumed and goods
produced reﬂects the idea that the politician cares about production in the
home country and about consumers’ well being. A good consumed in the
home country increases welfare, but even more if it has been produced there.
Hence, aggregate welfare is a linear function given as
W (r) = W [B(r); qS(r); qD(r)].










Regulation has a negative impact on the amount of goods produced and







Note that these assumptions are valid for many speciﬁc forms of competition.
Moreover, I make the following assumption on the beneﬁts of regulation:
Assumption 7.5 The beneﬁt function B(r) is concave, has a unique maxi-
mum, and rb = argmaxr B(r).
I make the two following assumptions, which state that a multinational and
a national ﬁrm react diﬀerently if regulation increases. Both reduce pro-
duction; however, the multinational can escape national regulation, since it
is able to relocate production to the foreign country and thus escape na-
tional regulation at least partially. In contrast, the national ﬁrm is bound
to produce in the home country. Hence, the eﬀect of regulation on domestic
production should be higher if the ﬁrm is a multinational. But relocation has
also a positive eﬀect on consumption in the home country. The multinational
escapes national regulation, and costs rise to a smaller extent compared to
a national ﬁrm.22 Hence, the eﬀect of regulation on consumption is negative
for both types of ﬁrms, and it is stronger if the ﬁrm is national.
22Recall that the ﬁrm bears increased transportation costs to serve the home market.
The total eﬀect is positive, because otherwise relocation is not optimal.
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Assumption 7.6 (relocation eﬀect): The negative eﬀect of regulation on











Assumption 7.7 (consumption eﬀect): The negative eﬀect of regulation on











Consider now the second stage of the game. A rational politician decides
about regulation. He cares about aggregate welfare and contributions. Con-
tribution oﬀers result from ﬁrms’ optimization in the ﬁrst stage of the game.
The politician takes these oﬀers as given and decides about regulation. Thus
in the second stage of the game, the politician chooses r to maximize his
payoﬀ, given the contribution schedule C(r):
max
r
U(r) = W [B(r); qS(r); qD(r)] + αC(r).
The ﬁrm is either a national or a multinational company, and I compare
political outcomes with both types of ﬁrms. α ≥ 0 is a weight which speciﬁes
the impact of money to the politician’s payoﬀ. Note that the politician’s
payoﬀ function is separable in aggregate welfare and contribution payments.
This is a common assumption, which assures that no interaction between
contribution payments and aggregate welfare exist.23








As a special case, consider a benevolent politician who does not care for
contributions, i.e. α = 0. In this case, the politician maximizes aggregate
23To be more precise, separability assures that income is transferable without loss. The
marginal utility of income is constant at rate α, and is independent of the level of aggregate
utility. To illustrate this point, consider a payoﬀ function of the form U = U [W (r), C(r)],
and U concave in W and C. In this case, the marginal utility of contributions decreases
in C. Moreover, it may also depend on the total level of aggregate welfare, because this
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welfare and chooses r0 = argmax W (r). By observation of the ﬁrst order
condition, the following insights result: The marginal (net) beneﬁt of regula-
tion is positive in equilibrium, because the politician trades-oﬀ net beneﬁts
from regulation with negative eﬀects on consumption and production. This
results in regulation r0 < rb. If the politician cares about contributions,
political costs of regulation change. They may increase or decrease, which
depends on the eﬀect of regulation on contribution payments. Note that I
cannot specify this function at the moment, because it depends on the ﬁrm’s
optimization in the ﬁrst stage of the game. Suppose that it turns out that
contributions decrease in r. In this case, regulation decreases if the politician
cares for contributions, i.e. r∗ < r0 < rb. Lower regulation results and aggre-
gate welfare declines. If contributions increase in r, regulation with lobbying
will be higher than the welfare maximizing level, i.e. r∗ > r0. It may even be
higher than rb, which is the maximum of the beneﬁt function. I will restrict
my attention to decreasing contribution schedules in the following. This is
natural to do so, because the following arguments show that contribution of-
fers can only increase if the lobbying ﬁrm has an interest in high regulation.
This is never the case if the ﬁrm produces at least partly in the home coun-
try. It may only result if the multinational completely relocates and beneﬁts
from high domestic regulation through a raising rivals’ costs argument. I will
exclude this special case in the following, but indicate here that it may arise
in general.24
Consider now the ﬁrst stage of the game. The ﬁrm anticipates the behavior of
the politician. It realizes that in order to induce a deviation from r0 towards
any alternative regulation, the contribution schedule must locally satisfy the
politician’s ﬁrst order condition around the preferred level of regulation. If
this was not the case, the politician would not deviate in the second stage
of the game facing the respective contribution schedule. Thus, in order to
induce a policy deviation towards any regulation, the contribution schedule









C(r) = − 1
α
W (r) + x.
Thus, any contribution schedule which shall be suitable to induce a certain
regulation policy r must satisfy the stated form locally. This is a necessary
24Some countries prohibit lobbying activities by foreign ﬁrms, as for instance the United
States.
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condition for the contribution schedule. Note that contribution payments for
a deviation towards a particular regulation depend on the induced level of
aggregate welfare, the weight α, and a ﬁxed parameter x, which shifts the
contribution schedule vertically and will be discussed in the following.
To understand what determines x, we have to take the maximization problem
of the ﬁrm into account. The ﬁrm maximizes net proﬁts, which are variable
proﬁts minus contribution payments, Π(r, s) − C(r).25 Note that the ﬁrm
determines a complete menu oﬀer, which consists of contribution oﬀers for
all possible regulations. This is a complete function C(r), which is more than
the contribution payment for the equilibrium policy choice r∗. The ﬁrm has
to take three constraints into account: First, any contribution schedule which
induces a deviation from r0 must satisfy the above form locally at the realized
level of regulation. Otherwise it would not induce the proper behavior of
the politician in the second stage of the game. Second, to induce a political
outcome diﬀerent from r0, the contribution payment needs to compensate the
politician for the deviation from his welfare maximizing policy r0. Hence, the
ﬁrm must consider the politician’s participation constraint, which is W (r) +
αC(r) ≥ W (r0). Third, it is optimal to oﬀer positive payments only for
certain policies if the resulting net proﬁts including contribution payments
exceed proﬁts which are realized if no contributions occur and r0 results,
Π(r0, s). Hence contributions are positive for any regulation r only if Π(r, s)−
C(r) ≥ Π(r0, s).
The ﬁrm solves
maxC(r) Π(r, s)− C(r) s.t. C(r) = − 1αW (r) + x
W (r) + αC(r) ≥ W (r0)
Π(r, s)− C(r) ≥ Π(r0, s).
Note that x is a parameter which shifts proﬁts to the politician on account
of the ﬁrm. If x is high, higher contribution payments are made in exchange
for a policy deviation. Hence the ﬁrm has an interest to choose x as low as
possible, but high enough to induce the preferred policy outcome. From the









25With slight abuse of notation, I drop the suﬃxes for ﬁrm types. The assumptions
hold for both types in the same way.
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is suitable to induce a policy deviation from r0. Moreover, the ﬁrm will always
choose the smallest amount of contribution payments which are suﬃcient to
induce a certain policy deviation from r0, because contribution payments are
not costless. Thus the equation must be binding in order to maximize proﬁts,
and any contribution schedule which entails higher payments for all levels of
regulation can not optimal: The ﬁrm could always increase proﬁts through
a slight reduction of x in this case, without aﬀecting the policy outcome.
Hence, if the ﬁrm anticipates how the politician decides in the second stage







in the neighborhood of r. Intuitively, contribution payments compensate the
politician for a policy deviation from r0, which exactly oﬀsets his induced
utility decline. As a consequence, he is indiﬀerent between the welfare maxi-
mizing policy r0 and any alternative induced through this contribution oﬀer.
Note that the ﬁrm beneﬁts from a ﬁrst mover advantage. It anticipates how
the politician reacts towards any possible contribution schedule C(r) and
minimizes compensation payments given that they are suitable to induce
the preferred policy outcome, and it realizes the full rent from the political
interaction.
Note that it is not optimal to oﬀer positive compensation payments according
to the above equation to any r, because this may violate the participation
constraint of the ﬁrm. Hence the ﬁrm prefers to pay zero contributions for
any policy deviation which necessitates compensation payments exceeding
the beneﬁt from deviation, and an optimal contribution schedule satisﬁes
C(r) = 0 for any r satisfying Π(r, s)− 1
α
[W (r0)−W (r)] ≤ Π(r0, s).26
Consider the following contribution schedule as a suggestion for the solution
to the maximization problem:
C(r) =
{
0 , if Π(r, s)− 1
α
[W (r0)−W (r)] ≤ Π(r0, s)
1
α
[W (r0)−W (r)] , if Π(r, s)− 1
α
[W (r0)−W (r)] > Π(r0, s).
This contribution schedule satisﬁes all conditions of the maximization prob-
lem. Contribution payments are positive only if the proﬁt increase through
the induced policy deviation exceeds the contribution payments which are
26To be more precise, zero contribution oﬀers are not necessary. It suﬃces that they are
small enough to not aﬀect the policy outcome (compare the appendix).
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necessary to induce this outcome; otherwise they equal zero. The ﬁrm ex-
actly compensates the politician for the respective policy deviation from r0
if contribution payments are positive. Note that this contribution schedule
has an interesting property: Since any positive contribution payment exactly
compensates the politician for the policy deviation, he remains indiﬀerent
between the welfare maximizing regulation r0, and any deviation associated
with positive contribution payments.
In fact, the ﬁrm is able to induce its most preferred policy outcome through
a slight modiﬁcation of the above contribution schedule. This is an impli-
cation of the ﬁrst mover advantage: Anticipating the politician’s behavior,
the ﬁrm is able to induce its preferred policy through the choice of a suitable
contribution schedule as long as the contribution function satisﬁes the stated
constraints.
The optimal policy choice r∗, given that the ﬁrm compensates the politician
for the deviation, is given by the ﬁrst order condition of the ﬁrm. Hence
r∗ = argmaxr Π(r, s)− 1
α
[
W (r0)−W (r)] ,
This result states that the ﬁrm prefers a policy choice whose marginal beneﬁt
exactly oﬀsets the marginal costs which are necessary to achieve it. This al-
lows us to determine the optimal contribution schedule. To be precise, there
is an inﬁnite number of optimal contribution schedules C∗(r) which imple-
ments the most preferred outcome: The reason is as follows: The ﬁrm must
compensate the politician for the policy deviation towards r∗, as character-
ized above. Contribution oﬀers must be zero for all policy variables satisfying
Π(r, s) − 1
α
[W (r0)−W (r)] ≤ Π(r0, s). But the contribution oﬀers distinct
from C∗(r∗) and not satisfying this latter condition are arbitrary as long as
they induce no other policy deviation. I restrict attention to one particular
form:27
Lemma 7.1 The following contribution schedule solves the maximization
problem of the ﬁrm:
C∗(r) =
{
0 , if r 	= r∗
1
α
[W (r0)−W (r)] , if r = r∗
27The complete speciﬁcation of all optimal contribution schedules is given in the ap-
pendix. The form stated here satisﬁes the ”natural” reﬁnement of Kirchsteiger and Prat
(2002).
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This particular contribution schedule is optimal for the ﬁrm. It oﬀers a
compensation payment for a policy deviation towards r∗, which leaves the
politician indiﬀerent between the welfare maximizing policy r0 and the most
preferred policy of the ﬁrm.28 Contribution oﬀers for all other policies are
zero. Hence the contribution schedule induces a policy deviation towards
r∗, which is the best policy choice of the ﬁrm. Note that zero contribution
oﬀers result for two reasons: Some contribution oﬀers are zero, because the
ﬁrm realizes that it cannot induce the respective policy deviation and gain
something. Hence it oﬀers nothing. In contrast, some policy deviations are
feasible for the ﬁrm, because necessary compensation payments are smaller
compared to the resulting beneﬁt. But although feasible generally, it is not
optimal to induce them because they do not maximize ﬁrm’s proﬁts net of
contribution payments. Hence the ﬁrm can oﬀer zero contributions for these
policy choices as well.
The form of the optimal contribution schedule is the same for a multinational
and a national ﬁrm for a broad range of r. Both ﬁrms pay positive contribu-
tions which are suﬃcient to compensate the politician for a policy deviation
towards its most preferred policy choice. But the contribution schedules
diﬀer with respect to four aspects: First, the intervals of feasible policy de-
viations diﬀer between both types of ﬁrm, because they depend on Π(r, s)
and Π(r0, s) which are diﬀerent for the multinational and the national ﬁrm.
Second, r0 diﬀers in both cases: The politician chooses a diﬀerent regulation
policy without lobbying, which depends on the present type of ﬁrm. Third,
equilibrium contribution payments compensate the politician for a deviation
from r0. These compensations depend on the loss in aggregate welfare if
regulation decreases. Welfare depends on the amount of goods which are
produced and consumed in the home country, and these amounts change
diﬀerently for both types of ﬁrms (assumptions 7.6 and 7.7). Finally, the
optimal policy choice r∗ may diﬀer between a national and a multinational
ﬁrm.
Note that equilibrium contribution payments tend to be high if the politician
cares much about welfare. In this case α is small, and the ﬁrm must oﬀer
high compensation payments to induce a policy deviation. As a result, ﬁrm’s
payoﬀ decreases if the politician cares much about aggregate welfare, and
more money is transferred on behalf of the politician. The politician’s payoﬀ
is independent of α, because he gets exactly compensated for the equilibrium
28I assume that the politician deviates if he is indiﬀerent. Otherwise the ﬁrm could
increase the contribution payment for r∗ by a small amount, and the politician would be
strictly better oﬀ with deviation.
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policy deviation. For instance, if he cares much about aggregate welfare con-
tribution payments tend to be high in equilibrium, but his marginal beneﬁt
of money is small in this case.
This result can be used to solve the model completely. The ﬁrm determines
the optimal contribution schedule C∗(r) in the ﬁrst stage of the game. It
anticipates the politician’s behavior of the second stage and induces a certain
policy outcome, r∗. Thus [C∗(r), r∗] determines the political equilibrium.29
This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 7.3 The multinational company tends to face lower regulation
compared to a national ﬁrm, if the following conditions hold:
• The consumption eﬀect is relatively unimportant, or consumption has
only small welfare eﬀects.
• The multinational and the national ﬁrm do not diﬀer much with respect
to their stakes in national regulation.
The multinational tends to face higher regulation compared to a national ﬁrm,
if the following condition holds:
• The relocation eﬀect is small if the ﬁrm is a multinational, or produc-
tion is unimportant for aggregate welfare.
Proof. The proof is given in the appendix.
By assumption, regulation has a positive direct eﬀect on aggregate welfare
and negative eﬀects on consumption and production in the home country.
The relocation eﬀect tends to lower regulation if the ﬁrm is a multinational,
because regulation aﬀects national production to a greater extent in this
case. Hence, if the politician cares much about production in the home
country and the relocation eﬀect is large, regulation might favor the interests
of the multinational company. The consumption eﬀect works in the opposite
direction. The multinational company is able to escape national regulation
at least partially and the negative eﬀect on domestic consumption is smaller
in this case. This eﬀect tends towards higher regulation of multinational
companies.
29Note that an inﬁnite amount of equilibria exists, because an inﬁnite number of optimal
contribution schedules induce the optimal policy deviation r∗.
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The proposition also covers the ﬁrst part of the analysis: Both types of ﬁrms
may have diﬀerent stakes in domestic regulation, which depends on exogenous
parameters as described in chapter 7.3. In this case, a national ﬁrm is c.p.
willing to oﬀer higher contribution payments at the margin, because national
regulation aﬀects it to a greater extent. As a result, regulation tends to be
lower if national ﬁrms are present compared to multinationals. With only
small stakes in the home market, multinationals’ incentives to engage in
lobbying are small. The extent of this eﬀect depends on the marginal beneﬁt
of contribution payments. If the politician cares much about contributions,
the tendency towards lower regulation of national ﬁrms increases.
The model predicts that the existence of multinational ﬁrms has ambiguous
eﬀects on national regulation, which raises scepticism about the common
perception that the presence of multinational companies leads to a loss of
sovereignty of the national state. In this setup, rather strict conditions must
be fulﬁlled to support this view. However, it may well be valid if relocation is
very important. Which view is suitable comes down to an empirical test of the
relative strength of these eﬀects. If it turns out that politicians have a high
interest in local production and relocation is an important issue, the model
may support the common perception. If this is not the case, multinationals
tend to face higher regulation than national ﬁrms, and the presence of these
ﬁrms does not reduce the scope of national policy making.
7.5 Conclusions
The approach provides a formal analysis of diﬀerences in lobbying incentives
between a multinational and a national ﬁrm. It is independent of speciﬁc
market forms or the type of competition, and determines how these diﬀer-
ences aﬀect the political outcome. A multinational diﬀers from a national
ﬁrm because it has smaller costs of relocating production. Smaller stakes
in the national market result, and a multinational can always perform at
least as good as a national ﬁrm. National regulation tends to have smaller
impacts on multinationals, which tends to decrease their lobbying incen-
tives. Less inﬂuence on the political decision can then be expected. This
argument suggests that multinationals tend to face higher regulation than
national ﬁrms. Moreover, consumer surplus declines less in the home coun-
try if regulation aﬀects multinationals. These two eﬀects, the lobbying eﬀect
and the consumption eﬀect, tend towards an outcome of the lobbying game
which neglects the common perception that multinationals reduce the scope
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of national politics.
An eﬀect which works in favor of less regulation of multinational ﬁrms is the
production eﬀect. Multinationals may relocate production due to unwanted
regulation, which decreases local production to a higher extent compared
to national ﬁrms. If politicians are interested in domestic production, they
might be hesitant to introduce high regulation in order to avoid a drain of
capital. If this eﬀect is strong, the presence of multinational companies may
well lead to a loss of sovereignty of the nation state.
The paper provides some hypothesis for empirical investigation. Less reg-
ulation of multinationals should coincide with the importance of local pro-
duction to politicians. Moreover, regulation should be lax in sectors with
relatively footloose capital, compared to sectors where relocation is costly.
Regulation of multinationals should be lax if lobbying is not too important,
or the politician cares not much about contribution payments. For instance,
a politician might have less discretion to set policies in sectors facing much
public attention. In contrast, it might be easier to cater to special interests
in sectors attracting little public attention, and contributions might be of
higher importance then.
There is ample scope for further research. To begin with, the ﬁrst aspect
is that either a multinational or a national ﬁrm is present in the market.
Presence of both ﬁrms, possibly with opposing interests in regulation, should
lead to further insights. Firms can then anticipate the lobbying oﬀers of their
opponents and modify contribution oﬀers accordingly. Whether this will
work in favor of more or less regulation remains an open issue. In addition,
politicians and multinationals might have asymmetric information about the
possible extent of relocation. A multinational might have better information
about the production and costs structure than the politician. I do expect
that regulation works more in favor of the multinational if information is
asymmetric.
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7.6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 7.1:
A necessary and suﬃcient condition that the ﬁrm relocates at some level
of regulation is given, if it is optimal to relocate at least partially if the
regulation takes on its tightest form. These conditions are given by
max {Πpr(r, s)− F pr; Πcr(r, s)− F cr} > Πnr(r, s).
This can be rewritten as in condition (i).
Next one has to assure that a regulation exists such that it is optimal to
produce in the home market only. Proﬁts not only decrease in regulation (as-
sumption 7.2), but even faster if production takes place in the home country
only (assumption 7.3). Thus it is necessary and suﬃcient to check whether it
is optimal to produce in the home market if regulation takes on its minimum
level. This condition is given by
Πnr(0, s) > max {Πpr(0, s)− F pr; Πcr(0, s)− F cr}.
Denote F prcrit(r) as the critical level of ﬁxed costs which makes the ﬁrm indiﬀer-
ent between moving partially and staying in the home country if regulation
is r. Thus F prcrit(r) ≡ Πpr(r, s) − Πnr(r, s). Diﬀerentiating yields that this
critical value is increasing in r by assumptions 7.2 and 7.3. Analogously,
F crcrit(r) ≡ Πcr(r, s) − Πnr(r, s) is increasing in r. By comparing these criti-
cal values, one gets that ﬁxed moving costs increase faster in r in the case of
complete relocation (again by assumption 7.3). Thus the relevant assumption
must be Πnr(0, s) > Πpr(0, s)− F pr, as stated in part (ii) of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 7.2:
Using standard technique one can derive the quantities sold by each ﬁrm
in each market for every possible production structure of the multinational.
By assumption 7.1, each of these quantities must be positive. This gives
assumptions on the relationship between the demand parameter a, marginal
cost of production m, transportation costs s and the tax t. These assumptions
are satisﬁed if a−m ≥ 2(s+ t) holds.
Straight forward application of standard oligopoly theory then yields the
following proﬁt functions for the multinational:
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Πnr(s, t) = 1
9
[(a−m+ s− 2t)2 + (a−m− 2s− 2t)2],
Πpr(s, t) = 1
9
[(a−m+ s− 2t)2 + (a−m)2]− F,
Πcr(s, t) = 1
9
[(a−m− s)2 + (a−m)2]− F.
Taking derivatives, it is easy to check that assumptions 7.2 and 7.3 are sat-
isﬁed. Thus all assumptions are satisﬁed.
Part (i) of proposition 7.1 gives an upper bound for the ﬁxed cost parameter
F . Simply plug tmax = 1
2
(a−m)− s into the proﬁt functions and compare.
This give the upper bound which is stated in part (iii) of proposition 7.2.
Part (ii) of proposition 7.1 gives a lower bound for F . Set t = 0 and compare
proﬁts without relocation and with partial relocation. This gives the lower
bound, which is stated in part (iii) of proposition 7.2.
Hence the conditions stated in proposition 7.2 assure that all assumptions of
proposition 7.1 are satisﬁed and the result follows.
Proof of Corollary 7.2:
We know that the ﬁrm produces in the home country only, if the tax is small.
The case of high transportation costs
If Πpr(s, tmax) > Πcr(s, tmax), it can never be optimal to relocate completely
for any value of t. Plug in the value of tmax and see that this is the case if
s > 1
4
(a − m), which is the critical value s∗. The critical value of the tax
where relocation is pays is given by t1.
The case of low transportation costs
By the former result, complete relocation pays for some tax level if s < s∗.
It has to be clariﬁed if partial relocation is optimal for some interval on t,
or not. This can be done by comparing the values of the proﬁt functions at
t = t1.
If Πpr(s, t1) > Πcr(s, t1), proﬁts are higher at t1 if the ﬁrm does not relocate
completely, but only partially to the foreign country. This condition yields
(s − t1)(a − m − t1) > 0, which is equivalent to s > t1. We know that
complete relocation is optimal if the tax is high enough. Thus to determine
the relevant critical value, one has to ﬁnd the value of the tax such that the
ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between partial and complete relocation. This yields t = s
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as the critical value and completes the proof if t1 < s < s∗.
For the case of s < s∗ and s < t1, the proof is analogous. If Πpr(s, t1) <
Πcr(s, t1), production in both countries is not optimal if t = t1. Thus a
smaller level t2 must exist, such that immediate complete relocation is op-
timal. This value is determined by comparing Πpr(s, t) and Πcr(s, t), which
yields the respective value for t2.
Complete speciﬁcation of the optimal contribution schedule:
There is an inﬁnite number of optimal contribution schedules which satisfy
the stated conditions. Remember that
r∗ = argmaxr Π(r, s)− 1
α
[
W (r0)−W (r)] .





[W (r0)−W (r)] , if r = r∗
1
α
[W (r0)−W (r)]− .(r) , if r 	= r∗
The function .(r) is an element of a class of functions satisfying
• .(r) > 0, and
• .(r) ≤ 1
α
[W (r0)−W (r)].
Proof of Proposition 7.3:
We know that the politicians chooses r∗ in the second stage of the game,








Note that I assume diﬀerentiability of the contribution function around r∗
here, which is slightly imprecise with respect to the stated contribution sched-
ule of lemma 7.1. From the preceding discussion, continuous contribution
function around r∗ are easy to ﬁnd. Hence I ignore this slight imprecision
here.
We also know that this induces the optimal policy choice of the ﬁrm, r∗. By
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around the equilibrium. The result follows from comparison of this ﬁrst order




On Investment - A critical
investigation from an industrial
economics point of view
8.1 Introduction
1Negotiations on a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) within the
OECD failed in 1998. This failure does not imply that eﬀorts to regulate
direct investment ﬂows on a multilateral basis have come to an end. Instead,
it can be expected that a general multilateral framework on investment will
substitute for the multiplicity of existing bilateral agreements in the future.2
The negotiations on the MAI indicate the form of such a future framework.
Several working papers present and criticize the contents of the MAI.3 But
an assessment from an industrial economics point of view has not yet been
made. In the following, I will give such an assessment. I conclude that a
comprehensive liberalization of direct investment ﬂows only makes sense if
1This chapter is based on the article ”Multilaterale Abkommen fu¨r Direktinvestitionen
(MAI) - Eine Kritik aus industrieo¨konomischer Sicht”, (Polk 2000). I am grateful to my
father for helpful comments.
2Compare UNCTAD (1998a).
3Compare e.g. Hartwig (1999), Kozul-Wright and Rowthorn (1998), Polk (1999), Singer
and Stumberg (1999).
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strong competition authorities exist, which are able to ensure eﬀective compe-
tition. In order to develop its positive eﬀects also in less developed countries
(LDCs), it is essential that a future agreement accompanies the implemen-
tation of eﬀective competition authorities in these countries. Moreover, the
term ”investment” needs closer speciﬁcation in a multilateral agreement. The
MAI entirely ignores these aspects.
This article deals also with the question which institution should implement
a future multilateral agreement on investment. The WTO and OECD play
an important role in this context: Due to their high worldwide share of di-
rect investment, OECD countries have a strong interest to liberalize invest-
ment ﬂows. Up to now, the regulatory framework of the OECD comprise
regulations concerning hidden investment barriers, the free ﬂow of capital,
and general guidelines for multinational enterprizes.4 These regulations have
three fundamental disadvantages: First, they do not cover all areas which are
relevant for investment ﬂows. Second, the agreements do not represent a real
multilateral framework. They refer only to the member states of the OECD.
Third, the contents of the agreements are not binding. Accordingly, the
OECD has no eﬀective dispute settlement body, which assures compliance
to existing rules.
In contrast, the WTO can be regarded as a real multilateral organization.
It contains two agreements that pertain to foreign direct investment: The
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) is an additional
agreement to the GATT (General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade). It states
that member countries of the WTO are not allowed to implement investment
barriers which form a possible obstacle towards trade. The General Agree-
ment on Trades in Services (GATS) also contains some minor investment
related regulations.5 But both agreements are limited to the scope of the
WTO. A comprehensive regulation of investment ﬂows, which is independent
of trade political concerns, has not yet been established within the WTO.6 I
4The existing regulations within the OECD refer to the ”The Declaration on Inter-
national Investment and Multinational Enterprises” (OECD 2000a), ”The OECD Guide-
lines for Multinational Enterprises” (OECD 2000b), and the Codices of ”Liberalisation of
Capital Movements” (OECD 2001a) and ”Current Invisible Operations” (OECD 2001b).
Compare Polk (1999) for a detailed presentation of these OECD agreements. Investment
related agreements of the WTO are also presented in this paper.
5For an overview of these regulations, see Polk (1999). Grimwade (1996), Senti (1999),
Trebilcock and Howse (1995) and WTO (1999) give a general overview of the regulatory
framework of the WTO.
6The question whether a multilateral agreement on investment is generally desirable is
not dealt with in this context. I will instead indicate which regulations should be altered
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will argue that the WTO is a good forum for a future multilateral investment
agreement.
This contribution has the following structure: Chapter 8.2 describes the reg-
ulations of the MAI which aﬀect market structure and competition. Chapter
8.3 introduces arguments from an industrial economics point of view, which
lead to my propositions in chapter 8.4. Chapter 8.5 discusses the WTO as a
possible forum for a future multilateral agreement and concludes.
8.2 Presentation of the relevant MAI regula-
tions
The basic contents of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment are:
• The National Treatment Principle.
• The Most Favored Nation Principle.
• Rules concerning protection of investors against expropriation.
• A dispute settling procedure.
Several authors discuss and critically evaluate the contents of the MAI.7 I
will restrict the following discussion to two important aspects, which concern
competition policy.
Deﬁnition of the term ”Investment”
The deﬁnition of the term ”Investment” determines the scope of the agree-
ment and is therefore of great importance. The deﬁnition of the MAI does not
diﬀerentiate between diﬀerent types of foreign investment.8 Strictly speak-
ing, the agreement does not only cover direct investment, which involves
a long term relationship and control of a resident entity in one economy.9
if an agreement like the MAI is be installed in the future. For this approach compare also
Ganesan (1998).
7Compare for instance Hartwig (1999), Polk (1999).
8OECD (1998b), Section II, Definitions.
9For a close deﬁnition of foreign direct investment in this sense compare UNCTAD
(2001), Annex B, A.2.
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Rather, scope is more general: It comprises any kind of engagement of a
foreign investor. For instance, what deﬁnes an investment is independent of
the question if the investor exercises control over the investment. Nor does it
presuppose that the investor engages in a long term relationship. Stated posi-
tively, any investment which entails the economic performance of a natural or
legal person falls under the scope of the MAI. Such activities include portfolio
investments, which may be undertaken for short term gains or risk diversi-
ﬁcation purposes. Moreover, the acquisition of companies, shares or similar
equities, debentures, intellectual property rights, licences or other movable
properties also fall under the deﬁnition of the MAI. The same applies to in-
vestment which is related to the privatization of state owned properties, or
for the allocation of concessions.10
Furthermore, the agreement does not diﬀerentiate between diﬀerent kinds
of foreign investment, as for instance acquisitions of ﬁrms, mergers, new
foundations of plant locations, or acquisitions of minority stakes. The eﬀect
of an investment on market structure and the degree of competition depends
much on its type: If a direct investment is made in form of a merger or an
acquisition, it has diﬀerent eﬀects on competition than e.g. the foundation
of a new plant location. Beside its type, the kind of control exercised with
the investment plays an important role. If a foreign investment consists
for instance of a cooperation in research and development activities (R&D),
other welfare eﬀects can be expected compared to a horizontal take-over of
a competitor.
In sum, the deﬁnition of the term ”Investment” in the MAI is too general. It
does not diﬀerentiate between diﬀerent forms of investments, between long
term and short term engagements, and between diﬀerent types of control.
This is relevant for the eﬀect on market structure and competition, as will
be further laid out in chapter 8.3.
Eﬀects on regional competition
The contents of the MAI weaken the bargaining position of governments to-
wards multinational enterprizes. The common practice is that governments
sanction concrete investment projects of foreign ﬁrms. The MAI forbids
such individual concession procedures: It allows a country to stipulate gen-
eral conditions for investments, as long as they do not discriminate foreign
investors against domestic ones. The principles of national treatment and
the most favored nation principle imply that a member state has to treat
10OECD (1998a), Section III, Privatisation.
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foreign investors in the same way as domestic ones. Individual investment
requirements, which possibly imply a discrimination against other domestic
or foreign investment, are forbidden.11 This mechanism implies a complete
and general opening of domestic markets for foreign investment ﬂows.
This complete liberalization of investment ﬂows does not only refer to en-
gagements of MAI member states. Rather, it grants access investors from
all countries, independent of their MAI membership. In addition, the treaty
explicitly prohibits certain popular conditions on foreign direct investment,
such as for instance local content requirements, minimum export contingen-
cies or minimum expenditure requirements for R&D.
The MAI foresees one exemption to the principle of national treatment: Re-
member that the treaty forbids negative discrimination of foreign investors
against domestic ﬁrms. But it explicitly permits positive discrimination of
foreign ﬁrms. Positive discrimination is a preferential treatment of foreign
investment vis a vis domestic ﬁrms. This rule, in connection with the most
favored nation principle, implies a second rule. If a country grants a particu-
lar concession to a foreign investor, it is bound to grant this concession also
to comparable investments in the future. These rules weaken the bargaining
positions of national governments vis a vis investors essentially. I present the
implications in the following chapter.
8.3 An evaluation of the MAI from an indus-
trial economics point of view
Multinational enterprizes are present in oligopolistic markets, which are char-
acterized by a high degree of market concentration.12 The existence of trans-
action costs is crucial for the emergence of multinational enterprizes: If trans-
action costs in markets are high compared to transaction costs within the
ﬁrm, ﬁrms gain through the internalization of trade within the ﬁrm organi-
zation, which promotes the emergence of multinational ﬁrms.13
Vertically integrated multinational enterprizes can be expected in markets
11OECD (1998a), Section III, National Treatment And Most Favored Nation
Treatment.
12Compare Horstman and Markusen (1987), Markusen (1984) or Helpman and Krugman
(1985).
13Dunning (1988), Chapter 1; Caves (1996), Chapter 4.
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where high switching costs between upstream and downstream ﬁrms exist.
For instance, search costs of ﬁrms reduce incentives to trade intermediate
goods in a market. If a customer is not able to react to a change in market
conditions within a suitable amount of time, the supplier may take advan-
tages in negotiations. This may reduce a customer’s incentive to trade the
good in a market, and ineﬃciencies may occur. Internalization within a
multinational enterprize can avoid such problems. Another reason for the
emergence of vertically integrated multinational enterprizes is the impor-
tance of product speciﬁc investments, which may cause a hold-up problem:
Suppose that an upstream and a downstream ﬁrm trade a good, the qual-
ity of which can be improved by a speciﬁc investment of the upstream ﬁrm.
Both ﬁrms beneﬁt from the investment. Now suppose that the upstream
ﬁrm invests and both ﬁrms share the investment costs. Once the investment
is done, costs are sunk. The downstream ﬁrm is then able to beneﬁt from
renegotiations. It knows that the investment is speciﬁc and its value to the
supplier is small if the latter trades with other ﬁrms. Accordingly, the down-
stream ﬁrm can renegotiate and impose a higher degree of the investment
costs on the upstream ﬁrm. But the upstream ﬁrm will anticipate this behav-
ior ex ante, and its incentives to invest decline. As a consequence, it invests
less than is socially optimal, and under investment results. A multinational
enterprize may overcome this hold-up problem through the internalization of
transactions and investments within a ﬁrm.
Horizontally integrated multinational enterprizes emerge in markets where
non-tradable assets play an important role. These are for instance R&D
intensive markets, or markets where organizational knowledge is a crucial
factor. Horizontally integrated multinational enterprizes may also emerge
in markets where marketing, brand names and the product mix plays an
important role. These assets can not, or only to a smaller extent, be traded
over markets. Internal organization within an enterprize may then provide a
solution.
In sum, multinational enterprizes are mainly prevalent in oligopolistic mar-
kets where goods are diversiﬁed, or in markets where transaction costs within
ﬁrms tend to be small. Market entry barriers must play an important role, or
markets must be inferior institutions for trade of crucial assets. In contrast,
if entry barriers do not exist, potential domestic competitors are able to en-
ter the market; If trade upon markets is possible, the organization of trade
within ﬁrms is unnecessary. In these cases, incentives to organize production
in multinational ﬁrms are small.
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8.3.1 Market concentration and the pursuance of mar-
ket power
Multinational companies are present in oligopolistic markets. This indicates
that an industrial economics point of view is appropriate to analyze the
contents of the MAI: Which eﬀect does a general liberalization of foreign
investment have on market structure and concentration? In particular, does
market concentration in host countries increase? And does increased mar-
ket concentration imply that multinational enterprizes can exercise market
power more easily? These questions are of interest, because a liberalization
of foreign investment may increase market concentration. As a consequence,
multinationals may exercise market power, which leads to negative welfare
eﬀects. But is this in fact the case? I discuss the relation between a lib-
eralization of foreign investment, market concentration, and the exercise of
market power in the following.
The relationship between market concentration and market power can be
summarized as follows:14 A high degree of market concentration exists if few
companies have a high share of market demand. The existence of market
power implies that companies take advantage of the high degree of market
concentration. If market power is exercised, ﬁrms increase proﬁts at the
expense of consumers and aggregate welfare. A high degree of market con-
centration should therefore not be judged negatively per se. Only if a high
degree of concentration leads to the pursuance of market power, allocative
ineﬃciencies arise and aggregate welfare decreases.
Ineﬃciencies may arise in various forms: A company which exercises market
power may be able to set prices above marginal costs, which increases proﬁts.
Compared to ﬁrst best marginal cost pricing, equilibrium demand decreases
and aggregate welfare declines. This may go hand in hand with a second
way to exercise market power: If a ﬁrm realizes high markups and equilib-
rium demand is low, incentives to invest in cost reducing technologies may
be small. The reason is that the beneﬁt of the investment may be relatively
unimportant if equilibrium demand is low. Moreover, a ﬁrm facing strong
competition may also have higher incentives to invest in cost reducing tech-
nologies, because the cost reduction becomes more important if competition
is strong. As a result, marginal costs may be excessively high if competition
14Compare Neven, Nuttall and Seabright (1993), Chapter 2, and Tirole (1988), Chapter
5. Scherer and Ross (1990), Chapter 11, explain measures for market concentration, such
as the Herﬁndahl-index and others.
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is low. In this case, ﬁrms underinvest in cost reducing-innovations, which
decreases aggregate welfare. Higher costs leads to higher consumer prices,
and demand and welfare decline. Thus, the pursuance of market power has
negative welfare eﬀects, irrespective of the speciﬁc form it is exercised.
However, a high degree of concentration does not necessarily imply that ﬁrms
are able to exercise market power:
• If consumers can easily switch between diﬀerent products, a high degree
of market competition prevails, even if the number of ﬁrms is small. In
this case, a single company is not able to inﬂuence the market result
noticeably, because consumers substitute towards products of competi-
tors in case of a price increases. Competition between ﬁrms tends to be
tough if products are homogenous and consumers can easily substitute
between them. If goods are heterogenous, substitutability tends to be
small and ﬁrms ﬁnd it easier to exercise market power.15
• Even though a single ﬁrm may not be able to exercise market power in
a speciﬁc market, ﬁrms may be able to coordinate and exercise mar-
ket power jointly. Competition laws forbid these practices, so explicit
cartels are rarely found.16 But ﬁrms may collude and exercise market
power implicitly. This is more likely if the number of companies is
small and the degree of concentration is high.17
Thus in itself, a high market share is not a reliable indicator that a ﬁrm exer-
cises market power. High prices are more likely if market demand is inelastic,
products are heterogenous, or coordination among ﬁrms is easy. But even
then high prices may not necessarily prevail. Suppose that market entry is
possible and potential competitors can enter the market at low costs. In this
case incumbent ﬁrms cannot set high prices, because high proﬁts makes entry
more attractive, which increases competition. Accordingly, markups may be
small even if market concentration is high. If a market is in fact contestable
depends on several other factors beside low entry costs. For instance, sup-
pose that the incumbent is able to adjust prices relatively fast in comparison
to the time scale of the investment. In this case incentives to enter a market
15Neven et al. (1993) show how these rather theoretical concepts can be applied in reality.
They introduce the concept of product speciﬁc ”relevant markets”, which describes the
range of substitutes for a good under consideration.
16The OPEC is an example of an explicit international cartel.
17Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) indicate that coordination is not possible in markets with
more than ﬁve ﬁrms.
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decrease, because the potential entrant anticipates that the incumbent will
decrease prices as soon as he enters. In sum, whether a market is contestable
depends on various factors beside entry costs, and should be judged case by
case.
Finally note that a high market share and an increase of market concen-
tration may result from successful investments. If a ﬁrm invests in cost
reducing technologies or demand increasing product improvements, demand
may switch from competitors to that ﬁrm. The market share of the investing
ﬁrm increases and concentration rises. Increased concentration is then not
the result of welfare decreasing high markups, but welfare enhancing invest-
ments. Therefore, a high degree of market concentration may be an indicator
that some ﬁrms are very eﬃcient, rather than exercising market power. All
these arguments indicate that a high degree of market concentration should
not per se be considered as negative. One must decide case by case whether
a high degree of market concentration goes hand in hand with the exercise
of market power.
What is the eﬀect of the MAI on competition? The MAI liberalizes foreign
investment. Its eﬀect on market concentration in the host countries is dif-
ﬁcult to assess. Two opposite hypotheses seem plausible from a theoretical
point of view: Multinational enterprizes may ﬁnd it easier to overcome entry
barriers compared to national ﬁrms, for instance because ﬁnancial constraints
are less binding. This tends to increase the number of ﬁrms in a market, and
market concentration declines. If this is the case, liberalization of foreign in-
vestment increases competition in host countries, and the exercise of market
power is less likely. Liberalization of foreign investment leads to less concen-
tration. The eﬀect of the MAI on market structure and aggregate welfare are
then positive. As a second hypothesis, multinational companies may reduce
competition in the host countries. This may be the case if multinational en-
terprizes drive out national companies due to technological advantages and
the realization of scale economies. This increases eﬃciency on the one hand,
but may also lead to a higher degree of market concentration on the other.
As a possible consequence, ﬁrms may better exercise market power.18
It may be diﬃcult to assess if the liberalization of foreign investment leads
to more market concentration in general. As the following chapters indicate,
there may be diﬀerences between the short run and in the long run. But
even if increased market concentration results from liberalization, one has
to consider whether ﬁrms are able to exercise market power. This depends
18Technological advantages lead also to lower costs, which tends to increase welfare.
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on market characteristics like demand elasticities, substitutability and the
degree of entry barriers. This has to be assessed case by case.
8.3.2 Short term eﬀects of direct investment
The last chapter contains two opposing statements about how a liberalization
of foreign investment might aﬀect market concentration. These statements
do not necessarily contradict each other, because short run and long run
eﬀects of increased foreign competition may be diﬀerent.
In the short run, the type of foreign investment determines which concentra-
tion eﬀects result. Unfortunately, only few studies deal with the question of
which type of market access a multinational chooses, and how this choice af-
fects market concentration in the short run.19 I will distinguish two forms as
polar cases, namely market access through merger and acquisition (M&A),
and market access through foundation of a new plant locations.20 These
two types have diﬀerent short run eﬀects on market concentration indicates.
Moreover, they are of great empirical relevance, because these two types
account for a great share of today´s direct foreign investment.21
Direct investment as foundation of new plant locations reduce market con-
centration in the short run. New market participants enter the domestic
market, which increases the number of ﬁrms and competition. In contrast,
mergers and acquisitions may increase market concentration. Whether this
is the case depends on diﬀerent factors and has to be examined case by case:
Suppose that a foreign investor acquires a domestic ﬁrm. The eﬀect on mar-
ket concentration depends on the relationship between the investor and the
takeover candidate before the acquisition. If the domestic company competes
with the exports of the acquiring ﬁrm, the acquisition leads to reduced com-
petition and increases market concentration. If in contrast the domestic ﬁrms
do not compete with exports of the investor, market concentration is not af-
fected. It may even decrease. Consider for instance the case where ﬁrms in
the domestic market are heterogenous: The acquired ﬁrm is small compared
19 Compare Walter (1993), Buckley and Casson (1998), Hennart and Park (1993), Caves
and Mehra (1986) in the context of multinational enterprizes. General industrial economics
approaches towards mergers and acquisitions and their eﬀect on market structure and
welfare are for instance Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990), Barros and Cabral (1994) and
Aydemir and Schmutzler (2002).
20Other types are for instance licensing or franchising.
21Friedman, Gerloski and Silberman (1992), UNCTAD (1998b), and UNCTAD (2001),
p. xiii.
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to its competitors and lacks productivity in the domestic market without the
investor. The acquisition may then lead to a transfer of know how and new
production skills, which increases productivity and the size of the acquired
company. Thus mergers and acquisitions may increase competition even in
the short run.
The eﬀect of foreign investment on market concentration and competition
depends on the type of investment and speciﬁc market conditions. But which
type of investment do companies choose? This question is subject to further
research. Existing studies (compare footnote 19) indicate that the following
factors plays a role: If speed of entry plays an important role, ﬁrms prefer
foreign investment as mergers and acquisitions. This is also the case if ﬁrms
intend to stay close to a market competitor, who is already present in a
market which is strategically important. In contrast, cultural diﬀerences
between the acquiring and the acquired ﬁrms tend to increase the costs of
a merger. Accordingly, if cultural diﬀerences play an important role, direct
investment as foundations of new plant locations are more likely.
8.3.3 Long term eﬀects of direct investment
Long run eﬀects of the MAI on market concentration depends mainly on two
aspects. First, multinational companies may be able to drive national ﬁrms
out of markets. Moreover, multinationals may ﬁnd it easier than domestic
ﬁrms to erect market entry barriers.22 The empirical evidence is ambivalent:23
Foreign investment in industrialized countries tends to decrease market con-
centration in the long run. Competition increases through direct investment,
which indicates that the MAI has positive welfare eﬀects in these countries.
In contrast, foreign investment in less developed countries (LDCs) leads to an
increase of market concentration in the long run. Multinational companies
tend to drive national companies out of markets. This is due to technological
advantages and the use of scale economies. Accordingly, the welfare eﬀect
of a broad liberalization of foreign investment in LDCs is diﬃcult to assess.
Market concentration and the exercise of market power may increase, which
tends to decrease aggregate welfare in these markets. On the other side, pro-
ductivity improvements lead to lower costs and reduce prices, which tends to
increase aggregate welfare.
22For instance, multinationals might use transfer prices to collect proﬁts in regions with
small taxes, which gives them strategically advantages over national ﬁrms.
23Compare Dunning (1974), Kumar (1990), Ratnayake (1999), Lall (1979), Petrochilas
(1989), Jenkins (1990).
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A second aspect relates to the exercise of market power. The broad liber-
alization of foreign investment through the MAI may have positive welfare
eﬀects, even if the market structure does not change in a speciﬁc country.
This is a contestable market argument: Suppose that the MAI does not
induce more foreign investment in a certain country. It may nevertheless im-
prove aggregate welfare there, if multinational companies overcome market
barriers easier than national companies. The mere threat to enter a market
may be suﬃcient to induce competitive pricing. In this case, prices decline
and aggregate welfare improves, even though the market structure remains
the same. Empirical studies show that the aspect of contestable markets may
play an important role.24
8.3.4 Competition for direct investment
Governments often try to inﬂuence the location decision of companies. They
grant subsidies or loopholes for speciﬁc regulations, which tends to decrease
taxes or costs. As stated in chapter 8.2, the contents of the MAI imply that
regional competition increases. Foreign investors improve their bargaining
position against national governments. The question arises if the induced
intensiﬁcation of regional competition through the MAI improves aggregate
welfare.
The following model by Rauscher (1995) gives a basic intuition how regional
competition eﬀects aggregate welfare.25 It analyzes strategic interactions be-
tween a single multinational enterprize and representatives of various identi-
cal regions. The multinational serves all regions, creating a consumer surplus
in each region that is independent of its production location.26 In each re-
gion, market demand and cost conditions are identical, except possibly for
emission taxes, which increase variable costs (and thus reduce the supply
of the good). Emission taxes are set by each region in the ﬁrst stage of
the game, because production causes pollution, which is strictly local. That
is, environmental damage occurs only in the host country of the enterprize.
Environmental damage is the same in each region. Jurisdictions maximize
24Compare Shapiro (1983), Geroski (1991).
25The following description follows the survey on regional competition by Schmutzler
and Polk (2001) closely. Janeba (2000) provides an analysis which combines the view that
multinational companies beneﬁt from regional competition, with the idea that governments
may potentially exploit multinationals once an investment has been made. Compare also
the quoted literature there.
26The model assumes away transportation costs.
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welfare, which consists of the sum of local tax revenue and local consumer
surplus minus local environmental damage. The multinational decides about
the production location in the second stage of the game, which is the region
with the lowest taxes. Finally, the multinational serves all regions from the
local production plant.
The basic insight of this model is that, even in the absence of global envi-
ronmental pollution, diﬀerent market equilibria may emerge. The reason is
that environmental damage and tax revenues arise only in the host country,
whereas all countries realize consumption rents. I restrict the analysis to two
polar cases, which I entitle as ”strong regional competition” and ”not-in-
my-backyard”-politics. In the ﬁrst case, countries opt for lax environmental
regulation to attract the investment. Strong regional competition exists, and
environmental regulation is too small. In the latter case, no region wants to
bear the burden of local environmental pollution, even though production in
general is desirable. When do these cases arise?
Strong regional competition arises if local environmental pollution through
production is very small. In this case, tax income from local production
outweighs the welfare eﬀect of environmental pollution. Accordingly, each
country is interested to win the competition for the plant decision. As only
the country with the lowest regulations gets the foreign investment, all coun-
tries face incentives to lower regulation. Strong regional competition results,
which leads to ineﬃcient under regulation of the ﬁrm. On the contrary, if en-
vironmental pollution is very high, disadvantages from local production exist.
In this case, tax revenue and domestic consumer welfare are not enough to
outweigh environmental pollution from local production. Each country sets
high emission taxes to deter local production. As all the countries employ
this ”not-in-my-backyard”-behavior, no production takes place in any region
and consumer welfare will not be realized. A prisoners’ dilemma results:
Due to strict regulation, no investment takes place, even though production
is desirable from an aggregate welfare point of view.
As the preceding model indicates, regional competition is eﬃcient with re-
spect to the location decision of the multinational ﬁrm. The ﬁrm invests
where environmental regulation is small, which minimizes tax payments. But
the extent of regulation is ineﬃcient. Regulation tends to be too strict if envi-
ronmental pollution is high. If it is low, strong regional competition emerges
and regulation tends to be too low. This result, namely eﬃcient regulation
with respect to the location decision, but ineﬃcient regulation with regard
to allocative aspects, is relatively robust to variations of the theme.
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The MAI intensiﬁes regional competition, which tends to decrease allocative
eﬃciency. In contrast, locational eﬃciency improves. In reality, these two
eﬀects have to be weighed against each other, which may be subject of further
research.
8.4 Propositions for a new MAI
I will develop three theses in this chapter:
• Foreign investment aﬀects market structure and competition. A multi-
lateral agreement on investment needs to consider these eﬀects. It can
either implement own competition rules, or explicitly state the primacy
of national competition laws.
• If a future agreement implements regulations on competition policies,
the term ”Investment” needs more careful speciﬁcation.
• A far reaching liberalization of foreign investment ﬂows can only ex-
hibit its positive eﬀects on growth, productivity and employment, if
all countries have well functioning competition authorities. A multi-
national agreement on investment should only be implemented, if it
includes active support for the creation of competition authorities in
all countries, especially in LCDs.
Before I justify these theses, let me ﬁrst state that the higher degree of re-
gional competition has no negative consequences in my opinion: I discussed
theoretical approaches concerning the eﬀect of foreign investment on com-
petition between regions in chapter 8.3.4. The discussion concluded that no
clear statement can be made about the eﬀect of increased regional competi-
tion on aggregate welfare. Suppose that further research indicates that tough
regional competition reduces aggregate welfare. Even then no argument in
favor of discrimination of foreign investors should be deduced. The MAI
prohibits discriminating behavior against foreign investors, but not a gen-
eral prohibition of certain types of investment. Accordingly, a country may
impose general investment regulations if it turns out that regional competi-
tion is bad. The binding condition is that these aﬀect foreign and domestic
ﬁrms in the same way. For instance, a government might impose a regula-
tion which restricts the maximum amount of investment subsidies, or it may
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prohibit the construction of new sites for nuklear energy. These types of
regulation are allowed as long as they aﬀect domestic and foreign investors
in the same way. They are only prohibited if they lead to discrimination of
foreign investors against domestic ones. And to my point of view, nothing is
bad about this particular prohibition of discrimination.
In addition, the MAI foresees a rule which implies that once granted subsidies
must be open to all investors in similar situations in the future. This rule
increases the cost of a singular subsidy substantially, because a country must
consider its expected future cost. If competition between regions turns out to
be bad, the implied higher costs of subsidies through the MAI tend to reduce
these ineﬃciencies. In sum, even if increased regional competition turns out
to decrease aggregate welfare, this should not be used to deduce arguments
for discriminating behavior against foreign investors.
8.4.1 Integration of competition policy aspects
The detailed eﬀects of a liberalization of foreign investment on market struc-
ture and concentration depend on the speciﬁc circumstances in which foreign
investment is carried out (compare chapter 8.3). But it is undebatable that a
broad liberalization of foreign investment aﬀects market structure and com-
petition. Hence a multilateral agreement should consider competition policy
concerns. It should be open to rules which prevent negative competition
eﬀects in the member states, which may be induced through the general lib-
eralization of foreign investment ﬂows. The draft of the MAI lacks such an
approach.
The form of integration is debatable. The question is whether competition
rules should be explicitly integrated in such an agreement on a multilateral
basis. Or is it preferable to foresee a clause which acknowledges the primacy
of national competition laws, but leads the implementation and integration
of these rules to the member states? This question is subject to current
debates.27
Consider for instance the following argument in favor of central competition
policy rules. The existence of multinational enterprizes leads to interdepen-
dencies between national competition policies, which gives incentives to set
competition policy strategically: A national government is interested to as-
27Compare for instance Basedow (1998), Rosenthal and Nicolaides (1997), Ha¨rtel (1999),
Barros and Cabral (1994).
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sure strong competition in its domestic market, which maximizes national
welfare. But suppose that this country is the host of a multinational en-
terprize, which produces in a foreign country. Moreover, suppose that its
proﬁts can be transferred to the home country. Then the country beneﬁts
from relatively lax competition in the foreign country, which increases proﬁts
there. Accordingly, if countries have asymmetric political strength, countries
may face incentives to implement diﬀerent standards of competition policy
in diﬀerent regions. Welfare reducing distortions in the product markets can
then be expected.28 This is an argument in favor of a central competition
authority within the MAI. But there are also arguments against it: It may
be easier for interest groups to inﬂuence a single central authority compared
to several national ones, as Laﬀont and Tirole (1993) indicate. Moreover,
a central authority eliminates competition between institutions, which may
not be desirable.
If the member states decide to centrally implement competition rules in
the agreement, concrete laws need to be worked out. Moreover, member
states must agree to implement an eﬀective dispute settlement body, which
promotes the factual realization and accordance to these rules. Eﬀective
punishment measures are crucial, otherwise the body would degenerate to
a tiger without teeth. On the other side, if the agreement includes rules
on competition policies at a decentral basis, competence for legislation and
implementation remains with the authorities of the member states. The
agreement should then foresee a primacy of competition concerns about the
liberalization of investment. The formulation, implementation and execu-
tion of concrete competition laws would then be left to the authorities of the
member states.
8.4.2 Specifying the meaning of ”Investment”
As sections 8.3.1 to 8.3.3 indicate, the eﬀect of foreign investment on market
structure and competition depends on its type. Accordingly, a multilateral
agreement on investment needs to diﬀerentiate between diﬀerent types of
foreign investment. The deﬁnition of the term ”Investment” in the MAI is
too general. For instance, the agreement treats portfolio investment in the
same way as traditional direct investment. These two types have diﬀerent
characteristics, as portfolio investment are made on a short term basis, and
risk diversiﬁcation plays a crucial role. Portfolio investments entail stability
28Caves (1996), Chapter 4; Empirical references can be found in OECD (1974).
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risks for the receiving country, and aﬀect corporate planning in a diﬀerent
way as long term direct investment.29 In contrast, portfolio investments do
not aﬀect market structure and competition, which direct investment does.
Long term oriented direct investment aﬀects market structure and compe-
tition in the receiving and the host countries, which should be considered
in a multilateral agreement. If a future agreement foresees the primacy of
competition laws upon the liberalization of investment ﬂows, but leaves the
implementation to the member states, a broad diﬀerentiation of the term
”Investment” seems suitable. However, if the agreement will explicitly in-
tegrate corresponding regulations on a multilateral basis, the term ”Invest-
ment” needs much more detailed diﬀerentiation in order to comply with the
diﬀerent eﬀects of various investment types. As explained in chapter 8.3.2,
e.g. mergers has other eﬀects on market structure and competition, as the
creation of new plant locations. The very far-reaching and general deﬁni-
tion of the MAI does not allow such a diﬀerentiation. It should be extended
accordingly.
8.4.3 Promotion of competition authorities in LDCs
I discuss possible negative eﬀects of foreign direct investment on LDCs in
chapter 8.3.3. The analysis hints at the increasing importance of well func-
tioning and eﬃciently working competition authorities. A multilateral agree-
ment serves to liberalize direct investment ﬂows, with the aim to increase
competition. The framework must assure that these positive eﬀects can in
fact be realized. This is not the case if increased liberalization leads to less
competition. In this case, the MAI may create negative eﬀects on mar-
ket structure and competition, which decreases aggregate welfare especially
in LDCs. Accordingly, the implementation of a multilateral agreement on
investment should only be undertaken, if it simultaneously promotes the es-
tablishment of eﬃcient competition authorities in LDCs.
If an agreement foresees that competition policy remains in the hands of the
member states, it should be considered that many LDCs lack well function-
ing competition authorities.30 To guarantee competition in these countries,
a multilateral agreement should then promote the implementation of well
functioning competition authorities in LDCs. If this is not the case, nega-
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tive eﬀects on market structure and competition may result in less developed
countries. Positive eﬀects on growth and development may be weakened in
these countries, and even be converted into a negative welfare eﬀects.
8.5 Is the WTO a suitable forum for a future
MAI?
If a multilateral agreement on investment will be implemented in the future:
What is a suitable forum for its realization? The OECD is not appropriate
for two reasons: First, it seems rather unlikely that the OECD resumes
negotiations after its ﬁrst failure. Second, the limited sphere of inﬂuence
of the OECD speaks against this organization, as it does not represent the
group of less developed countries.
The WTO can play an important role for the integration of such an agree-
ment.31 It already has an extended mandate beyond the ﬁeld of international
trade in some respects. It touches the ﬁelds of direct investment, trade and
competition policy, in as much as these ﬁelds are linked to questions of in-
ternational trade policy. Therefore an integrative and broad approach to
regulate these associated ﬁelds within the WTO seems reasonable.32 Con-
sider for instance the recent negotiations between China and the European
Union for a Chinese entry into the WTO. Access to the Chinese telecommu-
nication market was of special interest to the EU. So the countries agreed
that European companies are allowed to purchase minority stakes of Chinese
telecommunication companies of up to 49%. Remarkably, this WTO agree-
ment essentially regulates the liberalization of foreign investment, and does
not exclusively refer to mere trade policies.
The WTO has also established structures to elaborate, realize and integrate
multilateral agreements. The dispute settlement mechanisms are relatively
eﬀective. Recently, the settlement body accomplished that member states
abide to the contents of the WTO agreements.33 A dispute settling mecha-
nism must be integrated into a multilateral agreement on investment. As its
eﬀectiveness is crucial for a good implementation, the WTO appears to be a
31For argument in favor of an implementation within the WTO, compare Ganesan
(1998). Arguments against an implementation gives Hartwig (1999).
32Compare also OECD (1999a), OECD (1999b).
33Information on current and past proceedings can be found at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dispu e/dispu status e.htm.
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suitable platform.
Another advantage is that less developed countries are represented within the
WTO. Of course, their political weight and their representation in working
groups is not comparable to the US, the EU or Japan. This should be
improved with a multilateral agreement on investment, such that all countries
are in fact able to coordinate own interests and bring them forth within
the WTO. Other forums, as for example the UNCTAD, would probably
better represent the interests of LDCs. But it would be doubtful whether
the member states of the OECD agreed to such a forum.
A transfer of the MAI to the WTO generates political costs. For instance,
members of the OECD and the WTO face diﬀerent interests, as Hartwig
(1999) argues. But this is not an argument that an agreement should be
restricted to the OECD. If an agreement on investment is ever going to be




This book dealt with special interest inﬂuence on policy decisions. Chap-
ters 2 to 5 gave an overview of theoretical approaches towards lobbying and
analyzed the two main lobbying channels. With the inﬂuence motive for
lobbying, the focus lies on contribution payments in exchange for favorable
policies. The idea is that politicians follow individual objectives which depart
from welfare maximization. The political arena is viewed as a market, and
politicians supply special beneﬁts in exchange for money. Contributions may
consist of legal donations (i.e. public campaign spending) or illegal bribes
(i.e. black money), but the concept is of broader scope and goes beyond
pure money oﬀers. For instance, contributions may be interpreted as jobs
oﬀered to politicians for after incumbency, or even political mobilization of
a speciﬁc clientele like trade-union members or addicts of the tabloid press.
Contributions may also be interpreted as investments which are necessary to
get access to the political sphere. These may be costs for the maintenance
of lobbying bureaus, professional political entrepreneurs on the payroll, or
outlays for extensive networking.
The second channel of inﬂuence does not rely on the assumption that politi-
cians are self-interested. The idea of the inﬂuence motive for lobbying is
that politicians face restrictions which prevent them from being fully in-
formed about the policy eﬀect on aggregate welfare. Lobbies, in contrast,
are better informed, which gives politicians incentives to listen to interest
groups. Time constraints, workload of politicians or pecuniary reasons are
not the sole examples why this may be the case.1 Companies often posses
1Policy decisions often have strong impacts on certain sectors, as for instance trade
liberalization on agribusiness, environmental regulation on the chemical or car industry,
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information not available to the public, such as data on costs and demand,
technological knowledge etc. This information is valuable to politicians who
try to implement the welfare maximizing policy. Hence interest groups have
incentives to strategically inform politicians about policy eﬀects, and politi-
cians face incentives to listen to those groups.
The welfare eﬀect of lobbying depends on the channel of inﬂuence and may be
positive or negative. Suppose that lobbying takes the form of contribution
payments in exchange for political favors. As indicated in chapters 2 and
3, aggregate welfare declines if politicians deviate from ﬁrst best practices,
incurring deadweight losses on the expense of the public. A prohibition on
lobbying increases aggregate welfare according to this approach. The extent
of the welfare loss through lobbying depends on the relevant policy ﬁeld and
the degree of interest group organization: If lobbying competition is weak
and only some groups with possibly joint interests organize, negative welfare
eﬀects are more intense due to special interest inﬂuence. In contrast, if all rel-
evant groups organize, opposing interests cancel each other out and lobbying
has only minor eﬀects on aggregate welfare. Thus, a prohibition on lobbying
is more valuable in policy areas where one-sided interest group pressure pre-
vails. Moreover, it depends on the extent of the politician’s care for aggregate
welfare if lobbying inﬂuence is intense. If we postulate that politicians care
for aggregate welfare in policies attracting much public attention (and care
less about welfare in apparently unimportant ﬁelds), lobbying will be more
successful in seemingly unpopular policy areas. As a consequence, negative
welfare eﬀects through lobbying can be expected in policy ﬁelds which are
economically important but raise little public attention. In contrast, lobby-
ing in policy ﬁelds with much public attention is less eﬀective, especially if
competing interests inﬂuence the political process.2
In contrast to the case of contribution payments, lobbying as information
transmission tends to be welfare enhancing. As chapter 4 indicated, details
depend on signalling costs, the degree of lobbying competition, and the extent
of the politician’s ex ante information. For instance, if signalling costs are
high enough to separate between interest groups which tell the truth and
others, aggregate welfare (gross of lobbying costs) increases. If the degree of
information is high even without lobbying, the politician extracts only little
new information. The gain from lobbying is rather small in this case. It may
or health regulation on the tobacco industry. These groups have high stakes in a certain
type of regulation, whereas politicians must deal with many policy issues.
2The lack of public attention may be an explanation why the pharmaceutical industry
in Germany has a strong inﬂuence on political decisions.
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even be negative if lobbying costs are taken into account, because lobbying
eﬀorts may be unproductive activities and incur a welfare loss (Bhagwati
1995). Strong lobbying competition has ambiguous eﬀects: On the one hand,
information available to the politician increases; on the other hand, more
uninformative money is spent in the lobbying process.
The distribution of gains from lobbying depends on various factors. Politi-
cians always beneﬁt because they could alternatively foreclose access to in-
terest groups if they did not. Lobbying provides beneﬁts either in the form
of contribution payments or transmission of new information, and politicians
can always do at least as good with lobbying as without.
The eﬀect of lobbying on unorganized interests depends on the channel
of political inﬂuence. If lobbying takes on the form of contribution pay-
ments, politicians deviate from welfare maximizing policies in order to attract
money. Unorganized interests lose in this case, because lobbies and politi-
cians increase their payoﬀ at the expense of the unorganized public. The
best possible outcome for unorganized interests is that lobbying induces no
costs, which occurs if lobbying competition is strong and mere counteractive
eﬀects occur. On the other hand, unorganized interests beneﬁt from lobby-
ing if it involves the transmission of information. Although lobbies now and
then mislead the politician to the disadvantage of the public, the quality of
political decisions improves on average in this case. Intense competition be-
tween interest groups tends to increase the informational gain from lobbying,
which beneﬁts unorganized interests.
Payoﬀs to organized interests depend essentially on the degree of lobbying
competition. Beneﬁts tend to to decrease if lobbying competition is intense.
For instance, a single lobby facing no competition is able to extract the
full rent created through the political interaction if lobbying is in the form
of contribution payments. In contrast, lobbies are caught up in ineﬃcient
activities if lobbying competition is strong. In this case, interests groups
tend to lose because they are forced to engage in costly activities without
getting extra beneﬁts and lobbying serves merely to prevent them from being
outsiders in the political game. Groups therefore face incentives to cooperate
if lobbying competition is strong, or may even beneﬁt from a prohibition of
lobbying.
These insights are broadly valid for both types of inﬂuence channels, even
though subtleties remain. For instance, lobbies’ payoﬀs depend on the eﬃ-
ciency of the available policy instrument: With weak lobbying competition,
more eﬃcient means of redistribution tend to increase payoﬀs, because small
- 152-
The Economics of Lobbying Conclusions
contribution payments suﬃce to compensate the politician in this case. This
reverses if lobbying competition is strong. In this case, obligatory compen-
sation payments need to be high in order to prevent the politician from
implementing unfavorable policies with eﬃcient means of redistribution. As
a second example, consider the free-riding aspect of lobbying which occurs
if interest groups follow a common interest. The total beneﬁt of lobbying
is high since counteractive lobbying eﬀorts are small in this case. But the
distribution of gains depends on the ability to free-ride, which may under-
mine eﬀective lobbying. This aspect has been worked out in greater detail
in the context of environmental regulation in chapter 6. It indicates that
the extent of free-riding may also depend on the politician’s responsiveness
towards diﬀerent types of lobbying, and on the policy at stake.
Chapters 2 to 5 led to the conclusion that relevant policy ﬁelds for eﬀective
lobbying from an interest group’s point of view are characterized by weak
lobbying competition and little public attention. Strong informational ad-
vantages vis a vis governments makes lobbying more attractive to interest
groups, and eﬃcient policy instruments decrease the cost of redistribution.
Politician’s, in contrast, gain from strong lobbying competition. As interest
groups they gain from little public attention and prefer eﬃcient means of re-
distribution. It is noteworthy that politicians always beneﬁt from lobbying,
whereas lobbies may lose. It is therefore not surprising that politicians have
only small incentives to prohibit lobbying.
Chapter 6 investigated the instrument choice by lobbies and its eﬀect on
environmental regulation. Interest groups have two elementary means to
inﬂuence the political process, which aﬀects the degree of lobbying compe-
tition. They compete with respect to private lobbying eﬀorts, but follow a
common interest through general lobbying. If the politician becomes more re-
sponsive to private lobbying, competition between interest groups increases.
As a result, both groups tend to cut back on general lobbying and increase
private lobbying instead. Environmental regulation becomes stricter in this
case since joint engagement against environmental regulation attenuates and
interest groups are trapped in ineﬃcient redistributive battles.
The analysis indicated that responsiveness towards private lobbying does
not necessarily undermine environmental regulation. Granting loopholes to
individual pollutants may increase environmental quality because lobbying
competition increases, which diverts from harmful lobbying against regula-
tion in general. Moreover, if the responsiveness towards private lobbying
is interpreted as a parameter indicating policy discretion, a higher degree
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of general regulation can be expected if a certain policy goal is achievable
through several alternative instruments.
Chapter 7 applied the common agency framework to the regulation of multi-
national enterprizes. It investigated whether multinationals face stronger
incentives to engage in lobbying activities than national ﬁrms. There is a nat-
ural force towards less regulation of multinationals, because the possibility to
relocate production reduces the stakes in domestic regulation. However, the
extent of regulation depends also on its eﬀect on aggregate welfare. If the
multinational’s ability to relocate production is important and has strong
negative welfare eﬀects, less regulation of multinationals may occur. The
model also implied that the possibility of lobbying beneﬁts national ﬁrms to
a greater extent than multinationals, simply because this channel of inﬂuence
is less important for multinationals.
Chapter 8 focused on regulation in practice. It analyzed the General Agree-
ment on Investment from an industrial economics point of view and criticized
the ﬁnal draft. Main shortcomings are the disregard of competition concerns,
the lack of support for LDCs, and the broad deﬁnition of the term ”invest-
ment”.
Let me conclude with an outlook to further research. To my opinion, beneﬁts
can be expected from further insights with respect to three areas of inter-
est. First, it is not yet well understood which channel of inﬂuence lobbies
choose. It can be observed that informational lobbying as well as contribu-
tion payments play an important role in reality, often both at the same time.
But what determines which type of lobbying occurs? Second, the question
of interest group formation is a long posed but not yet suﬃciently answered
issue. Theory indicates that small interest groups with large stakes in polit-
ical decisions eﬀectively inﬂuence policies. This can be observed in reality;
however, we also observe important inﬂuence by large groups, as for instance
labor unions in Europe, environmental groups like Greenpeace, or special
interest groups like the ADAC, a strong car lobby in Germany. This leads
room for further theoretical insights concerning group organization and its
inﬂuence on political decisions. Finally, theoretical research should always
go hand in hand with empirical investigation, but lobbying activities are dif-
ﬁcult to assess empirically. I see much scope for further research in this ﬁeld
especially with respect to European countries, where empirical research has
still been very scare. If data is diﬃcult to obtain, case studies may provide a
suitable form to get further insights how interest groups shape policies. And
it is undebatable that they do so to a huge extent.
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